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Governors
Mario Cuomo
George Deukmejian
on Campaign '84

Our Values:

How Have They Changed?

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with Daniel Yankelovich, Robert Shogan, Charlotte Hays,
Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter

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What Are Movie

I've been irritated by a strong presence within the film colony of films with an anti-Establishment message. In War Games, *the general is made to look a bloody idiot. I'd like to make films as politically strong as I can—not as Commie-bashing but to counteract movies like* The China Syndrome, Missing *and* Gandhi.

Euan Lloyd
Producer, *The Final Option*

Deal of the Century *deals with all the bribery and chicanery in the aerospace industry. Their motto is "Make the sale at any cost." Almost every incident depicted in the film is true. Most of the high-priced, advanced weaponry doesn't work. When a weapon fails, the military simply revises the conditions of the test.*

William Friedkin
Director, *Deal of the Century*

We believe that if you can find a movie that makes a statement and is entertaining, a film that's a little deeper than frivolous, it's an asset. The managers of movie companies don't sit around saying, "How do I feel about El Salvador?" They respond to a director who wants to make a particular film. If we feel that particular film is wise financially, we'll do it.

Michael Eisner
President, Paramount Pictures

(*New York Times*, September 10, 1983)

In the 1960s a number of movies dealt with social and political themes, but their creators argue that most were desperate efforts to capture the youth market. "They were simply the equivalent of bikini movies, made by a panic-stricken set of studio managers who were doing what they thought teenagers wanted," explained David Chasman, a former vice-president of United Artists, Columbia, and MGM. Since the 1960s few political films have come from major producers and studios—until this year. At least five opened this fall, and all but one share a socially conscious, anti-Establishment perspective.

Daniel revives the controversy over the Rosenberg espionage case; *Silkwood* takes on the nuclear industry; *Deal of the Century* confronts the arms industry and makes a "reasonably strong statement on the insanity of the arms race," according to its producer; *Under Fire* challenges Reagan policies in Nicaragua. Only *The Final Option* supports the moderate or hard political line—it transforms the Iranian hostage crisis so that the embassy is taken over by anti-nuclear activists depicted as communist terrorists.

Richard Grenier, *Commentary* magazine's film critic, would disagree that movies of the sixties were guilty only of a yen for commercial popularity. He argues that Hollywood movies have been predominantly left-leaning for some time, and that producers and directors are now merely making their private political preferences more explicit.

Is Grenier correct? Is the new crop of movies a public statement of moviemakers' personal politics? We can't fully answer these questions, but we can throw a little light on them. In 1982, as part of a general study

makers Made Of?

of leadership groups in the United States, we contacted a random sample of 149 writers, producers, and directors of the fifty top grossing films from 1965 through 1982. Our source was *Variety*.

Sixty-four percent of those contacted (ninety-six in all) completed the questionnaire. Those we interviewed are among the most successful of Hollywood's moviemakers.

As one might guess, the film world's creative community closely resembles that of prime-time television, a group on which we have reported in *Public Opinion* (December/January 1983). They are primarily white males with very large incomes, moderate to liberal economic attitudes, and a low regard for our institutions. Their social views are broadly humanistic, and they enthusiastically support certain aspects of the new morality that emerged in the 1960s. They believe that mass culture should be a force for social reform.

If our group is representative, then Hollywood moviemaking is almost exclusively the purview of white men. By and large they are urban and cosmopolitan, and over seven out of ten hail from either the West Coast or the Northeast. Their fathers tended to vote Democratic, they tend to vote Democratic, and two out of three call themselves political liberals. Sixty-two percent were raised as Jews, although fewer than half indicate a religious preference (compared to over 90 percent of the American populace), and only 4 percent attend church or synagogue regularly. Even those who do express a religious preference rarely grant organized religion an important role in their lives.

Sixty-four percent report family incomes of more than $200,000 a year. By contrast, fewer than 3 percent of the corporation executives we interviewed in 1980 can boast such high family incomes.

The movie moguls have clearly come a long way, although few started at the bottom of the economic

Table 1

BACKGROUNDS OF MOVIE ELITE

White	99%
Male	99
From metropolitan area	81
Northeast or West Coast	73
Father voted Democratic	70
Raised in Jewish religion	62
College graduate	63
Family income $200,000 and over	64
Political liberal	66
Religion none	55
Regular churchgoer	4

Table 2

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING RECORD OF THE MOVIE ELITE: 1968-80

1968	
Nixon	17%*
Humphrey	76
1972	
Nixon	18
McGovern	82
1976	
Ford	22
Carter	78
1980	
Reagan	29
Carter	51
Anderson	17

*Up to 9% voted for minor party candidates in some elections.

ladder. Only 23 percent come from working-class families, and the largest number (36 percent) say their fathers were businessmen. The same proportion describe their childhood financial situations as relatively well off.

The movie elites overwhelmingly prefer Democratic presidential candidates. In the last four presidential elections, no Republican candidate outpolled the 29 percent garnered by Ronald Reagan in 1980 (see table 2). In 1968, Nixon received only 17 percent of their vote, and in 1972 only 18 percent. In that year George McGovern received a whopping 82 percent of the moviemakers' vote, the highest of any Democratic candidate in the four elections about which we asked.

The movie elites' liberal self-image and presidential voting record is quite consistent with their attitudes on social and political questions, as table 3 reveals, though their economic attitudes are closer to the mainstream.

Like the television elite, the moviemakers prefer the principles of private enterprise to those that underlie socialism. Only 15 percent believe that large corporations should be nationalized. Close to seven out of ten believe that private enterprise is fair to workers, and almost half favor reducing government regulation of industry. On the other hand, they firmly believe in expanding the welfare state. Forty-five percent think that the government should guarantee jobs for all, and almost seven in ten would like to see the government "substantially reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor." Yet, they are not complete egalitarians, for a resounding 96 percent believe that people with more ability should earn more.

While the movie elites support capitalism as an economic system, they are alienated from the society in other ways. Almost nine out of ten believe that the legal system favors the wealthy, and over 60 percent agree that the very structure of our society produces alienation. In addition, over seven out of ten are convinced that public officials really do not care about the average person. Only one out of eight believes those in authority usually know best. Not surprisingly, over half think that American institutions need a complete overhaul. Their alienation is, in fact, somewhat more pronounced than that of the television elite. For example, 43 percent of the television people supported a total overhaul of American institutions, and 65 percent were convinced that public officials were uninterested in helping the ordinary citizen.

The movie elites, like other elites we've studied, are compassionate about disadvantaged groups. They are not the strongest advocates of affirmative action for blacks—and even less so for women—but they do express strong support for those at the bottom of the ladder. Over 50 percent regard the poor as victims of cir-

I'M SICK OF IT... ANOTHER FALL LINE UP OF SEX AND VIOLENCE, SEX AND VIOLENCE...

cumstance, and large majorities reject all other descriptions of the disadvantaged as responsible for their own fate. They are, however, quite pessimistic about the possibility of ending discrimination in their lifetime; only one out of five believes that this can be accomplished.

Table 3
MOVIE ELITE ATTITUDES ON SOCIAL ISSUES

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Economics				
Government should redistribute income	26%	33%	25%	14%
Government should guarantee jobs	17	21	34	28
Big corporations should be publicly owned	3	12	30	52
Private enterprise is fair to workers	17	50	22	11
Less regulation of business is good for U.S.	15	34	35	14
People with more ability should earn more	64	30	3	2
Alienation				
U.S. institutions need complete overhaul	15	36	24	23
Structure of society causes alienation	21	41	28	9
U.S. legal system favors wealthy	53	35	7	6
Public officials don't care about average man	30	42	21	4
People in authority usually know best	0	12	37	51
Disadvantaged Groups				
Women are better off at home	1	8	19	70
Women should get preference in hiring	8	24	50	19
Blacks lack education to advance	36	37	20	4
Blacks lack motivation to advance	7	14	28	48
Black gains come at white expense	1	8	25	65
Blacks should get preference in hiring	9	36	37	18
Whites and nonwhites should not marry	3	12	20	64
Discrimination can be ended	7	13	17	64
Poor people are victims of circumstance	13	39	37	9
Foreign Policy				
More forceful with Russians	13	17	26	42
CIA overthrows sometimes necessary	18	26	23	40
Foreign policy protects business	35	39	17	8
Sex and Morality				
Woman has right to decide on abortion	92	4	0	2
Homosexuality is wrong	7	21	24	45
Homosexuals shouldn't teach in schools	4	9	22	64
Adultery is wrong	13	29	40	19

The moviemakers tend to be rather "dovish" in foreign policy. Only 30 percent of them think that we should be more forceful with the Russians, and only four out of ten believe that it is ever legitimate for the CIA to attempt to undermine hostile regimes. Three-fourths of them agree that the primary purpose of American foreign policy has been to protect business interests.

Finally, the movie industry elites tend to support a rather liberal moral ethic. Sixty percent maintain that adultery is not wrong; indeed, fewer than one in seven strongly condemns extramarital sex. Ninety-six percent believe that women should have the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion. Only 28 percent believe that homosexuality is wrong, and almost nine out of ten support the right of homosexuals to teach in public schools.

The movie elites seek new leaders as well as new directions for American society. We asked them to rate ten leadership groups according to the influence they wield in American life, and then to indicate their own preferences for how much each *should* wield. Their responses closely matched those of the television elite.

As table 4 indicates, in the moviemakers' eyes, the most influential groups in the United States are the media, business, and government agencies, with the

"Sure it was lousy, but it was better than reality."

media and business almost tied at the top of the ladder. At the other end, intellectuals, black leaders, and feminists ranked as the three least influential.

Given the choice, the moviemakers would turn that ordering almost on its head. Intellectuals would rank first, closely followed by consumer groups, then the media, and black leaders. The bureaucracy, religious leaders, and the military would drop to the bottom.

The relatively moderate stance of the moviemakers on economic issues is again displayed in their view of the appropriate place for business. While they would sharply reduce its influence, they do not (unlike the public interest group leaders we interviewed) place business at the very bottom of the scale.

The moviemakers' politics are reflected in their ratings of the reliability of various sources of information on public affairs issues. The *New York Times* heads the list of reliable information sources, as it did with most other elite groups. Public Broadcasting System (PBS), whose staff is the most liberal of the national media we studied, ranks second, with *Newsweek* third. The very liberal *New York Review of Books* tops the list among journals of opinion, with a reliability rating above that of *Time*, and well above television news and the *Los Angeles Times*. The left-leaning *Nation* and the neoliberal *New Republic* follow, with the conservative *National Review* and the neoconservative *Commentary* next; the *Public Interest* trailed far behind.

Table 4
RANKS OF INFLUENCE AMONG LEADERSHIP GROUPS

Perceived Influence		Preferred Influence	
1. Media	(5.8)	1. Intellectuals	(5.0)
2. Business	(5.6)	2. Consumer Groups	(4.6)
3. Government Agencies	(4.9)	3. Media	(4.0)
4. Labor Unions	(4.5)	4. Black Leaders	(3.8)
5. Military	(4.0)	5. Business	(3.8)
6. Religion	(3.4)	6. Feminists	(3.7)
7. Consumer Groups	(3.4)	7. Labor Unions	(3.3)
8. Intellectuals	(2.9)	8. Government Agencies	(3.0)
9. Black Leaders	(2.7)	9. Religion	(2.7)
10. Feminists	(2.6)	10. Military	(2.0)

Table 5
RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION SOURCES
(% rating reliable)

1. *New York Times*
2. PBS
3. *Newsweek*
4. *New York Review of Books*
5. *Time*
6. *U.S. News and World Report*
7. TV Network News
8. *Nation*
9. *New Republic*
10. *Los Angeles Times*
11. *National Review*
12. *Commentary*
13. *Public Interest*

Table 6
MOVIE ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD TV ENTERTAINMENT

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
TV should promote social reform	32%	35%	14%	17%
TV should be realistic	39	33	18	9
TV is too critical of traditional values	1	18	33	48
There is too much sex on TV	8	15	43	33
There is too much violence on TV	38	29	22	12

Our last set of questions concerned attitudes toward TV entertainment. Here again the views of the moviemakers parallel the opinions of those who create prime-time television drama. They agree with most Americans that there is too much violence on television. On the other hand, fewer than one in four, as compared to three-quarters of the general population, believes that television contains too much sex. Over seven out of ten believe that television should be realistic, and close to seven out of ten believe that television should promote social reform (see table 6).

Leading moviemakers are, like our television elite, a liberal cosmopolitan group which is quite critical of major aspects of American life. If they were searching to capture the youth market in the 1960s, it was a congenial search, and if the new wave of political films are successful, our findings suggest that, in the future, such films will tend to support an anti-Establishment perspective.

Without a systematic content analysis we cannot evaluate Grenier's contention that even many supposedly nonpolitical movies in the 1970s took an anti-Establishment perspective. On the other hand, preliminary findings from Linda Lichter's content analysis of prime-time television programs strongly suggests that the liberal anti-Establishment views of television producers and writers do affect the content of shows which are, overtly, purely concerned with entertainment values. Can the moviemakers be far behind?

This essay is part of a larger study of American social and political elites conducted under the auspices of Smith College, The Research Institute on International Change of Columbia University, and George Washington University. The study is directed by Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter. Interviews of the Hollywood elite were conducted by Carol Davis Services, a California survey research firm.

Stanley Rothman is Mary Huggins Gamble professor of government at Smith College. S. Robert Lichter is an assistant professor of political science at George Washington University and a senior research fellow at Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change.

VALUES: GENERATIONS APART

OR WHY THE COLLEGE CAMPUSES ARE QUIET AGAIN (ARE THEY?) AND EXPLAINING THE BIG CHILL

People often assume that social change is linear. Thus, discussions of changes in American values over the past two decades have frequently tried to fit things into a neat progression toward more social "liberalism" or more "conservatism." Daniel Yankelovich argues that things are more complex than that—and we agree with him.

Yankelovich's view helps explain the value shifts we show on the following pages. At the beginning of a period of change, he observes, there is a kind of unthinking reaction against a broad collection of established mores and rules. Whatever it is that is generating change, it is expressed as a generalized impulse, especially among groups in the forefront—commonly the young, and in the United States the young college population. Eventually, some proponents of change begin to look critically at *some* of the results, while they continue to applaud others. Opponents regroup. Thus begins the second—or "sorting out"—stage. Some progressions of values are carried ahead, while others are reversed. A new "package" results, different from what was obtained before the changes began, but different, too, from the "reaction" stage.

In this period of value change, 1965-1975 appears to have been the core of the first "reaction" stage, while the late 1970s and the early 1980s have been the second "sorting out" stage. The latter is still going on, and its results are becoming clearer.

Early studies and commentaries on the first stage reaction—such as Charles Reich's *The Greening of America*—focused on young people with college training, and for good reason: The general impulses to change the society were especially prominent in this group. For both social and psychological reasons, the young are the foremost partisans of the new. The college experience further encourages them to question ideas and values.

Now as we examine the "sorting out" stage, we need to be similarly attentive to the young college cohort. For just as they provided a kind of overstatement of the initial reaction, so too are they likely to encapsulate the type of questioning that distinguishes the sorting out process.

In the first part of Opinion Roundup (pages 22-26), we show a broad cluster of issues on which the young generally, and the college-trained in particular, now appear more conservative than their counterparts of a decade ago. For example, 68 percent of the college cohort 18-24 years of age in the early 1970s described extramarital sex as generally wrong; 85 percent of the age 18-24 year college population of the early 1980s say it is wrong. Just 35 percent of the young college group of the early 1970s favored the death penalty; 67 percent of the current young college cohort support the death penalty for convicted murderers.

The first cluster of issues is diverse, but it does reveal a common theme: *a renewed attentiveness to societal needs*. As the "sorting out" proceeds, the young are finding important areas where they are less inclined than their counterparts of a decade ago to downplay the old emphasis on the needs of society that "traditional values" reflected.

The idea of "political generations" holds that people develop distinctive outlooks from the formative events of the time they "come of age politically," outlooks that they take with them for the rest of their lives. This suggests that today's young college population should differ on the first cluster of questions from the college-trained cohort that is now 30-34 years of age (the 18-24 year old college population of the early 1970s). Our data show this is indeed the case. On a number of these issues the college-educated public aged 30-34 are today more liberal than their counterparts aged 18-24. The latter reflect more the new currents in social values.

On a second cluster of issues (pages 27-29), however, the "sorting out" of the second stage is not altering the established progression in value change. Issues emphasizing the extension of individual rights—for example, the rights of blacks and women—are especially prominent in the second cluster.

The key finding is that on the second cluster issues, the younger groups are notably supportive of change—or "liberal." Here there are none of the discontinuities between the college-trained 18-24 year olds and 30-34 year olds that we saw in the first cluster. Value change has progressed without interruption: The young are cast in a familiar role of supporting the new more than older age cohorts do.

Are young people, especially the young with college training, more liberal today than their counterparts of the early 1970s, or are they more conservative? As we have seen, the answer depends on which issues we examine. From the initial impulse to "change things," a process of sorting out those areas where further change seems desirable, from those where "second thoughts" are in order, has produced a fascinating split in generational responses. Today's college population is at once more liberal and much more conservative than the college generation of the early 1980s—and we can see from the data that follow where one or the other applies.

E.C.L.

Contrasting The Mood

THE YOUNG NOT AS RESTLESS,

HOW TO READ THESE CHARTS: As Everett Ladd has explained on page 21, the data on pages 22-37 tell several different stories of values and generational change. We've shaded certain portions of the first chart of the section to illustrate. The line graph compares attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s, by age. We have circled a portion of that chart to direct your attention to the 30-34 year olds in the 1980s, a group which exhibits attitudes different from its younger and older age cohorts. The 30-34 year olds carried the attitudes they formed in the 1970s (when they were age 20-24) into the 1980s. Shaded area #2 shows the difference in attitudes of 18-24 years olds who were in college in the 1970s and those who are in college today. The arrow (#3) shows how 18-24 year olds in college in the 1970s feel when they reach 28-34 years of age in the 1980s. Again, we see that this age cohort is different from those which come before or after. This is one group to watch.

Question: Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a form of government? (Code one). It's the worst kind of all; it's bad, but no worse than some others; it's all right for some countries; it's a good form of government.



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974, and for 1980, 1982.

Question: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (1972, 1973) Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (1974, 1980, 1982, 1983)



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1973, 1974, and for 1980, 1982, 1983.

Note: For 18-24 year olds "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate. For all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

of the 1970s and 1980s

MORE CONSERVATIVE

Question: Now I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?





Note: Data combined for 1972, 1973, 1974; and for 1980, 1982.

Question: Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?





Note: Data combined for 1972, 1973, 1974; and for 1980, 1982.

Question: And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?





Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974; and for 1980, 1982.

Note: For 18-24 year olds "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post graduate. For all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Question: Would you please look at this card and tell me which *one* thing on this list you would *most* prefer in a job? Which comes *next*? Which is *third* most important? Which is *fourth* most important? . . . High income.



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974, and for 1980, 1982.

Question: What is your opinion about a *married* person having sexual relations with someone *other* than the marriage partner—is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974, and for 1980, 1982.

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . (Read each statement, and circle one code for each) she is married and does not want any more children?



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1973, 1974, and for 1980, 1982, 1983.

Note: For 18-24 years, "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate. For all other ages "College Graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . the woman wants it for any reason?





Note: Data combined for 1980, 1982, 1983.

Question: Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal or not?





Note: Data combined for 1980, 1983.

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws? There should be laws against the distribution of pornography whatever the age; There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18; There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography.





Note: Data combined for 1980, 1983.

Note: For 18-24 years, "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate. For all other ages "College Graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

High

I. RENEWED CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE SYSTEM

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? . . . Despite its many faults, our system of doing things is still the best in the world. (Disagree, Mostly disagree, Neither, Mostly agree, Agree)



Question: People have different opinions about world problems. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? . . . When things get tough enough, we'll put our minds to it and find a technological solution. (Disagree, Mostly disagree, Neither, Mostly agree, Agree)



Question: Do you agree or disagree with each statement below? . . . Good luck is more important than hard work for success. (Disagree, Mostly disagree, Neither, Mostly agree, Agree)



Question: Do you agree or disagree with each statement below? . . . People like me don't have much of a chance to be successful in life. (Disagree, Mostly disagree, Neither, Mostly Agree, Agree)

Note: Sample sizes = 12,627 for 1975; approximately 18,000 for 1982. All were high school students. Responses of one form = 2,000-4,000 respondents. Agree = Agree + Mostly agree. Disagree = Disagree + Mostly disagree.

Source: Surveys by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, spring 1975 and spring 1982.

School Seniors

Question: Now we'd like you to make some ratings of how good or bad a job you feel each of the following organizations is doing for the country as a whole. For each one, mark the circle that best describes how you feel. How good or bad a job is being done for the country as a whole by . . . the U.S. military? (Very good, Good, Fair, Poor, Very poor)



II. EXPANDING SOCIAL LIBERALISM WHERE WOMEN ARE CONCERNED

Question: The next questions ask your opinions about a number of different topics. How much do you agree or disagree with each statement below? . . . Men and women should be paid the same money if they do the same work. (Disagree, Mostly disagree, Neither, Mostly agree, Agree)



Question: Suppose you were married and had one or more preschool children. How would you feel about each of the following working arrangements? . . . Husband works full-time, wife doesn't work. (Not at all acceptable, Somewhat acceptable, Acceptable, Desirable)



Question: How much do you agree or disagree with each statement below? . . . Having a job gives a wife more of a chance to develop herself as a person. (Disagree, Mostly disagree, Neither, Mostly agree, Agree)



We are grateful to Patrick O'Malley of the ISR for supplying us with the 1982 data used on pages 26 and 27.

Note: Sample sizes = 12,627 for 1975; approximately 18,000 for 1982. All were high school students. Responses of one form = 2,000-4,000 respondents. Agree = Agree + Mostly agree. Disagree = Disagree + Mostly disagree.

Source: Surveys by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, spring 1975 and spring 1982.

On Many Values, Younger

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?





Note: Liberal (points 1-3 on the 7-point scale) = Extremely liberal + Slightly liberal. Data combined for 1980, 1982, 1983. In 1983 this question was asked of approximately one-half of the sample.

Question: Do you think a person has the right to end his or her life if this person . . . has an incurable disease?





Note: Data combined for 1982, 1983

Note: For 18-24 year olds, we compare high school graduate to all other ages. High school graduate = Some college. For 18-24 year olds "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate. For all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys

Generations Liberal and Liberated

Question: How often do you attend religious services?



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1973, 1974; and for 1980, 1982, 1983.

Question: Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (negroes/blacks) and whites? (1972, 1973, 1974 asked of non-blacks only; 1980 and 1982 asked of all respondents.)



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1973, 1974; and for 1980, 1982.

Question: If your party nominated a (negro/black) for president, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1974, and for 1982, 1983.

Question: If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1974, and for 1982, 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys

WHAT DEMOGRAPHICS TE

PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAT IS MARRIED, BY AGE, 1951-1981



Percent Married

Age	1951	1960	1970	1981
14-19 years	8%	7%	6%	5%
20-24	58	58	53	37
25-34	84	85	84	70
35-44	86	88	88	81
45-54	82	83	85	82
55-64	73	74	76	77
65 +	51	53	51	56

Note: 1951-1970 = people 14 and over. 1981 = people 15 and over.

PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAT IS DIVORCED, BY AGE, 1951-1981



Percent Divorced

Age	1951	1960	1970	1981
14-19 years	*	*	*	*
20-24	1%	1%	2%	3%
25-34	2	2	4	9
35-44	3	3	4	10
45-54	3	3	4	9
55-64	2	3	4	7
65 +	1	2	2	4

* = less than .5%.

Source: 1951, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1951*, page 45; 1960, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1961*, p. 34; 1970, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1971*, p. 32; 1981, *Marital Status and Living Arrangements*, March 1981. Current Population Reports, p. 20. No. 372, p. 7.

PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION THAT IS SINGLE 1930 TO 1981



1930	41%	1975	30%
1940	40	1977	32
1950	33	1978	33
1960	33	1979	34
1965	27	1980	35
1970	28	1981	35

Note: Single includes never married, widowed, and divorced.

Source: For 1930, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, p. 20. For 1940-1981, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1982-83, U.S. Bureau of the Census, page 38.

MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, 1950-1982



	Men	Women
1950	23	20
1955	23	20
1960	23	20
1965	23	21
1970	23	21
1975	24	21
1980	25	22
1982	25	23

Source: For 1950-1980, *Marital Status and Living Arrangements*, March 1981. Current Population Reports, Series P-20 Number 372, page 1. For 1982, U.S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data.

LL US ABOUT OUR VALUES

PROLIFERATING POSSLQ'S (PERSONS OF OPPOSITE SEX SHARING LIVING QUARTERS), 1970 TO 1983



	Number	Percent
1970	523,000	*
1980	1,589,000	2
1983	1,891,000	2

Note: * = less than .5%. 1983 percentage based on 1983 projected U.S. population.

Source: *Households, Families, Marital Status and Living Arrangements.* March 1983, Current Population Report Series P-20, Number 382, page 4.

MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF MARRIED FEMALE POPULATION 1940 TO 1982

1940[1]	14%	1970[2]	40%
1950[1]	23	1979[2]	50
1960[1]	32	1982	51

Note: [1]Based on persons age fourteen or older.
[2]Based on persons age sixteen or older.

Source: For 1940-1970 figures, U.S. Bureau of the Census; for 1979, Bureau of Labor Statistics. For 1982, *Household and Family Characteristics: March 1982,* Current Population Report Series P-20, Number 381, page 168.

BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN AS A PERCENT OF ALL BIRTHS, 1950-1980



1950	4%	1976	15%
1955	5	1977	16
1960	5	1978	16
1965	8	1979	17
1970	11	1980	18
1975	14		

Note: Prior to 1960 excludes Alaska and Hawaii. Beginning in 1970 excludes births to non-residents of the U.S. Includes estimates for states in which marital status data were not reported. No estimates included for misstatements on birth records or failure to register births.

Source: For 1950-1979 *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-83.* U.S. Bureau of the Census, page 66. For 1980, U.S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data.

BLOOM COUNTY
SURPRISE! SAY HELLO TO YOUR MOTHER AND FATHER, BOBBI, DEAR!
HOLY CATS.
SO HOW'S MY INDEPENDENT LITTLE GIRL?
SURPRISED. WHY DIDN'T YOU CALL?
I NEED A MARTINI.
SUCH A MESS! I'LL JUST STRAIGHTEN A FEW THINGS UP...
MOTHER... PLEASE STOP SNOOPING IN MY ROOM.
OH MY PILLS!
THEY'RE FLINTSTONE VITAMINS.
DON'T SNAP AT YOUR MOTHER.
by Berke Breathed

The 1970s

No Reduction in Pop Cynicism

Question: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the *people running* these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? . . . Major companies



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974; and 1980, 1982, 1983.

Question: . . . Military



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974; 1980, 1982, 1983.

Question: Now I'd like your opinions on a number of different things. In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average man is getting worse, not better. (Agree/disagree)



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974; and 1980, 1982.

Question: Now I'd like your opinions on a number of different things. It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future. (Agree/Disagree)



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1974; and 1980, 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys

and the 1980s

Habits and Customs: Age and Education

Question: Do you smoke?



Note: Data combined for 1980, 1983.

Question: (Asked of respondents who said have occasion to use alcoholic beverages such as liquor, wine or beer) Do you sometimes drink more than you think you should?



Note: Data combined for 1980, 1983.

Question: How often do you read the newspaper—every day, a few times a week, once a week, less than once a week, or never?



Note: Data combined for 1982, 1983.

Note: Comparisons are of 18-24 year old High school graduates vs. High school graduates + Some college for all other age groups. For 18-24 year olds, "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate, while for all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Standards in the 1980s:

Question: Are there any situations that you can imagine in which you would approve of a man punching an adult male stranger?



Question: Would you approve of a man punching a stranger who had hit the man's child after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car?



Question: Would you approve of a man punching a stranger if the stranger was beating up a woman and the man saw it?



Question: . . . Would you approve of a man punching a stranger if the stranger had broken into the man's house?



Note: Data combined for 1980, 1983. Comparisons are of 18-24 year old High school graduates vs. High school graduates + Some college for all other age groups. For 18-24 year olds, "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate, while for all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys

A Difference of Degree

Question: Now to a different subject. A. The qualities listed on this card may all be important, but which *three* would you say are the *most desirable* for a *child* to have? B. Which *one* of *these three* is the *most* desirable of all? C. All of the qualities listed on this card may be desirable, but could you tell me which *three* you consider *least important*? D. And which *one* of these three is *least important* of all? . . . That he tries hard to succeed.



Question: . . . That he obeys his parents well.



Question: . . . That he is interested in how and why things happen.



Note: Percentages represent total of "Most desirable" and "One of the three most desirable." Comparisons are of 18-24 year old High school graduates vs. High school graduates + Some college for all other age groups. For 18-24 year olds, "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate, while for all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Families: Small is Beautiful

Question: What do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have?



Note: Data combined for 1972, 1974, and for 1982, 1983.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys

Looking at Attitudes Toward Military Spending in the 1970s and 1980s

WHAT CLASS TELLS US ABOUT THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)? . . . Military, armaments, and defense.



Note: Comparisons are of 18-24 year old High school graduates vs. High school graduates + Some college for all other age groups. For 18-24 year olds, "College" = Some college + College graduate + Post-graduate, while for all other age groups "College graduate" = College graduate + Post-graduate. Data combined for 1973, 1974; and for 1980, 1982, 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

QUESTION WORDING GERMAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Public opinion polls were used liberally during the debate on deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Germany. Even Soviet Premier Andropov cited a July 1983 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen poll which showed a substantial majority of Germans opposing deployment. But the picture is not simple (see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," *Public Opinion*, Octo-



EMNID, SEPTEMBER 1983. Question: Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you tend to agree or to disagree with it. "The West must remain sufficiently strong with regard to the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, necessary to deploy modern nuclear weapons in Western Europe if the Soviet Union does not dismantle its new intermediate-range weapons." (Favor = Agree; Oppose = Disagree)



FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE WAHLEN, SEPTEMBER 1983. Question: The Soviet Union and the U.S. are currently conducting disarmament talks in Geneva concerning medium-range missiles. If these negotiations should bring no results by fall, what should happen? (a) Nonetheless deploy no new missiles in the Federal Republic (b) Deploy fewer missiles in the Federal Republic than planned and at the same time seek new negotiations (c) Deploy all the new missiles as planned and at the same time seek new negotiations (d) Deploy all the new missiles as planned but seek no new negotiations at the same time. (Favor = B & C; Oppose = A)



ALLENSBACH, AUGUST 1983. Question: The NATO double-track decision exists for some time now. In it the NATO countries on the one hand agreed to station suitable missiles in central Europe as counterweight to Soviet medium-range missiles, and, on the other hand, to begin arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. All things considered, do you find this double-track decision good or not good? (Favor = Decision good; Oppose = Decision not good)

ALLENSBACH, AUGUST 1983. Question: Suppose we have only two choices—get out of NATO or station the new American missiles in our country ("bei uns"). What should we do in that situation? (Favor = station new missiles; Oppose = get out of NATO)

ALLENSBACH, AUGUST 1983. Question: A question concerning the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. If no agreement is reached in Geneva by the end of the talks in October and the Soviet Union leaves in place its SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe: should the new American Pershing II medium-range missiles then be deployed in the Federal Republic, as provided in the NATO double-track decision, or should they not be deployed? (Favor = Deploy new missiles; Oppose = Should not)

MAKES A DIFFERENCE: TOWARD DEPLOYMENT

ber/November 1983, p. 45). As those who study public opinion are fond of saying, different question wordings produce different results. The questions below, asked in Germany from July to September 1983, amply demonstrate this maxim.

Note: We are grateful to Ken Adler and the USIA for providing this data.

ALLENSBACH, AUGUST 1983. Question: Which of the following views is closer to your own: I favor stationing the Pershing II missiles because more modern weapons mean greater security; Still more powerful weapons mean greater danger. I am therefore against stationing the Pershing IIs. (Favor = stationing Pershing IIs; Oppose = Against)



INFAS, SEPTEMBER 1983. Question: Suppose the two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, do not agree in Geneva by this fall concerning the medium-range missiles. What in your opinion should then be done? (a) New medium-range missiles should then be stationed in the Federal Republic, as provided in the NATO double-track decision (b) There should be a partial stationing, but the negotiations in Geneva should nonetheless continue (c) There should be no stationing for the present and the negotiations in Geneva should continue (d) One should entirely forgo stationing of new missiles in the Federal Republic. (Favor = A & B; Oppose = C & D)



INFRATEST, SUMMER 1983. Question: If the negotiations in Geneva should fail, should new medium-range missiles then be stationed in the Federal Republic or should then no medium-range missiles be stationed? (Favor = should station new missiles; Oppose = should not)



FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE WAHLEN, SEPTEMBER 1983. Question: The Soviet Union and the U.S. are currently conducting disarmament talks in Geneva concerning medium-range missiles. If these negotiations should bring no results by fall, what should happen? (a) Continue negotiations concerning disarmament and do not deploy new missiles in the Federal Republic (b) continue negotiations concerning disarmament but deploy new missiles at the same time (c) break off the disarmament talks and deploy new missiles in the FRG. (Favor = B & C; Oppose = A)



FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE WAHLEN, JULY 1983. (Question same as above) (Favor = B & C; Oppose = A)

EMNID, AUGUST 1983. Question: In the event that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should not bring any results, new missiles are then supposed to be deployed; here in the Federal Republic as well. Are you in favor or opposed to the deployment of new missiles? What if you had to make a choice? (Favor = deployment of new missiles; Oppose = oppose)



EXAMINING ETHICS

Question: Do you think the overall level of ethics and honesty in American society has risen, fallen, or stayed the same during the past ten years?


Don't know 4%
Risen 9%
Stayed the same 22%
Overall level of ethics and honesty in American society has fallen during the past 10 years 65%

Question: Listed below are a number of activities. Check which, if any, of these you yourself have ever done. Have you ever: Taken home work supplies; Called in sick to work when not ill; Used company telephones for personal long-distance calls; Overstated deductions somewhat on tax form; Driven while drunk; Smoked marijuana; Used cocaine.



Note: Respondents were asked to check off those activities they had ever done on a separate answer sheet and seal that sheet in an envelope. General public sample consisted of 1,558 in-person interviews; 396 mid-level big-company executives were polled by mail. Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the *Wall Street Journal* June 24-July 4, 1983.

by Richard Brody

International Crises: A Rallying Point for the President?

Since September first, the United States has been involved in three international incidents of the sort thought to rally public opinion behind the president—the Soviet attack on KAL-007, the bombing of Marine Headquarters in Beirut, and our rescue mission/invasion in Grenada. Evaluations of President Reagan in the wake of these events seem to confirm the commonplace notion that international crises create "special moments" in public opinion. But why should public reaction to such events increase support for presidential performance? It is no trick to explain support when things go well. But it is not obvious why, in Nelson W. Polsby's words, "invariably, the popular response to a president during international crisis is favorable, *regardless of the wisdom of the policies [the president] pursues.*" (Emphasis added.) This counterintuitive movement of public attitudes—backing the president when his policies may have been unwise or even unsuccessful—is what intrigues public opinion researchers. When things go badly, or the outcome is unclear, the public's positive response needs to be accounted for.

Explanations of this counterintuitive movement of opinion emphasize patriotism and fear of the unknown. According to J.R. Lee, "[The] public tends to support a presidential action . . . when there is not enough information for evaluating the situation. . . . [The] initial reaction of the public to major foreign policy events is to give the president the benefit of doubt." The president, Lee argues, ". . . becomes the focus of national attention in times of crisis . . . symbolizing national unity and power. . . . The public's reaction will include a feeling of patriotism in supporting presidential action, a desire not to hurt a president's chance of success."

Getting down to cases, let us consider the movement of public opinion in the wake of forty events that John Mueller and Samuel Kernell classified as potential rally points.[1] On the whole, opinion change in these situations follows the expected course—after three-fourths of them, the president picked up support. But this does not always happen.

Crisis Chronology

The Mayaguez incident (May 12, 1975) was triggered when the Cambodian Navy seized an American merchant ship in the Gulf of Thailand. In the Gallup polls that bracketed the episode, President Ford's approval rating moved up 11 percentage points (40 percent to 51 percent), even though there were casualties. In the successful rescue of the thirty-nine members of the Mayaguez crew, thirty-eight U.S. Marines and airmen were killed, and fifty more were wounded. These casualties—and the negative international reaction to applying military force in the region—raised questions about the wisdom of the action. Nonetheless, the public formed up behind the president and boosted his popularity.

The Pueblo incident (January 23, 1968) resembles the Mayaguez, and yet the public failed to rally behind President Johnson. Like the Mayaguez, the Pueblo was a U.S. ship captured by an Asian Communist nation in international waters. In the case of the Pueblo, no rescue mission was attempted, and no lives were lost. In the Gallup polls that bracketed the onset of the incident, President Johnson's approval ratings dropped from 48 percent to 41 percent.

The Pueblo episode is one of several that failed to rally the American public, even though it resembled incidents that did. The downing of a U-2 spy plane by the Soviet Union in May 1960 gave President Eisenhower a three-percentage point gain in approval; nine years later, though, when North Korea shot down our EC-121 electronic surveillance plane, President Nixon's approval rating got no boost.

The U.S. Marine landings in Lebanon in 1958 and in Santo Domingo in 1969 increased approval of Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson by six percentage points, but when the Marines went into Cambodia in May 1970, President Nixon's approval rating increased only slightly.

The Berlin blockade is associated with a three percentage point rise in President Truman's job rating, but the two Berlin crises in 1961 benefited President Kennedy hardly at all.

Finally, with the 1968 Viet Cong invasion of our embassy in Saigon, President Johnson dropped seven percentage points, but President Carter's approval gained six points in the first poll after the embassy in Teheran was taken over.

International events that appear similar can pro-

duce different responses. This difference undermines the claim that the public always rallies behind the president out of some sort of reflexive patriotic response. Why should Mayaguez call forth patriotism and Pueblo not? Why should Lebanon and Santo Domingo and not Cambodia? The answer is that responses depend upon the context of the event, and the key contextual element is the nature of the media information available to the public. If we require contextual elements to help us account for the public's response to international crises, why posit a reflexive response at all? If international crises alter the normal partisan character of the information used by the public, the rally phenomenon loses its mystery.

The Role of the Media

When events are breaking at an unusually rapid pace, and the administration has a virtual monopoly on information about the situation, opposition political leaders tend to refrain from comment or to make cautiously supportive statements. Presidential critics change their positions in response to their patriotism and outrage at the threat to the country, and from a desire not to appear intemperate. Until the situation becomes clearer, opposition political leaders have a substantial incentive to remain silent or to be vaguely supportive—support usually withdrawn later—and almost no incentive to criticize the president.

Crises also alter the normal mix of evaluative comments available to the public through the media. If opposition political leaders are silent or supportive of presidential action, reporters and editors will either have to carry an unusually uncritical mix of news about presidential performance or risk the appearance of searching out negative comment for its own sake. Searching out negative comment is both unprofessional and unnecessary. The intrinsic drama of an international crisis is sufficient to relieve reporters and editors of the need to dramatize stories by reporting political conflicts or policy debates between opposing elites. As a result, press and television accounts of the "politics" surrounding crises will be unusually full of bipartisan support for the president's actions. The public responds accordingly. When opinion leadership does not rally or run for cover, the media must and do report this fact. At such times, the public receives countervailing elite evaluations of presidential performance and appears to look to the events themselves for information with which to update its judgment of how well the president is handling his job.

An examination of some crisis cases shows these processes at work. The Mayaguez incident broke into the news on May 12, 1975, and ceased to be a leading news story ten days later. At no time during this period did any negative comment by a recognized opposition leader make front-page news. During Mayaguez, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were the principal sources for news upon which the public could base its evaluation. By contrast, President Johnson's policy came under public attack from Republican senators four days after the Pueblo story broke. The public rallied behind President Ford but did not rally behind President Johnson.

The U-2 incident broke into the news on May 6, 1960 (just as the 1960 campaign was getting under way). The *Washington Post* carried reports of congressional attacks on the Soviet Union and Khrushchev, but no criticism of President Eisenhower or Secretary Herter. Two days later, after the president admitted the plane had been spying but claimed it had been a necessary action, the *Post* carried a page two report of a broadside attack by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), on President Eisenhower's policies. But the ADA attack did not mention the U-2 incident. On May 17, 1960, after the Soviet Union walked out of the Paris Summit meeting, a page seven story appeared reporting Adlai Stevenson's characterization of the U-2 flight as a "blunder." The first sustained criticism appeared on May 21 and on May 23 when the *Post* reported that the collapse of the Paris Summit and the U-2 incident were to be Democratic campaign issues in the 1960 presidential election. The crisis had finally become politicized, eighteen days after it had begun.

President Eisenhower got a small boost in approval in the wake of the U-2 incident. Support was still at its peak when bipartisan backing broke down. But forty days after the U-2 incident first broke into the news, its rally effect had totally dissipated.

The rally of public support after the American embassy was seized in Teheran was more intense and longer-lived than the rally following the U-2 incident, but we can see similar forces at work on public opinion. The public response was wholly "non-partisan"; members of all three party groups reacted in similar ways to President Carter's performance during the first five

Figure 1

ELITE CRITICISM AND
PUBLIC OPINION DURING KAL-007


Percent
30
20
10
0
Legend
The bar graph plots the change in presidential approval as indexed against the August 1983 baseline of 43%
The broken line is elite criticism of President Reagan's handling of the KAL-007 crisis as a percentage of total New York Times lineage on the crisis
0
5
10
15
20
Day into the Crisis

Source: Gallup Poll, 9/7-8/83, *Newsweek*, 9/19/83 + 23%
Gallup Poll, 9/9-12/83, *S.F. Chronicle*, 10/17/83 + 9%
CBS News/*NYT* Poll, 9/14/83, *New York Times*, 9/16/83 + 7%
Gallup Poll, 9/16-19/83, *S.F. Chronicle*, 10/17/83 +12%

Table 1

RALLY EVENTS AND THE MOVEMENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT

President/Event	Percentage Point Change in Approval
Truman	
Truman Doctrine (March 1947)	+12
Berlin Blockade (April 194.)	+ 3
Soviet A-Bomb announced (September 1949)	− 6
Korean Invasion (June-July 1950)	+ 9
Inchon Landing (September 1950)	− 4
China Crosses the Yalu River (November-December 1950)	− 3
Korean Peace Talks Begin (July 1951)	+ 4
Eisenhower	
Korean Truce Signed (July-August 1953)	+ 1
Sputnik I Launched (October 1957)	+ 3
U.S. Marines Land in Lebanon (July 1958)	+ 6
U-2 Shot Down by Soviets (May 1960)	+ 3
Kennedy	
Bay of Pigs Incident (April 1961)	+ 5
Berlin Wall (August 1961)	+ 1
Test Ban Treaty (August-September 1961)	+ 4
Berlin Crisis (October 1961)	+ 2
Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)	+12
Johnson	
Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 1964)	− 5
Start of North Vietnam Bombing (February 1965)	− 2
Invasion of Dominican Republic (April-May 1965)	+ 6
Pueblo Incident (January 1968)	− 7
Tet Offensive/U.S. Embassy Invaded (January-Februa[illegible])	− 7
North Vietnam Ag[illegible]ace Talks (April 1968)	+ 4
Bombing Halt (Nov[illegible]68)	+ 1
Nixon	
"Vietnamization" Speech (November 1969)	+11
Invasion of Cambodia (May 1970)	+ 1
China Trip (February 1972)	+ 4
Haiphong Harbor Mined (May 1972)	− 3
"Peace is at Hand" Speech (October-November 1972)	+ 6
Christmas Bombing (December 1972)	− 8
Vietnam Peace Agreement (January 1973)	+16
Arab-Israeli [illegible]ase Fire (May 1974)	+ 3
Ford	
Cambodia Falls to Communists (April 1975)	− 5
Mayaguez Incident (June 1975)	+11
Egypt-Israel Treaty (August 1975)	+ 1
Carter	
Panama Canal Treaty (August 1977)	+ 6
Neutron Bomb Deferred (March-April 1978)	− 8
Mid-East Summit at Camp David (September 1978)	+ 3
Mid-East Treaty (March 1979)	+ 6
Embassy Seized in Teheran (November 1979)	+ 6
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)	+ 2
Hostage Rescue Attempt Fails (April 1980)	+ 4

months of the crisis. The public responded as if to a single source or to multiple harmonious sources.

In the Pueblo incident, President Johnson enjoyed only a few days respite before sustained criticism emerged and was reported; in the U-2 incident President Eisenhower was free from criticism for a fortnight. President Carter enjoyed freedom from sustained criticism for at least six weeks. No wonder the president's job approval rating prospered.

Early Reactions

At the time the hostage crisis began, President Carter was a long way from being free of potential criticism. Rivals for the Democratic nomination, and a field of Republicans, were broadcasting the message that they were the best choice to correct the "mess" that the Carter administration had made of American public policy. Given routine negative evaluation of the president's performance, it is striking that Iran was not immediately seized upon as yet another instance of President Carter's inadequacy. The dozen or so aspirants to the presidency who had regularly been criticizing President Carter's domestic and foreign policy would not, could not, or, in any case, did not try to score on the foreign policy problems made manifest by the seizure of the embassy.

The exceptions highlight the point: on November 5, John Connally declared ". . . If appeasement were an artform, this administration would be the Rembrandt of our time." This one-liner got exactly two lines on page fourteen of the *Washington Post*, but it was not reported in the *New York Times;* it was mentioned on CBS Evening News, but not on ABC or NBC. Governor Connally apparently concluded that this line was unhelpful: on December 1, 1979, he reversed himself, offering the judgment, ". . . We have only one president. Now is the time to rally behind him and show a solid front to Iran and the world."

On December 2, Edward Kennedy went public with his feelings about the Shah and his regime. Although the president was not mentioned specifically, Kennedy's comments were widely interpreted as critical of Carter and damaging to the president's efforts to save the hostages. Overwhelmingly negative editorial and op-editorial response to Kennedy's comments probably encouraged the opinion leadership in its apparent belief that criticizing the president was not useful.

President Carter was free of sustained criticism during the first sixty days of the crisis. After sixty days, the pace of criticism quickened, and public opinion gradually began to turn around two weeks later.

Recent international crises further illuminate these processes. President Reagan's job approval ratings were sharply higher following the destruction of KAL-007, but the rally stalled with the rising chorus of criticism from his conservative confrères. A comparison of trends in media coverage of the president's critics and trends in his job approval during this period shows the two

(Continued on page 60)



by John Kenneth White and Dwight Morris

Shattered Images: Political Parties in the 1984 Election

"Tweedledum and Tweedledee." "Not a dime's worth of difference." These clichés have become part of our lexicon about political parties. Ronald Reagan's chief pollster Richard Wirthlin sums up their sorry state this way: "People don't see the political parties as performing any useful function. What impact does a political party have on you? Not many people could answer that question." These observations were borne out by a recent Yankelovich, Skelly, and White survey. Of twelve issues that dominate the political discussion today, "no difference" and "no opinion" bested the political parties on eight and placed second on the remaining four (see table 1).

Table 1
PARTY BEST ABLE TO HANDLE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS

Question: Do you feel that the Democratic party or the Republican party can do a better job of handling . . . or don't you think there is any real difference between them?

Party best able to handle:	No difference/ No opinion	Democratic party	Republican party
Reducing crime	58%	23%	19%
Stopping spread of communism	52	19	29
Dealing effectively with U.S.S.R.	48	24	28
Providing quality education	47	36	17
Reducing risk of nuclear war	46	34	20
Providing health care	46	43	11
Reducing waste and inefficiency in government	45	23	32
Protecting environment	45	43	12
Providing jobs	39	46	15
Keeping defense strong	37	21	42
Controlling inflation	36	27	37
Helping the poor	34	54	12

Source: Survey by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, September 20-22, 1983.

Image Making

Such public ambivalence toward the parties is relatively new. For most of our history, voters have gone to the polls with well-defined mental pictures—to borrow a phrase from political scientist Richard Trilling—of the two parties. Nearly a century ago, Republican William McKinley associated his party with the "full dinner pail"; voters agreed, thereby reinforcing the GOP's existing majority. A generation later the Great Depression shattered that GOP image. The ascension of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932 gave the Democrats an opportunity to recast their party's image. And the Democrats made the most of it, projecting their concern for the "common man," and linking it to effective policy action through agencies such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, Works Progress Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Roosevelt branded the Republicans as "economic royalists" (translation: "fat cats"), claiming that they were more concerned with

budget balancing than with helping the little guy. This image redefinition, accompanied as it was by practical political action, precipitated a political realignment that ensconced the Democrats as the nation's new majority party.

The mental picture of the two parties that formed during the 1930s lasted a generation. Thirty years ago, when pollster George Gallup asked voters what the Democratic party stood for, 28 percent answered that it is "the party of labor and the common man." Democrats were even more positive in their assessment, with 42 percent citing their party's "common man" heritage.

Other Gallup surveys confirmed the Democrats' grip on the "common man" theme. A 1946 Gallup poll gave the Democrats a better than two-to-one average over the Republicans as "the party best able to keep wages high." In 1948, a plurality of voters maintained that the GOP was "run by a few big businessmen." Finally, a majority surveyed in 1955 believed that the Republicans best served the interests of "professional and business" groups while the Democrats were more concerned about "skilled" and "unskilled" workers—the common man. Only when it came to balancing the budget did the Republicans enjoy an advantage: In 1940, voters thought the GOP "more likely" than the Democrats to balance the ledger books—by a 42 to 23 percent margin.

Blurring the Images

By the late 1970s, this mental picture of the common man Democrat and tight-fisted Republican lost its clarity. Much of this was due to the inability of both political parties to promote effective action on issues of major concern. George Gallup was among the first to detect this. In 1970, the pollster asked voters to select the party that "can do a better job of dealing with 'crime and lawlessness' "—issues of paramount importance then. The results were startling: 21 percent chose the Democrats; 24 percent, the Republicans; *55 percent* picked "no difference" or "no opinion."

Evaluations of party incapacities began showing up more often as the decade advanced. In the mid-seventies, Republican presidents Nixon and Ford were judged unable to cope with the economic reality facing the second-generation common man. A 1974 Market Opinion Research survey found just a handful of voters selecting the GOP as best able to handle the nation's economic problems. Only 8 percent believed the Republicans would reduce unemployment; 12 percent said the GOP would control inflation; 19 percent argued the GOP could hold down taxes; an equal number said the Republicans would control government spending. Although the Democrats bested the Republicans on each of these issues, many voters cast a vote of no confidence in either party, arguing that there was "no difference" or offering no opinion. A 1974 Gallup survey, for example, found 43 percent of the voters choosing "no difference" or "no opinion" on the ability of the two parties to cope with inflation. Sixty-one percent of the Democrats, however, were fairly confident of their party's ability to deal with the problem. But the Republican percentages were striking: 46 percent chose their party as the best inflation fighter; an equal number said there was no difference or had no opinion.

The Democrats' self-assurance, so prevalent in 1974, dissipated just four years later as Jimmy Carter failed to turn rhetoric into policy. As the 1970s drew to a close, the nation had begun to see "double": double-digit inflation, interest rates, and near double-digit unemployment. By 1980, inflation was 13.5 percent; the prime rate exceeded 15 percent; unemployment rose to 7.1 percent. Just one year after Jimmy Carter assumed office, a CBS News/*New York Times* poll found that while inflation, crime, unemployment, and energy were characterized as "very important" problems, a sizable slice of the electorate failed to see any difference in the parties' approaches to these issues. More significantly, a number of Democrats and Republicans were unable to distinguish between the two parties' views. Forty-six percent of Republicans and Democrats said the parties didn't differ on the issue of rising prices; 60 percent of Democrats and 55 percent of Republicans said they didn't differ on crime; 44 percent of Democrats compared to 43 percent of Republicans found no difference between the parties' positions on unemployment; and finally, 40 percent of Democrats and 42 percent of Republicans said there was no difference on energy.

The initial target of the voters' cynicism was Jimmy Carter himself. At midterm, 75 percent of the electorate, in response to a CBS News/*New York Times* poll, believed that Carter would *not* be able to balance the budget; 60 percent said he could *not* make the income tax fair; 55 percent allowed that he could *not* restore trust in government. The pressure became so intense that Carter delivered his famous "malaise" speech outlining the nation's lack of self-confidence:

> We remember the phrase "sound as a dollar" was an expression of absolute dependability until ten years of inflation began to shrink our dollar and our savings. We believed that our nation's resources were limitless until 1973 when we had to face a growing dependence on foreign oil. . . .
>
> What you see too often in Washington and elsewhere around the country is a system of government that seems incapable of action. . . . Often you see paralysis and stagnation and drift. You don't like it, and neither do I. What can we do?

The president offered few answers, and disillusionment deepened. At the conclusion of his term, voters gave Carter the dubious distinction of being the postwar president who was "least able to get things done," in a Louis Harris survey. Public disenchantment was widespread, affecting both political parties. In a 1976 CBS News/*New York Times* poll, voters agreed that there was "an important difference in what the Republican party and Democratic party stand for" by a 58 to 35

percent margin; four years later, in August 1980, the electorate *disagreed* with this proposition by 45 to 43 percent.

Reagan rejected Carter's "malaise" theory. According to Richard Wirthlin, "People were drawn to Ronald Reagan because he described a vision of America as being a special land with unique opportunities. The electorate didn't blame the institutions for the fact that America was falling far short of the opportunities available; rather the public blamed Jimmy Carter."

Republicans coupled their invocation of American exceptionalism with a strategy designed to redefine their party's image. GOP National Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr., explains: "Ronald Reagan transformed the Republican party into a party that stands for new approaches to old problems, and not the failed policies of the past." Democratic pollster Peter Hart concurs:

> Four years ago, the political tides turned against the Democratic party because voters saw the Democrats as ineffective stewards of the nation's affairs, whose underlying agenda related to the past rather than the present or the future, and whose approach lacked the balance necessary to keep America on an even keel.

The Republican Opportunity Deferred

Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency ushered in a new wave of public optimism. A CBS News/*New York Times* survey in June 1981 revealed that when asked whether *any* president could cut federal taxes, check inflation, or balance the federal budget, a sizable group of voters—49 percent, 42 percent, and 35 percent respectively—said, "Ronald Reagan can." More significantly, renewed public confidence appeared to be translating into a refurbished image for the Republican party. A post-1980 election survey conducted by Richard Wirthlin showed 72 percent believing the Republicans would better control government spending; 67 percent believed the GOP would best control inflation; 64 percent said the Republicans would hold down taxes; 61 percent argued the GOP could reduce unemployment. Almost a year later Louis Harris found the Republicans seizing the initiative on most "common man" economic issues for the first time in a generation. Only on the questions of unemployment and helping the elderly and poor did the Democrats retain their traditional leads (see table 2).

But by midterm the Reagan administration, like its Democratic predecessor, began to falter. Although some strides had been made in reducing inflation, lowering taxes, and curbing federal spending, the outlook for employment, deficit, and interest rates was not as promising. In 1982, unemployment topped 10 percent; the prime interest rate approached 20 percent; and federal deficits neared $200 billion.

As 1981 faded, a variety of survey data spelled trouble for the Republicans. Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale's chief pollster, Peter Hart, finds that, by now, the Democrats have achieved near parity with the GOP on such issues as balancing the federal budget, keeping taxes down, and managing the economy. In addition, the Democrats, by August 1983, had reversed the 1981 GOP lead as "the party of the future" (see figure 1). Events began to overtake the

Table 2

DEMOCRATIC/REPUBLICAN CONGRESS BEST ABLE TO HANDLE NATION'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Question: Now, if you had to choose, which do you feel would do a better job on (read each item)—a Republican or Democratic controlled Congress?

	Democratic Congress		Republican Congress	
Best able to handle:	**1981**	**1983**	**1981**	**1983**
Cutting federal spending	27%	41%	61%	44%
Balancing federal budget	25	39	59	44
Keeping inflation under control	29	38	54	50
Straightening out the economy at home	32	NA	52	NA
Bringing high interest rates down	37	43	45	43
Cutting rate of unemployment	47	58	39	31
Helping elderly and poor get a better break	67	69	23	20

Note: NA = Not asked.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, September 19-24, 1981 and November 9-14, 1983.

Figure 1

PARTY BEST ABLE TO HANDLE NATION'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS



Note: *Not asked in 1981.

Source: Surveys by Peter D. Hart Research Associates and Lynch Research Inc., for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, latest that of August 1983.

"party of new ideas"—principally the onset of the most severe economic recession since World War II. Richard Wirthlin maintains, "The onset of the economic difficulty stopped the role toward the Republican party and reversed it to some extent."

Still, there remain some bright spots for the Republicans. They have improved their image in a few areas. According to Wirthlin, 57 percent of voters in 1981 believed "As the government is now organized and operated, I think it is hopelessly incapable of dealing with the crucial problems facing the country today." By 1983, the percentage agreeing with the statement had been cut ten points. Further, a variety of survey data gave the Republicans a decisive edge when respondents were asked to choose which party can best handle inflation: A June 1983 CBS News/*New York Times* survey showed the Republicans with a nine-point advantage, 41 to 32 percent.

In a late October-early November Penn + Schoen poll for *The Garth Analysis*, 48 percent preferred the Republicans to the 38 percent who selected the Democrats in response to this question, "In general do you favor Democratic proposals for the budget which call for more social spending, delaying the tax cuts, and reducing defense spending, or Republican proposals which call for less social spending, keeping the tax cut, and increasing defense spending?" Respondents in the South, Midwest, and West preferred the Penn + Schoen characterization of the Republican alternative; those in the Northeast split evenly.

On the fundamentals, however, the Reagan administration has been unable to recast the Republican image in a more favorable light. The opportunities for Republicans as seen in the Harris data in table 2 have faded to some extent. GOP Chairman Fahrenkopf concedes the Republican party still has much work to do:

> The American people believe that somehow the Republican party exists only for the rich; and that middle-class and poor Americans are not involved in the Republican party. That image albatross has been around the Republican party's neck since the days of Franklin Roosevelt. And we have not done a very good job in getting rid of it.

Democratic National Chairman Charles Manatt put it this way: "The reality of the Democratic party today is a strengthening of its resolve and the recommitment to basic principles of fairness, opportunity, and more job training and job creating. That needed a reaffirmation after the 1980 experience."

Manatt's contention that there has been a "recommitment" to basic principles is underlined by a variety of survey data. For the first time in nearly a decade between half and two-thirds of the Democrats and Republicans said that *their* party was the best able to handle the nation's most pressing problems. The increase in partisanship has been especially notable among Democrats. In 1980 just 45 percent of the Democrats said their party was best able to handle inflation; by 1983 the figure jumped to 59 percent. Similarly, in 1980 only 51 percent of the Democrats believed their party could better handle unemployment; by 1983, 75 percent of the Democrats felt this way (see table 3). Moreover, Democrats exhibit far greater confidence in their ability to provide better public school education for our nation's children—by a margin of 72 to 49 percent.

Republicans' confidence in their party has increased only slightly since 1980. According to a CBS News/*New York Times* poll, 78 percent of the Republicans picked their party as best able to handle inflation, a 7 percentage point increase since 1980. In addition, 64 percent of GOP partisans say their party can best handle unemployment, a decline of only 1 percentage point from three years earlier. Moreover, 70 percent of the Republicans and 64 percent of the Democrats argue their party is "best able to deal with the uncertain problems of the future"—a vote of confidence that suggests an intensification of partisanship for the long term.

Table 3
PARTISANSHIP ON ISSUE

	August 1980	April 1981	June 1983
Democrats saying their party better able to:			
Handle inflation	45%	32%	59%
Handle unemployment	51	51	75
Republicans saying their party better able to:			
Handle inflation	71	75	78
Handle unemployment	65	62	64

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of June 1983.

Table 4
PERCENTAGE OF VOTERS VOLUNTEERING "NO DIFFERENCE" OR "NO RESPONSE" BY PARTY

Question: Regardless of how you vote, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party is better able to . . .?

	"No Difference/No Response"		
Party best able to:	**Democrats**	**Republicans**	**Independents**
Deal with the uncertain problems of the future	26%	25%	46%
Deal with foreign competition	27	20	40
Make the right decisions about defense	26	23	40
Handle inflation	21	14	38
Provide better education	18	33	38
Help people like you*	9	21	36
Handle unemployment	14	18	36
Insure economic recovery	18	14	35
Create a fair federal budget**	16	18	27

Note: *Asked in May 1982. **Asked in October 1982. All others asked in June 1983.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of June 20-26, 1983.

Unlike the partisans, self-described Independents continue to have blurred mental pictures of the two parties. As table 4 indicates, Independents are often

twice as prone as the partisans to volunteer "no difference" or "no opinion" when it comes to selecting which party can best cope with contentious issues. Although the GOP may have dispelled some of the stereotypical responses of the past, they have yet to convince Independents that they can manage the problems of the present. Says Wirthlin, "I think the jury is still out on whether the Republicans have captured that new image. We have reconsidered and paused in 1982 and 1983. But the verdict is not yet in." Thus, the opportunity of 1980 became an opportunity deferred.

The Democrats' Dilemma

As Ronald Reagan wrestled with the nation's economic problems, many Democrats watched with a smug attitude that said, "We told you so!" Yet at the same time the Democrats pondered a dilemma: how to reaffirm the past and remain the party of the future. House Speaker Tip O'Neill put it this way, "You just can't go the old New Deal road. The 1980s are a time of change and the [Democratic] party has to respond to the people." Peter Hart concurs: "Simply reinforcing the traditional strengths of the party's image will not be sufficient." To reinforce his contention, Hart notes that 53 percent of voters agree with the statement: "Even though there may be some problems with the Reagan approach, the Democrats do not have responsible alternatives." Democratic presidential candidate Gary Hart recently warned that unless the Democrats "forget about the tactics of politics and start thinking about the substance of politics, we will lose in 1984, and we deserve to lose."

Breaking the Mold

In each of the three presidential elections held during the 1960s, Democratic candidates have invoked the memory of Franklin Roosevelt and the party's "common man" heritage. John Kennedy reminded voters of the New Deal's unfinished business and promised to "get America moving again." Lyndon Johnson bragged of his party, "We're in favor of a lot of things, and we're against mighty few." Plagued by an unpopular war, Hubert Humphrey wrapped himself in the Democratic mantle of helping the "little guy" and pleaded with members of his party to "come home." Humphrey's strategy nearly worked—a near-certain Nixon landslide became a cliffhanger.

In 1980 Jimmy Carter, like Hubert Humphrey before him, was in serious political trouble. Carter pollster Patrick Caddell observed that the president entered the contest with "low popularity ratings, and severe problems with his handling of both foreign and domestic policy, particularly the economy." Caddell warned that if the election became a referendum on the Carter administration "there was no way we could survive." Backed to the wall, Carter emulated some of Humphrey's 1968 tactics—trying to make himself and the party of FDR one. This was quite an about-face for a party outsider, but Carter tried anyway. One Carter television commercial depicted the Democratic "Hall of Fame"—Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy—and reiterated the party's traditional concern for the little guy. But the Carter game plan was flawed in one very significant respect: It didn't work. In fact, it could no longer work for any candidate—especially Jimmy Carter. The reason: Candidate images have become so paramount (and Carter's was lousy) that each election breaks the mold of the one that preceded it. In the current climate, the political party becomes, as one politician put it, "a Hertz car we all rent around election time." The function once performed by the parties —simplifying the electoral choice—is left to the candidates. Samuel Lubell was the first to recognize this, noting in 1972: "Nixon did not need a Republican party to win. McGovern had no Democratic party. By election day not much was left to the voter but to ratify or reject what Nixon had done."

In many respects, 1984 promises to be a rerun of 1972. Although the ending may not be the same, the outcome will undoubtedly hinge upon whether the voters want to "stay the course." A Decision/Making/Information survey conducted in August 1983 shows that 56 percent of the electorate believe "Ronald Reagan changed things a lot when he became president." Forty percent disagree. Reagan pollster Wirthlin argues:

> The association between Ronald Reagan and political change is deeply imbedded in the psyche of the American voter. Reagan just wasn't another caretaker president. . . . Thus, Ronald Reagan is the "mold" for the 1984 presidential election. It's Ronald Reagan, his vision for America, and the extent to which that vision had been activated today that will frame the election.

Analysis of support for the presidential front-runners Reagan and Mondale tends to confirm Wirthlin's hypothesis. Seventy-one percent of Reagan voters explain their decision saying they prefer the president's policies, while 64 percent of Mondale's supporters rationalize their choice in anti-Reagan terms. Democratic political consultant John Rendon argues, "The general election will be a contest between two people, not two parties."

It is quite unlikely that the mold for the 1984 presidential election—a vote of confidence or not for President Reagan—will persist. Rather, this mold will be replaced by a new, unknown, candidate-centered framework in 1988. For the foreseeable future the Republicans can no more refine their national image than the Democrats can reshape theirs. Like Humpty Dumpty, the shattered images of both parties cannot be pieced together again.

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by David Glass, Peverill Squire,
and Raymond Wolfinger

Voter Turnout: An International Comparison

Everyone knows that Americans vote less than citizens of other democratic countries. There are several explanations offered for this disparity. One theory is that low American turnout reflects alienation or mistrust that can discourage voting. We have concluded that this is not true. Another possibility is that calculating turnout percentages on different bases affects comparisons of the United States and other democracies. We conclude that this is indeed the case; when the base used is people who are registered, American turnout measures up very well against other countries.

Some election specialists recognize that the United States computes turnout differently from other countries: the percentage of the American *voting-age population* who vote is contrasted with the turnout rate of *registered persons* elsewhere. The latter figure includes only those people who are legally qualified to vote in the current election. The voting-age population includes a great many people who could not possibly vote: millions of aliens, who are categorically ineligible to vote; over a million citizens who are ineligible in most states—ex-felons and inmates of prisons and mental hospitals; and, most numerous, citizens who would be eligible if they had taken the step of establishing that eligibility by registering. This apples-and-oranges international comparison inevitably casts American voting performance in the most unfavorable light. To the best of our knowledge, no one has compared turnout in the United States and in other countries on both percentage bases: as a percentage of the voting-age population and as a percentage of registered voters.[1] How would American turnout stack up if the same yardstick were used for all countries?

Table 1 compares turnout in the most recent national election in the United States and a number of other countries for which we could obtain data. The left column in table 1 presents the data in the customary way, with American turnout as a percentage of the voting-age population and other countries' turnout as a percentage of registered voters. This produces the familiar picture: at 52.6 percent, the United States places twenty-third among the two dozen nations. Only Switzerland (48.3 percent) has lower turnout. At the top of the list, five countries have voting rates above 90 percent (see table 1).

The right column in table 1 provides a common base for all countries: the number of votes cast divided by the voting-age population. This is a fairer comparison, but it does not make the United States look any more like a nation of voters. Of the twenty-one nations for which we could obtain data, the United States ranked twentieth, with Switzerland again the only country lagging behind. The gap between the United States and the top-ranked country is the same as in the first column. In short, ranking turnout by the American standard does little to dispute the traditional finding that fewer Americans vote than do the citizens of any other democratic country (except, of course, Switzerland). Now that we have established that Americans do indeed vote less, our task is to explain why.

Alienation's Not the Answer

One plausible—and certainly popular—hypothesis about low American turnout is that it is caused by alienation from the political system. Commentaries deploring the state of American politics often link low

Table 1

RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY TURNOUT IN THEIR MOST RECENT NATIONAL ELECTION[a]

Traditional Measure of Turnout[b]		Vote as a Percentage of Voting-Age Population[c]	
1. Belgium	94.6	1. Italy	94.0
2. Australia	94.5	2. Austria	89.3
3. Austria	91.6	3. Belgium	88.7
4. Sweden	90.7	4. Sweden	86.8
5. Italy	90.4	5. Portugal	85.9
6. Iceland	89.3	6. Greece	84.9
7. New Zealand	89.0	7. Netherlands	84.7
8. Luxembourg	88.9	8. Australia	83.1
9. Germany	88.6	9. Denmark	82.1
10. Netherlands	87.0	10. Norway	81.8
11. France	85.9	11. Germany	81.1
12. Portugal	84.2	12. New Zealand	78.5
13. Denmark	83.2	13. France	78.0
14. Norway	82.0	14. United Kingdom	76.0
15. Greece	78.6	15. Japan	74.4
16. Israel	78.5	16. Spain	73.0
17. United Kingdom	76.3	17. Canada	67.4
18. Japan	74.5	18. Finland	63.0
19. Canada	69.3	19. Ireland	62.3
20. Spain	68.1	20. United States	52.6
21. Finland	64.3	21. Switzerland	39.4
22. Ireland	62.2		
23. United States	52.6		
24. Switzerland	48.3		

Note:

a. Most recent as of 1981.

b. In the "Traditional Measure of Turnout," U.S. turnout is calculated as the percentage of the voting-age population, while turnout elsewhere is calculated as the percentage of registered voters.

c. An anomaly exists between the right and left columns in table 1 (as well as between table 1 and table 2) for five countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In each of these cases the vote as a percentage of voting-age population is higher than the vote as a percentage of registered voters. This is because there is a separate source for calculating the voting-age population. The less trustworthy number is the voting-age population figure. This often had to be estimated from old census data for present-day populations. For example, the Italian and Spanish numbers had to be projected from 1971 and 1970 census figures on the percentage of the population over 18.

Source: The figures for the United States are from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1982-83. The data for all other countries for the number of voters and the number of persons registered are from *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 2d ed., by Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. The voting-age population was derived from the countries' Year Books. It was occasionally necessary to extrapolate the present age breakdown on the basis of the last census.

turnout to public disaffection. Yet, repeated cross-sectional analyses have shown that the relationship between alienation and turnout is weak or non-existent.[2] Our concern, though, is with levels of alienation in the United States compared with those in other countries. Data on this point are scarce. None of the handful of comparative studies includes most of the countries in which we are interested, but together they give some clues about relationships between alienation and turnout across national boundaries.

We begin with a 1959 survey, which asked respondents in the United States and three European democracies about aspects of their countries in which they took pride. Fully 85 percent of the Americans said they were proud of their political institutions, compared to 46 percent of the Britons, 7 percent of the West Germans, and 3 percent of the Italians.[3] The question about pride seems not to have been asked in Europe since 1959. At that time, when the turnout gap was only slightly smaller than at present, Americans clearly were far prouder of their political institutions than were Europeans.

More recent European data are available on a closely related topic, citizens' satisfaction with their political system. *Euro-Barometre* regularly asks Europeans, "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?" The 1980 National Election Study asked Americans "how good a job you feel [the federal government] is doing for the country as a whole" on a scale from 0 ("very poor job") to 8 ("very good job"). These two questions are not identical. The European question asks respondents to judge "democracy" as part of their assessment of their government's performance. The NES item has no such cosmic implications and seems more likely to evoke partisan answers. Thus, the NES question invites more critical responses than does the European one. Fifty-nine percent of American respondents gave answers ranging from "fair job" to "very good job"; the mean for ten European countries was 51 percent. Respondents in Luxembourg (77 percent), West Germany (73 percent), and Denmark (60 percent) were more satisfied than Americans; people were less satisfied in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Holland, and Great Britain.[4]

Americans may vote less than citizens in other democracies, but they also seem less alienated. Ireland and Switzerland, the two countries that resemble the United States in their anemic turnout, also exhibit high levels of confidence and support for the system. In 1973, the only year for which we could find data about Switzerland, the Swiss ranked first (67 percent) in satisfaction with how democracy worked in their country, and the Irish were in third place. Residents of the two countries with highest turnout, Belgium and Italy, ranked second (62 percent) and last (27 percent), respectively.[5]

Finally, we have the results of an eleven-nation survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in 1981, reported in *The Confidence Gap* by Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider. Gallup asked about the respondents' degree of confidence in

> the armed forces, the legal system, the educational system, the churches or organized religion, the press, labor unions, major companies, the civil service, and the parliament or Congress. . . . The overall level of confidence turned out to be higher in the United States than in any other country surveyed except Ireland. After Ireland and the United States came Britain, Denmark, Spain, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, Japan, and Italy, in that order.

Whatever the reasons for Americans' lower turnout, dissatisfaction with their political system is not one of them.

Americans also surpass Europeans in other atti-

tudes that seem conducive to voting, such as a belief in their ability to influence political developments. In 1982 *Euro-Barometre* asked respondents in ten nations, "Do you think that if things are not going well [in this country] people like yourself can help to bring about a change for the better or not?" The 1980 National Election Study solicited agreement or disagreement with this statement: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." Fifty-nine percent of the American respondents disagreed with this statement; that is, they expressed feelings of political efficacy. An efficacious response to the *Euro-Barometre* question was given by 62 percent of Greeks and 56 percent of Danes. Luxembourg and Great Britain followed at 42 percent; all other countries had even fewer citizens who expressed efficacious feelings.

Americans are also more likely to engage in all forms of political participation other than voting. A mid-1970s comparative survey asked Americans and Europeans about their participation in both conventional activities like discussing politics, attending political rallies, and the like, *and* unconventional or protest behavior, such as signing petitions and going to lawful demonstrations. The levels of participation were higher in the United States than in Austria, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Great Britain.[6]

Using the European Denominator

If activity, optimism, and self-confidence about political participation determined turnout, Americans would lead the world. But there are some important steps between impulse and action, when the action is voting. Enthusiasm is not enough; in order to vote in this country, one's name must appear on a register of those whose qualifications have been established. What happens if American, as well as foreign, turnout is measured as a percentage of these registered voters who go to the polls?

The decentralization of election administration in the United States makes it difficult to tell exactly how many people register, and how many of those vote. No one source is completely satisfactory. Of those avail-



"I think voter apathy is terrible. Everybody should come out and vote for either what's-his-name or you-know-who."

able, we have most confidence in the Vote Validation Study conducted as part of the Michigan 1980 National Election Study, in which interviewers inspected voting records to establish whether each of their survey respondents had registered and voted.[7] The major drawback of this source is the somewhat upscale character of the Michigan sample, which underrepresents some underprivileged elements of society, particularly uneducated young men. Doubtless this is why the vote-validated Michigan sample shows a 1980 turnout rate of 60 percent. While this surely exaggerates turnout, it should be noted that the Census Bureau's 52.6 percent figure understates it.[8]

Eighty-seven percent of the registered respondents in the Michigan sample voted in 1980. The 1980 Voter Supplement of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, based on unverified responses from a sample of more than 90,000, yields an estimate that 88.6 percent of those registered voted. Both figures are very respectable rates in the international rankings of turnout. *If the basis of comparison with other countries uses the American denominator—the percentage of the voting-age population who vote—the United States looks bad. If the yardstick is the measure used elsewhere in the world—the percentage of those registered who vote—then the United States looks pretty good, as table 2 shows.* Using this European denominator, the United States ranks eleventh among the twenty-four countries, more than 38 percentage points ahead of last place Switzerland, and at least ten percentage points higher than Greece, Israel, Great Britain. Japan, Canada, Spain, Finland, and Ireland. Moreover, the gap between the United States and top-ranked Belgium is not very wide —only eight points in table 2 instead of the 42 percentage points in table 1. By this measure the United States looks better than most countries and nearly as good as any country.

Table 2
TURNOUT OF THOSE WHO ARE REGISTERED

	Vote as a Percentage of Registered Voters	Compulsion Penalties	Automatic Registration
1. Belgium	94.6	Yes	Yes
2. Australia	94.5	Yes	No
3. Austria	91.6	No (some)[a]	Yes
4. Sweden	90.7	No	Yes
5. Italy	90.4	Yes	Yes
6. Iceland	89.3	n.a.	n.a.
7. New Zealand	89.0	No (some)[a]	No
8. Luxembourg	88.9	n.a.	n.a.
9. W. Germany	88.6	No	Yes
10. Netherlands	87.0	No	Yes
11. United States	86.8	No	No
12. France	85.9	No (some)[a]	No
13. Portugal	84.2	n.a.	n.a.
14. Denmark	83.2	No	Yes
15. Norway	82.0	No	Yes
16. Greece	78.6	Yes	Yes
17. Israel	78.5	No	Yes
18. United Kingdom	76.3	No	Yes
19. Japan	74.5	No	Yes
20. Canada	69.3	No	Yes
21. Spain	68.1	Yes	Yes
22. Finland	64.3	No	Yes
23. Ireland	62.2	No	Yes
24. Switzerland	48.3	No (some)[a]	Yes

Note: a. Penalties apply only to small portions of the country or certain types of elections.

Source: See table 1. Compulsion penalty and automatic registration information are from G. Bingham Powell, "Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal, and Socio-Economic Influences," table 2, p. 10, except for Canada and Spain. The information on these two countries is in Inter-Parliamentary Union, ed., *Parliaments of the World* (New York: De Gruyter, 1976).

The Impediments

Two aspects of the election laws in different countries seem to be particularly important in explaining international variations in turnout. One of these is "compulsory voting" (actually penalties for nonvoting) present in five countries: Belgium, Australia, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Political scientist G. Bingham Powell's analysis revealed that such provisions are associated with about a 10 percent increase in turnout. The rather substantial impact of these laws seems to be achieved through moral suasion rather than actual sanctions. British political scientist Ivor Crewe confirms that "both convictions and sanctions against nonvoters appear to be negligible. . . . " Nevertheless, their impact is substantial; mean turnout in the Netherlands dropped 11 percentage points after that country abandoned compulsory voting. The most formidable sanctions may be in Italy, which does not formally require its citizens to vote, but whose constitution declares that voting is a duty; Italians who fail to vote have "DID NOT VOTE" stamped on their identification papers. What prudent Italian would risk blighting his chances of favorable consideration by a government official?

The second source of variation in turnout, and one that is much more important for the United States, is the location of responsibility for registration. In most countries, voter registration is automatic, a by-product of government-maintained records of every citizen's name and location. In a few countries, voter registration is a separate step, but one that the government initiates through a systematic canvass, either by public officials or payments to party workers. Great Britain and Canada, which register by canvass, have lower turnout than continental nations that make use of more automatic procedures. *The United States is the only country where the entire burden of registration falls on the individual rather than the government.*

Registration requirements make voting in the United States more troublesome than in any other country. The need to register—and the difficulty of doing so—impedes Americans' relatively strong impulse to participate, helping to produce a relatively low rate of voting. In most American states, registration is separated from voting by both time and geography. Registration usually does not provide the emotional gratification that voting does. Election day is the climax to a widely publicized and hotly contested competition. In contrast, the deadline for registration is as obscure as the registration requirements and procedures them-

selves. What is more, almost anyone who moves must register all over again; and in any given year one-sixth of the population moves.

The deterrent effect of American registration procedures can be tested by examining turnout in those states whose registration laws pose the smallest obstacles to voters. The most important legal provision in this respect is the closing date for registration; all other factors held constant, the closer to election day one can register, the greater the likelihood of voting. Four states permit election-day registration (Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin), and one requires no registration (North Dakota). How does turnout in these five states compare with that in other countries?

Table 3 shows that the five states allowing election-day registration or requiring no registration had considerably higher turnout than did the United States as a whole. The national percentage of the voting-age population who voted was 52.6 percent; for the five states, it ranges from a low of 61.5 percent (Oregon) to 70.1 percent (Minnesota). By comparing tables 3 and 1, we see that even our most permissive states do not match most other countries in turnout, although they come close to a few. All but Oregon exceed Finland and Ireland. Minnesota does better than Canada as well.

Table 3
TURNOUT IN STATES WITH ELECTION-DAY REGISTRATION (1980)

State	Percent of the Voting-age Population Who Voted	Where to Register
Minnesota	70.1%	At polls on election day, City Hall, City Clerk, County Auditor
Wisconsin	67.2	Election day at polls with identification, Municipal Clerk or Board of Election Commissioners in counties where registration is required
North Dakota	64.8	No registration
Maine	64.6	Registrar of Voters, Board of Registration, Justice of Peace, Notary Public
Oregon	61.5	County Clerk
All U.S.	52.6	

If the difficulty of registration accounts for much of the poor American turnout, why is there still such a gap between the permissive states and Europe? One reason is that the measures of turnout are still not equal. The numerator of the turnout percentage, the "number of votes cast," is some millions less than the number of all voters in the United States, because it excludes spoiled ballots, people who go to the polls but do not vote for a presidential candidate, and those whose write-in votes are not counted. According to Ivor Crewe, turnout elsewhere "includes invalid and blank votes (a more than negligible proportion in a few countries). . . ." These differences account for one to two percentage points of the turnout gap.

A second explanation is that election-day registration as practiced in some states is not equivalent to automatic registration. In Maine and Oregon, the voter must make two trips—one to register and one to vote. Oregon voters must first register with the county clerk, which may mean quite a trek for people in small towns and on farms. Another impediment may be that people are unaware how easy it is to vote. One-third of the nonvoting respondents in North Dakota—the best example, since it has no registration requirement—said they could not vote because they had not registered.

Finally, the sheer number of elections that confront Americans in a year may result in low turnout figures. The only evidence on this point is fragmentary but fascinating. Richard Boyd found that the number of residents in a Connecticut town who voted *at some time* during the year was considerably higher than the number who participated in any single election.[9] In short, voters may simply grow weary of voting.

One explanation that we have found unsatisfactory is that political choices in this country are not defined sharply enough to mobilize people to vote. There is no left-wing party, for example, to represent the workers' interests. Clearly, this notion cannot account for most of the gap between turnout in the United States and, say, France. Turnout in France is 15 percentage points higher than in the United States, but only three to five points higher than in Wisconsin or Minnesota. Since it is difficult to believe that either the class basis of the political parties or the character of partisan competition in these high-turnout states is different from that in states with average turnout (say California or Colorado), this line of thought has its limitations as an explanation of American turnout.

The Registration Obstacle

Analyses of group differences in turnout usually emphasize that impediments to voting are greater for some than for others. In fact, this applies to registration far more than it does to actual voting. Tables 4 and 5 provide strong confirmation for our hypothesis that registration is the critical hurdle. Table 4, for example, contrasts the relative difficulty for those of different ages and at different levels of education. Only 51 percent of people with a grammar school education managed to vote in the 1980 election, compared to 84 percent of those with a college degree or more—a gap of 33 percentage points. This is a familiar story. The gap, however, narrows to 17 percentage points when the comparison shifts to *registered respondents*. In other words, the less educated act much more like the better educated once they have crossed the crucial barrier of registration.

The same pattern also appears among age groups and those with different levels of political interest. The gap in turnout between the young and old, and between

the least and most interested, narrows significantly when the comparison is among those who have registered. It is especially striking among different age groups. Young Americans are notoriously light voters. Only 42 percent of those aged 18 to 24 made it to the polls in 1980, far behind the 69 percent turnout rate of those 65 and older. Yet, among young people who managed to register, 86 percent voted, compared to 90 percent of those aged 35 to 64. The gap between various age groups all but disappears among those who registered; the young vote at the same rate as the old once they pass the registration hurdle.

Even those least likely to vote—the uneducated, young, and politically uninterested—vote at fairly impressive rates if they are registered. Seventy-nine percent of people with only a grammar school education who were registered, for example, managed to vote. Comparing this with the data in table 2, we see that this group would rank sixteenth; higher than Greece, Israel, and Great Britain, and just below Norway and Denmark. The youngest group in table 4, with an 86 percent turnout, would rank much higher. Even people who were "hardly at all interested" in politics turned out at a rate of 74 percent (see table 5).

Table 4
TURNOUT AND REGISTRATION (1980)
BY AGE AND EDUCATION

By age:	Percent of All Respondents Who Voted	Percent of Respondents Registered to Vote	Percent of Registered Respondents Who Voted
18-24 years	42%	49%	86%
25-34	57	65	88
35-64	69	77	90
65 and over	69	82	85
By education:			
0-8 years	51	65	79
9-12	53	64	84
1-4 college	68	75	90
5 or more college	84	87	96
All U.S.	60	69	87

Source: The Vote Validation Study of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies, *The American National Election Study, 1980.*

Table 5
INTEREST IN POLITICS, TURNOUT, AND REGISTRATION
IN 1980

Follow politics a	Percent of All Respondents Who Voted	Percent of Respondents Registered to Vote	Percent of Registered Respondents Who Voted
Hardly at all	38%	51%	74%
Only now and then	54	64	84
Some of the time	70	76	92
Most of the time	75	83	91

Note: a. The question (variable 974): "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?"

Source: The Vote Validation Study of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies, *The American National Election Study, 1980.*

Remedies

Once we understand that the basic cause of our low voting rate is the registration requirement, we can see where major efforts to raise turnout should be directed. If we were to institute the European model of automatic registration, turnout would increase dramatically. This would be the surest method, but it goes strongly against the grain of American political culture. Far more than people elsewhere, Americans seem possessed by a desire to guard individual privacy from governmental intrusion. In fact, there are no records of all inhabitants in any American locality, and Americans have shown a genuine aversion to establishing them in the past.

Short of making it automatic, what might be done to ease the burden of registration? One impediment to voting is a closing date far in advance of election day. The closer the deadline to the election, the more people will vote. Many states could shorten their 30-day closing dates to a week or two before the election, without any apparent sacrifice of convenience or procedural safeguards. Potent interest groups oppose this step. County election officials often plead their need for a full month to consolidate records and then distribute them to precincts in time, although those states with shorter deadlines seem to get the job done in less time. Another interesting source of opposition to shorter closing dates is candidates for office, many of whom spend most of their campaign budgets on direct mailings in the last two or three weeks before the election; an early closing date permits them to use an up-to-date set of addresses. With a deadline just before the election, candidates would have to use lists from the primary election, which would be missing recent immigrants to their district and also would include people who had moved away. In addition to these procedural opponents, shorter closing dates, like other reforms, are often opposed by conservatives who believe that they would strengthen liberals; the evidence shows that more permissive registration procedures would increase the number of voters but not change their political character.

Election-day registration carries to a logical extreme the goal of shortening closing dates. While this provision unquestionably increases turnout, it has some potential for serious voting fraud. The brief experience in Minnesota and Wisconsin has not produced any scandals, but this may reflect the clean politics culture of those states more than the presence of adequate safeguards. One study of the two states concluded that election-day registration was an "honor system" without adequate procedural protection. Moreover, this seems to be an idea whose time has come and gone; Congress easily defeated President Carter's proposal for a nationwide system in 1977, and since then the provision has made very little progress.

Two more modest proposals occur to us. One concerns the possibility that some Americans refrain from

registering because they fear that doing so will make them liable to jury duty. Voter registration lists are used almost everywhere as a basis (sometimes the only one) for selecting jury panels, and serving on juries is a form of civic participation that many Americans wish to avoid. There is no hard evidence on this point, but there is a wealth of anecdotes from precinct workers and local election officials. If states were to use other sources in addition to registration rolls for selecting juries, such as lists of people who have registered their cars or obtained drivers' licenses, and then publicized the policy, people might be less motivated to avoid jury duty by refusing to register to vote.

The burden of registration is most likely to deter two kinds of people: those whose interest or clerical skill is insufficient to get them over this threshold, and people who, having moved, need to re-register. Movers do eventually get around to registering, but their registration rate takes approximately five years to catch up with those who have stayed put. Movers take their time about registering, but they cannot be so casual about telephone service, electric power connections, and similar arrangements that are made on arriving at a new home. Concerted efforts to include registration by mail forms with the paperwork required by utility companies might boost registration in those states that permit it (some 60 percent of the population). Some of these organizations are accustomed to including civic-minded material in their monthly mailings.

Post office change-of-address notices are an even more interesting possibility. If these were filled out in duplicate, the second copy could be mailed to the relevant secretary of state. In the case of intra-state moves by those who are already registered (83 percent of moves are within the same state), the secretary of state might be able to transfer the registration to the new address. Mail registration forms could be sent to the unregistered. Pilot programs to try these suggestions in limited areas are feasible, and would be appropriate subjects for financial support by foundations or a federal grant program.

If almost everyone who is registered votes, measures such as holding elections on Sunday, making election day a holiday, or extending the hours that polls are open would do little to improve turnout. All these are designed to encourage those who are already very likely to vote. Money, energy, and political capital should be reserved for actions that have more potential—getting people to register, on the amply documented assumption that once people register, they vote.

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NOTES

[1] The only exception of which we are aware is in Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 5th edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), p. 241. Great Britain, the U.S., and Idaho are compared. Idaho compares favorably on both measures, and the U.S. exceeds Great Britain in the proportion of the registered who go to the polls.

[2] See Jack Citrin, "The Alienated Voter," *Taxing and Spending*, October 1978, pp. 1-7 and Austin Ranney, "Nonvoting is Not a Social Disease," *Public Opinion*, October/November 1983, pp. 16-19.

[3] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 102.

[4] The *Euro-Barometre* data appeared in *Public Opinion*, June/July 1981, p. 38.

[5] Dusan Sidjanski, "The Swiss and Their Politics," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 11 (1976), pp. 294-321.

[6] Samuel H. Barnes et al., *Political Action* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing Co., 1979), p. 169.

[7] For a variety of reasons, information on the registration status or voting could not be gathered for 177 of the 1,614 respondents. We have deleted them from our analysis.

[8] For an explanation, see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 115-117.

[9] Richard W. Boyd, "Decline of U.S. Voter Turnout: Structural Explanations," *American Politics Quarterly*, vol. 9 (April 1981).

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(Continued from page 10)

implications of the launching of Sputnik. Lyndon Johnson is depicted as a publicity crazed boor who tries to bully his way into Glenn's home, against the wishes of the astronaut's wife, so he can catch the eye of the television cameras. But when it wants to stir its audience, the movie strums the old familiar chords. "I'm tired of seeing the Russians come in first," Glenn grimly declares, and then hurtles through space, in danger of incineration, humming the "Battle Hymn of the Republic." He defies the space agency brass and risks his career to protect his marriage, by backing his wife's refusal to let LBJ cross her threshold. "If you don't want the vice president or the TV network or anybody else coming through the house," he tells her, "that's it as far as I'm concerned."

Understandably, Glenn's supporters are counting on the aura of wholesome heroism projected by the film to spur his quest for the presidency in 1984. Meanwhile, there is evidence that another presidential prospect, looking ahead to 1988, is trying to take advantage of the continued potency of the old values. Edward Kennedy recently inveigled an invitation from Reverend Jerry Falwell to address 5,000 members of the Moral Majority who listened politely to Kennedy's remarks on separation of church and state. But it was Falwell who had the last word. "You might have gotten a few of them tonight," the Reverend told the senator, "but I'll get them back next week."

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Israeli Reflections On The Holocaust

by Hanoch Smith

A half-century has passed since national socialism rose to power in Germany, and thirty-eight years have gone by since the conquering Allied armies stilled the gas chambers. By the time the Allies arrived, six million Jews had been brutally murdered. Those events scarred parts of the world community as well as the survivors, and no doubt contributed to the establishment and determined survival of the State of Israel.

Now, with the passage of time and the growth of a new generation in Israel, it is time to investigate how and whether the attitudes of Israeli Jews have changed. How do they look upon the Holocaust and anti-Semitism today?

The Influence of the Holocaust Today

Overwhelmingly, Israeli Jews today see the Holocaust as a significant influence on their view of the world. Forty-five percent agree completely (the most intense response) that it is a major factor.

Statement: The Holocaust is a major factor in how I view the world		
Completely agree	45%	>83%
Agree	38	
Not sure, no answer	9	
Generally don't agree	3	
Disagree	5	

Sixty-five percent of those born in Europe/America agree completely, 40 percent of those born in Israel of European/American fathers agree completely, and 33 percent of those born in Israel of Asian/African fathers agree completely. The group that was most distant from the Holocaust, Israelis born of Asian/African fathers, were least likely to agree completely. Nevertheless, 76 percent either agreed or agreed completely that the Holocaust was a major factor in how they viewed the world. There is also a generational effect that shows up in the most intense category: of those over fifty years of age, 60 percent agree

About the Survey

In May 1983, the Smith Research Center conducted a survey on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism among a probability sample of 1,018 Jews aged eighteen years and older, representing a cross-section of Israeli society, including city dwellers and residents of Israeli cooperative settlements. The results were cross-tabulated by:

A. *Country of Origin,* divided into: those born in Europe or America; those born in Israel with fathers born in Europe or America; those born in Asian or African Moslem countries; those born in Israel with fathers born in Asia or Africa; and those born in Israel with fathers born in Israel. We collapsed the first two groups into "European/American" (50 percent of Israeli Jews over eighteen years of age), and the third and fourth groups into "Asian/African" (44 percent). The remaining 6 percent are third generation Israelis.

B. *Age:* the post-Holocaust group, those eighteen to twenty-nine years old; those who have childhood memories, at best, of the Holocaust (thirty to forty-nine years old); and those who lived through the Holocaust (fifty years old and older). All of the groups were the same size.

C. *Political Affiliation:* In this survey 43 percent said they supported the government coalition party (led by the Likud and the religious parties); 37 percent said they supported an opposition party (led by the Labor Alignment or Ma'arach); and 20 percent were undecided, refused to answer, or did not support either a coalition or opposition party. In this analysis, we ignore small differences between groups and report only those results that are strikingly different.

completely; in the thirty to forty-nine year old group, 43 percent agree completely; and in the eighteen to twenty-nine year old group, only 36 percent agree completely. Between opposition and government supporters, the differences are slight.

The trauma of the Holocaust is very much on the minds of Israelis, even in the second and third generations. Responses have not changed much over time; only their intensity has.

Distrust of the Outside World

Israeli Jews now believe almost unanimously—in the light of recent revelations by Martin Gilbert and others—that Western leaders knew the Holocaust was taking place and did very little to save Europe's Jews. Two questions begin to probe the depth of feelings about non-Jews and their role in the Holocaust and after.

Statement: History shows that despite the fact that leaders of the West knew what was happening to Jews during the Second World War, they did very little *to save them.*

Agree completely	59%	>91%
Agree	32	
Not sure, no answer	6	
Generally don't agree	1	
Disagree	2	

In the "agree completely" category, older and European/American born Israelis gave the most intense responses; but in no group did less than 50 percent agree completely with the above statement.

One should be cautious in drawing all-embracing inferences from responses to this one question. Israeli Jews, in reacting to this statement, accuse Western leaders not of complicity but indifference. The harshness of the accusation lies in its almost universal acceptance. The more serious charge is found in responses to the following:

Statement: From the Holocaust we learn that Jews cannot rely on non-Jews

Agree completely	55%	>87%
Agree	32	
Not sure, no answer	6	
Generally don't agree	3	
Disagree	4	

This, indeed, is a sharp indictment, with 87 percent affirmative responses, including 55 percent who absolutely agree. Geographical heritage makes a difference in the "agree completely" category, and so does the respondent's age. Sixty-four percent of those born in Europe or America agree completely, compared to 41 percent of the Israelis born of European/American fathers. Among those born in Asia or Africa, 63 percent agree completely, as against 50 percent of the Israeli-born whose fathers were born in the Islamic countries. Between age groups, 64 percent of those fifty or older agree completely, compared to 45 percent in the eighteen to twenty-nine year old category.

There are political differences, too, with this question: 63 percent of the Likud government supporters agree completely, compared to 48 percent among the opposition.

The Holocaust continues to be a profound influence on Israelis today, fostering in them a strong mistrust of non-Jews. This view permeates all sectors of Israeli society, though with less intensity among the Israeli-born and the younger generation.

Arab Attitudes

Perhaps the most shocking revelations were responses to statements about the Arabs. Two-thirds of the respondents believe that hatred of Jews is rooted in a majority of Moslems; most of the remainder do not disagree, but have no opinion. The Jews of Moslem country origins agree most strongly. Nearly half (49 percent) of those born in Moslem countries agree completely with the statement, with another 31 percent generally agreeing—80 percent in all. Among the Israelis born of these origins, 71 percent agreed, with answers split evenly between "agree completely" and "agree."

Statement: Hatred of Jews is rooted in the majority of Moslems

Agree completely	36%	>67%
Agree	31	
Not sure, no answer	20	
Generally don't agree	5	
Disagree	8	

The European/American origin response was much milder. Slightly over 30 percent of all Europeans completely agree that Moslems hate Jews, and another 27 percent agree generally. Thus, about 75 percent of all Asian/African Jews agree with the statement about Moslems; a clear majority of European/American Jews (about 57 percent) do also.

Perhaps the strongest view of the situation is represented by Jews' estimations of what Arabs would do to them if they could. Three out of every four Israelis agree that Israel's Arab neighbors would subject Israel's Jews to a Holocaust.

Statement: If they could, the Arabs would subject the Jews of Israel to a Holocaust.

Agree completely	48%	>75%
Agree	27	
Not sure, no answer	15	
Generally don't agree	5	
Disagree	5	

It matters little that those originating in Moslem countries believe more in this fate than those originating in Europe/America, or that government supporters believe it more intensely than the opposition. Overall, the view is strongly held by all parts of the Israeli Jewish community and is apparently deeply rooted.

Living with memories of the Holocaust shapes Israelis' personal lives. They distrust those in the West, based on their interpretation of the Holocaust experience. They believe themselves surrounded by Arab Moslems who hate them and would slaughter them given the opportunity. This is a unique community; no other country or people faces anything like this. Yet, all is not so grim.

The Zionist Answer

The Israelis have their answer. Often embattled, always existing under tension, the Israelis have built their modern democratic state. Today, over 3,400,000 Jews live in Israel, the second largest Jewish community in the world after the United States and the only one showing steady growth. And a majority of Jews (61 percent) continue to see the Holocaust as a major factor in the establishment of the Jewish state.

Statement: The Holocaust was the main *factor in establishing the State of Israel.*

Agree completely	29%	>61%
Agree	32	
Not sure, no answer	14	
Generally don't agree	9	
Disagree	15	

Among all European/American Jews, 66 percent agree, while among the

group originating in Moslem countries, the same percentage of the foreign-born agree. But only 50 percent of the Israelis born of Asian/African fathers agree with the proposition. Apparently, a sizable minority among this group—farther removed from the Holocaust—sees other reasons for the establishment of the State. Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear relationship between the Holocaust and Israel in the minds of the nation's Jewish community.

A clear majority sees Israel as a factor preventing the possibility of another Holocaust. But there are 24 percent who are clearly not in agreement. This minority is strongly concentrated among the Israelis born of European/American origins, 34 percent; third generation Israelis, 35 percent; opposition supporters, 29 percent; and the eighteen to twenty-nine year old group, 31 percent. Conversely, it is among the Asian/Africans that the belief is strongest, especially among their second generation. Among these young people, 71 percent agree that no new Holocaust is possible, and 14 percent disagree—the remainder are unsure or give no answer.

The overall view of Israelis seems to be that their state *is* the answer to the problem of anti-Semitism. Some doubts are appearing among a minority of those of second generation European/American origins, though it is not clear what this means—whether their doubts are symptoms of discouragement or of new hope.

Statement: Because of the existence of Israel, the occurrence of another Holocaust is impossible.

Agree completely	*34%*	*>62%*
Agree	*28*	
Not sure, no answer	*14*	
Generally don't agree	*7*	*>24%*
Disagree	*17*	

Shadows of Hope

We have seen how Israeli Jews feel about the role of non-Jews during the Holocaust, and the distrust that exists. On the question of Christian anti-Semitism, however, there lies hope for change.

Statement: Anti-Semitism is rooted in a majority of Christians.

Agree completely	*18%*	*>47%*
Agree	*29*	
Not sure, no answer	*22*	
Generally don't agree	*10*	*>31%*
Disagree	*21*	

Of the eight statements presented in this study, this is the only one on which less than a clear majority agrees. True, many more agree than disagree with the proposition (47 percent to 31 percent), but even among those who agree, only 18 percent do so completely.

There are big variations in response among different population groups. A clear majority, 57 percent of European/American born Jews agree that anti-Semitism is, indeed, rooted in a majority of Christians. But only 35 percent of those born in Israel of European/American fathers agree with this statement, while 40 percent do not agree—a small plurality on the side of disagreement.

Jews of Islamic country origins who have had less contact with Christians, are less likely to believe that anti-Semitism is rooted in a majority of Christians, though not by much less than the Europeans. The biggest differences are between age groups. Sixty-four percent of all Jews fifty years of age and older believe that anti-Semitism is rooted in most Christians; only 37 percent of the eighteen to twenty-nine year olds believe this, while an equal number disagree. These are the largest group differences in the entire survey. It suggests that young Israelis, who travel extensively in Europe and America, are beginning to find some new responses among people of their own generation. In light of the total picture, this is encouraging.

The trauma of the Holocaust still lies heavily upon Jewish Israelis. So many fears flow from the ghastly experience of the Holocaust that it is difficult for Israeli Jews to believe that this might be a different and better world. Some young Israelis, especially, want to believe this, and it is with them that hope lies.

Hanoch Smith is director of Smith Research Center, an Israeli polling firm.

Brody

(Continued from page 43)

moving in tandem. When the media broadcast criticism, the president lost support; when criticism was absent, he gained public approval.

The same dynamic appears during our most recent crises. The Beirut bombing and the Grenada invasion are intertwined in time and in the attention they received. Public opinion appears to respond to elite conflict over Grenada, because opposition alignments over the Caribbean crisis were simpler and clearer than they were in the Lebanon crisis.

President Reagan's Gallup approval rating stood at 48 percent when our troops landed in Grenada on October 26, and that level persisted while Speaker O'Neill and most of the Democratic congressional delegation voiced opposition to the invasion. On October 27, President Reagan spoke to the American people. The polls immediately following the speech show no gain in the president's overall job approval rating but do indicate gains in approval of his sending troops and in public confidence in his handling of the crisis. Democratic leadership responded to the speech, to the polls, and to the apparent success of the operation in Grenada by muting its opposition. The public, for its part, responded to the change in the Democrats' stand and to the "good news" from Grenada: In the latest Gallup poll—covering the first two weeks in November—the president's overall approval rating is at 53 percent.

The public rallies around the president because of something more than a primitive reflex; it follows opinion leadership, but that leadership is, as always, sensitive to the public mood. In this and every other observable respect, public opinion during international crises is like all public opinion: it results from the complex processes that link the president, the political leadership, the media, and the public to the American political system.

Richard Brody is a professor of political science at Stanford University.

[1] The forty cases are those found in Kernell's dissertation, which covers the postwar years through 1972. I have added the seven generally acknowledged rallying events in the Ford and Carter administrations. I have deleted from Kernell's list summit meetings and presidential speeches which introduce foreign policy initiatives, unless they gave rise to substantial uncertainty about the future.

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

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by Richard Rose

Public Confidence, Popular Consent: A Comparison of Britain and the United States

The paradox of democracy is that everyone is expected to consent to how the country is governed, but to disagree about who should govern. In the United States, the president's dual role as head of state and elected head of government confuses the important distinction between consent for institutions and disagreement about the choice of the nation's political leader.

By contrast to earlier periods, America since 1945 has experienced a fairly consistent swing of the electoral pendulum. The reasons for withdrawing confidence are many—personal shortcomings of politicians, unsatisfactory economic conditions, war. The literature itself is often contradictory. Lee Sigelman, in an article entitled "The Presidency: What Crisis of Confidence?", states, *"For every survey finding that can be cited on one side of a question, there is an equal and opposite finding that can be cited on the other side."* Moreover, many reasons given to account for the decline in confidence are contradictory, for some argue that the fault derives from uniquely American problems, while others argue that they are symptoms of a crisis of confidence throughout the Western world.

The important question is whether the swing of the pendulum, involving the rejection of each party leader in turn, cumulatively leads to popular rejection of the very institutions of governance, and to a withdrawal of popular consent for the Constitution. Lloyd Cutler and Ted Sorensen (the latter is interviewed on p. 2) have argued that there is a profound crisis in American politics. Cutler asserts that American institutions cannot respond, and that a parliamentary system would perform better. Sorensen recommends that temporary steps be taken to break our political gridlock.

The Confidence Equation

Comparing popular approval of British prime ministers with American presidents is particularly appropriate, for the centralization of politics in Britain, reinforced by media coverage, has increasingly made the prime minister the recognized symbol of British government as the president is in the United States. Moreover, like the Americans, the British have been prone to reject incumbents, thus showing that popular choice is changeable, with all this may imply for popular consent. The British economy has been sluggish in the postwar era, by comparison with the United States. Insofar as economic forces reduce popular consent, then popular confidence in the prime minister should be lower than in the United States. But the absence in Britain of such events as Watergate or the Vietnam War implies that British confidence in the prime minister would be higher than American confidence in a president.

The first step is to determine the level of popular approval of presidents and prime ministers, and whether or not it has been changing. Gallup questions date back to 1945.

The president of the United States normally averages a higher level of approval (53 percent) than the prime minister of Britain (47 percent). The overall averages, however, conceal very substantial differences between individual presidents, ranging from a 71 percent average rating for John F. Kennedy's truncated presidency to a 43 percent average for Harry Truman. In Britain, there is a smaller difference between the highs and lows—the 57 percent approving Sir Anthony Eden and the 37 percent approving Edward Heath. Over three decades the popularity of both presidents and prime ministers tends to bunch around the 50 percent level, exactly what would be expected in a system in which the competing parties rotated in office.

American Inconstancy, British Reserve

Americans are far more fickle than the British in evaluating a national leader. On average, the difference in Britain between the highest and lowest approval rating of a leader is 24 percent; for a president it is 41 percent. Harry Truman's career illustrates the inconstancy of American opinion; 87 percent approved of him shortly after he entered office following the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but only 23 percent did so in November 1951 during the Korean War. The British are neither as inclined as Americans to give approval to their na-

Table 1
THE AVERAGE POPULARITY OF PRESIDENTS AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS

Leader (Term)	President	Prime Minister
John F. Kennedy (1961-1963)	71%	
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1960)	65	
Sir Anthony Eden (1955-1957)		57%
Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1968)	56	
Sir Winston Churchill (1951-1955)		52
Harold Macmillan (1957-1963)		51
Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974)	49	
Ronald Reagan (1981-1983)	48	
Clement R. Attlee (1945-1951)		47
Gerald R. Ford (1974-1976)	47	
James E. Carter (1977-1980)	46	
Harold Wilson (1974-1976)		46
James Callaghan (1976-1979)		46
Harold Wilson (1964-1970)		45
Sir Alex Douglas-Home (1963-1964)		45
Harry Truman (1945-1952)	43	
Margaret Thatcher (1979-1983)		39
Edward Heath (1970-1974)		37
Average	53	46

Source: Calculated from publications of the Gallup poll, Princeton, N.J., and of the British Gallup poll, London.

tional leader, nor so quick to withdraw it.

Two factors can explain the greater stability of British opinion. The first is that British politicians are known nationally for longer before becoming prime ministers than are presidents. As a known quantity, a newly installed prime minister does not go through a honeymoon period. For example, the best known postwar prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill, inspired the satisfaction of only 55 percent of the electorate shortly after returning to office in October 1951.

The greater strength of party loyalties in Britain also accounts for less variation in popular judgments of national leaders. Insofar as personal evaluations are shaped by party loyalties, then supporters of the opposition party will be less likely to endorse a newly installed prime minister, even if a national hero; Churchill's ratings were lower than those of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Equally, supporters of the governing party will be less likely to turn against a prime minister in troubled times; Jimmy Carter suffered a lesser fall in popularity than Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher.

A crucial characteristic of the popularity of a president or prime minister is its *cyclical* element. The popularity of a leader varies substantially within a relatively short period. If generalizations about popular confidence are made at the peak point in each leader's cycle, then all national leaders would appear to make a positive contribution to national confidence. The median American president peaks at 77 percent and a British prime minister at 57 percent. If each political leader is judged at his nadir, the median president drops by 42 percent from his peak and a prime minister, 22 percent.

In any four-year period, national electorates are predisposed to show high confidence in their national leader *and* to withdraw that confidence. Since the personal characteristics of established middle-aged politicians in the national limelight do not change quickly, these rapid fluctuations cannot be accounted for by personality characteristics often used to explain political appeal. They are much more likely to reflect judgments of the performance of the government that the leader is meant to lead. Since the patterns occur in Britain, and also in France, Germany, and Sweden, it does not reflect shortcomings unique to America's politicians, but characteristics of competitive democratic politics.

The idea of a short-term cycle of popularity within a four-year presidential term or the life of a parliament need not imply stability from one decade to the next. If the economy is in persisting difficulty or if too many political leaders get caught deceiving the nation, this could produce a long-term decline in popular approval of the nation's elected leader. A cyclical pattern can involve the dips in popularity being consistently greater than subsequent rises. The cumulative effect would be a lower average level of approval for a nation's leader from one term to the next.

Long-Term Decline

In the American presidency, there has been a cumulative trend down in the level of popular approval from one decade to the next. The rate of decline, as identified by regression statistics, is low, only half of one percent a year, but in nearly four decades since 1945, this has produced a cumulative decline in underlying popularity of 19 percent. Moreover, each president's support has declined during his period in office, albeit in very different ways. President Eisenhower's overall popularity remained high for eight years, and his annual loss of approval—1 percent—was very low. President Kennedy's popularity was still high when he was assassinated because his annual trend of 6 percent loss in popularity was registered for less than three years. President Carter was right to sense a loss of confidence, for his popularity decline, at a rate of 8 percent a year, resulted in nearly a 32 percent loss from inauguration in 1977 to election defeat in 1980.

Two cautionary points should be made about the statistical evidence. The first is that the trend down for each president starts from a different point. President Eisenhower entered office very popular, and lost little support each year. By contrast, President Ford lost little support each year, but he did not start out at a high level of popularity. Second, the cyclical fluctuations in each president's popularity mean that the trend is *not a prediction*. We cannot forecast victory or defeat for any president. We can show that an incumbent president is likely to leave office less popular than he entered.

The United States is not unique; there has been a trend down in popular approval of British prime ministers at almost exactly the same rate as for presidents. The popularity ratings of individual British prime ministers follow a slightly different pattern from the United States. Whereas four prime ministers show a decline in

support during their terms, three prime ministers show an increase in popularity. Sir Alec Douglas-Home's and James Callaghan's rises could be attributed to starting from a relatively low base, entering Downing Street midterm in a parliament, rather than by winning a general election. Margaret Thatcher's slight trend up reflects starting from a relatively low base.

It is striking to see how much there is in common in popular reactions to national leaders on opposite sides of the Atlantic. A British prime minister is on average less popular than an American president—but the difference is only 7 percent.

The common pattern of long-term decline in the popularity of prime ministers as well as presidents indicates that explanations for either ought to include influences common to both. Nor is it difficult to find such influences. The fall in the popularity of leaders from the early 1960s has been accompanied by persisting and then intensifying economic difficulties. Undoubtedly nation-specific events—Vietnam and Watergate in the United States, and the aging of an Edwardian Harold Macmillan, or the personal rigidity of Edward Heath—are to some extent relevant. But the common rise in inflation and unemployment in the past fifteen years and the decline in economic growth are arguments for voters to turn against those constitutionally and democratically responsible for the state of the nation.

Confidence in Institutions

Judgments about the president or prime minister of the day are not tantamount to judgments upon the office of the presidency or the prime minister. Seymour Martin Lipset's and William Schneider's wide-ranging review of confidence (*The Confidence Gap*) in American institutions concluded that "institutions are more popular than their leaders." In an analysis of American attitudes toward government, business, labor, and other institutions, they found only a weak relationship between attitudes toward elected officials and toward the major institutions. Dislike of a president or prime minister is entirely consistent with endorsement of the political system and the social order of which the politician is a part. *It is the constitutional right of every citizen to dislike the nation's political leader without being regarded as an enemy of the state.* Cyclical shifts in popular approval during an individual's term of office, as well as at the general elections, are normal occurrences in a competitive party system.

Given the long chain of inference necessary to draw conclusions about confidence in the regime from election results or popularity ratings of individual politicians, it is best to rely upon direct measures of popular confidence in major institutions of society. Drawing upon survey data from a variety of democratic systems, we can ask: To what extent do Americans have more or less confidence in their institutions than Europeans?

Popular confidence in major institutions of society, ranging from government to the media and churches, has been measured systematically and comparably by a 1981 survey of the European Values Systems Study Group. The conclusion is clear: *Americans tend to have more confidence than do Europeans in their national institutions, including political institutions.* On nine out of ten measures of popular confidence, a higher proportion of Americans express "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in national institutions than the average in Europe. Taking all ten institutions together, 59 percent of Americans express confidence in their institutions as against 53 percent of Britons, 49 percent of French, 47 percent of Germans, and 45 percent of Italians.

Table 2
POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA AND EUROPE

Institutions	U.S.A.	G.B.	Ger.	Fr.	It.	Europe avg.	Difference U.S.-Europe
	(Those expressing a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence)						
Armed forces	81%	81%	54%	53%	58%	60%	+21
Police	76	86	71	64	68	71	+5
Church	75	48	48	54	60	52	+23
Education system	65	60	43	55	56	55	+10
Civil service	55	48	35	50	28	40	+15
Parliament-Congress	53	40	53	48	31	43	+10
Legal system	51	66	67	55	43	57	−6
Major companies	50	48	34	42	33	39	+11
Press	49	29	33	31	46	32	+17
Labor unions	33	26	36	36	28	32	+1
Average	59	53	47	49	45	48	+11

Source: Gordon Heald, "A Comparison between American, European, and Japanese Values" (Hunt Valley, Maryland: Annual WAPOR Conference, May 21, 1982), Table 4. Report of 1981 Surveys of the European Values Systems Study Group.

The institutions that tend to elicit the *highest* level of popular confidence in both America and Europe are *public* institutions: the armed forces, the police, the legal system, the education system, the civil service, and Parliament and Congress. In the United States, the only institutions in which less than half of Americans are prepared to express confidence are private sector institutions, the press and labor unions. The persistence among elites of what has been labeled the "jeremiah outlook" should not obscure the evidence that most people are political pragmatists, accepting national political institutions as imperfect but better than available alternatives and capable of reform.

The level of political confidence in the United States is high enough to reject the idea of a worldwide malaise. If one compares today's circumstances with half a century ago—when Hitler was in power in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, the Third Republic institutions in France were stagnating, and economic difficulties had apparently brought about the collapse of the British party system—there is no doubt that American political in-

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by John Robinson

The Ups and Downs and Ins and Outs of Ideology

Has the American public become more conservative in the last decade? The answer is not as simple as the question. On one side, we have seen more conservative political candidates elected, culminating with Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980. We have also seen some conservative causes elevated to prominence—Proposition 13, opposition to abortion, support for higher defense spending, and pride in military actions overseas.

While future historians may consider the above ample proof of a clear shift to the right in American politics, the clues from public opinion polls have been far less conclusive. Of course, polls rarely yield simple answers to simple questions, but on matters of political ideology and beliefs, the empirical evidence has been especially elusive.

Careful studies of the public's political beliefs and ideology show one thing consistently: the public does not often think about politics in ideological terms. On specifics, the research offers a welter of apparent contradictions and exceptions to any convenient generalizations. A few examples:

- After reviewing extensive public opinion data on political issues in the 1960s, pollster Louis Harris described what he referred to as "Karl Marx upside down." He found resistance to new ideas and social changes among the working classes who might expect to benefit most from them; he also found more tolerance of minorities, greater support of foreign aid and other internationalist policies, and more support of social welfare policies among supposedly more conservative businessmen.
- Lloyd Free and Albert Cantril, in their 1967 book, *The Political Beliefs of Americans*, described the public as basically conservative on abstract issues (government regulation of business, private property) but liberal on specific government programs and policies (Medicare, social security, and urban renewal).
- Educational psychologists Fred Kerlinger and E. J. Pedhazur have conducted several studies over the last two decades revealing that endorsement of a liberal stand on one item does not guarantee rejection of a conservative stand on another issue. Many people scored just as high (or low) on the liberal scale as they did on the conservative scale.
- Political scientist Everett Ladd, reviewing poll data in the February/March 1981 issue of *Public Opinion* noted that on many issues, there were greater differences among conservatives (particularly between the grade-school and college-educated) than between liberals and conservatives.

This jumble of findings hints that land mines await those who would turn to survey data for simple answers about the public's complicated political beliefs. One is tempted to characterize them as "schizophrenic" or "Janus-faced." Recent data reinforce these images. The General Social Survey (GSS) of the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center, for example, provides the following evidence of movement in a conservative direction over the last decade.

1. Some 73 percent of Americans felt their federal income taxes were too high in 1982, up from 63 percent in 1976.
2. While 57 percent of the public favored capital punishment for murderers in 1972, 77 percent favored it in 1983.
3. In 1972, 74 percent of the public said that courts were not harsh enough with criminals; that figure rose to 89 percent in the 1983 survey.
4. While 44 percent in 1974 felt that divorce should be more difficult to obtain, by 1983, 55 percent felt that way.
5. In 1973, 44 percent believed that communism was the worst form of government, and in 1982, 61 percent did.
6. In 1973, 56 percent agreed that pornography leads to a breakdown in morals, in 1983, 62 percent did.

Over the same period, however, the GSS data show just as much evidence of movement in a liberal direction.

1. On racial issues, 25 percent of whites in 1972 rejected the assertion that "Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted"; in 1982 that figure

rose to 39 percent.

2. In 1972, 27 percent said premarital sex relations were "not wrong at all"; in 1983, 39 percent said that.

3. Those saying that they would vote for a woman for president rose from 74 percent in 1972 to 87 percent in 1983.

4. Those saying that birth control information should be available to teenagers rose from 80 percent in 1974 to 87 percent in 1983.

5. Approval of euthanasia when a person has an incurable disease went from 39 percent in 1977 to 50 percent in 1983.

A Difference of Degree

The director of the highly regarded GSS, James Davis, has portrayed the pre-1980 shifts as a "long-range climate toward liberalization . . . , overshadowed by a conservative shift in the 'weather'." Demographic changes help explain the more liberal "climate." The major predictor of liberal attitudes over the years, particularly on questions of tolerance, has been the respondent's level of education. In general, the more educated the respondent, the more tolerant his attitudes, and the average level of education over the years has been rising steadily. In 1960, 17 percent of the adult population had had a college education; in 1984, that figure is 37 percent.

The rising level of education, then, helps explain part of this complicated picture—the public's greater tolerance: of homosexuals, of changing roles for women, and of minority rights, for example. But it does not explain the political emergence of such conservative concerns as: escalating taxes, our declining prestige overseas, diminished respect for marriage and the family, and a lack of adequate punishment for lawbreakers.

The lack of a clearcut ideological trend shows up at the elite level, too. Most politicians resist ideological labels these days—applied to them or to their voting records. The complexity of political circumstances, and the premium that American politics places on compromise, make it dangerous to walk into political combat with a unidimensional philosophy. Issues that are conservative one year (one might use deficit reduction as an example) can become liberal the next.

Nonetheless, the terms still mean something to the public. Again, we turn to the GSS questions for illumination. People who describe themselves as conservative do differ from those who describe themselves as liberal on most of the political questions the GSS asks yearly.

On almost every issue, self-identified conservatives do take what we think of as the more conservative stand. They are more opposed to abortion under a variety of circumstances, to racial integration, to the United Nations, to government spending on social programs, to atheist and homosexual rights, to pornography, to legalized marijuana, to communist governments, and to abolition of the death penalty.

Nonetheless, on many of these issues, the differences between liberals and conservatives are small. On the abortion questions mentioned above, for example, self-identified conservatives are only 10 to 15 percentage points more opposed than are self-identified liberals. But on some other subjects that are considered calling cards for one ideological camp or the other—gun control or high taxes, for instance—there is virtually no difference between liberals and conservatives. The differences are arrayed in table 1, which gives the rough percentages (translated from correlations) that separate self-identified conservatives from liberals on several matters.

The table also reveals the issues that *most* distinguish conservatives from liberals, though even these differences are not vast. These are "lifestyle" matters like ERA, legalized marijuana, and sex outside marriage.

In fact, the single issue in the GSS battery that most sharply separates liberals from conservatives is the propriety of premarital sexual relations—one that is almost completely outside the political arena and is least subject to political control. Differences between liberals and conservatives on this issue are about 25 percentage points. Moral issues, rather than political ones, most divide the ideological extremes. This holds true even though moral issues are rarely mentioned in open-ended responses (where survey researchers let the respondent answer in his own words rather than choose responses provided by the pollsters) the public gives about what distinguishes liberals from conservatives. When asked, liberals emphasize broader concerns about social change and social justice, and conservatives emphasize concern about the threat of big government to free enterprise.

The Party Line

Adding to our confusion about movement in one philosophical direction or the other is the role of party identification and its effect on ideology. Some political observers have all but dismissed the importance of the issue and ideological differences described above. But they overlook one significant aspect: Ideology does a far better job of distinguishing the public's political beliefs than party affiliation does. For example, in some cases people who label themselves Democrats take far more conservative sides than do those who label themselves Republicans. On other issues, mainly social welfare matters, Democrats take more liberal stands. But even these differences are not as clear or as consistent as those found in table 1.

We can look again at education for a partial explanation. Republicans, on the whole, have more years of formal education than Democrats do; this leads them to more liberal, or tolerant, attitudes on many issues. It is for that reason that political observers face such a difficult task in attempting to describe electoral outcomes in simple ideological, partisan, or issue terms. The three are so intricately interconnected that they defy easy explanation.

At the same time, there *is* a significant correlation between party affiliation and ideological identification.

Table 1

WHAT SEPARATES CONSERVATIVES FROM LIBERALS?

	Tolerance	Social control	Traditions/ Morals	Government/ Spending	Foreign affairs
On these issues, the difference between conservatives and liberals is: **Very low (0-9%)***		Approve of policeman striking male who said vulgar things Courts not harsh enough with criminals Oppose police permit before buying gun	Divorce should be more difficult to obtain Person has right to end own life	Federal income tax too high	U.S. should stay out of world affairs
			Oppose legal abortion Birth control information should not be available to teenagers		
Low (10-14%)*	Oppose racial busing	Approve of wiretapping	Would not vote for female president Women should stay home and leave running country to men Disapprove of married woman working if husband is employed Attend religious services frequently Disapprove of Supreme Court ruling on prayer in public schools	Government should not reduce income differences between rich and poor	Dislike Russia and dislike China Pull out of United Nations
Low Moderate (15-19%)*	Approve laws against interracial marriage Whites have right to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods Don't allow atheist to speak in community Don't allow communist to speak in community Don't allow homosexual to speak in community	Favor death penalty for murderers	Should be laws against pornography	Country spends too much on: improving environment improving health improving education solving urban problems improving conditions of blacks welfare	Communism is worst form of government Country spends too little on defense
			Oppose Equal Rights Amendment Don't legalize marijuana		
Moderate (20-25%)*			Wrong to have sex before marriage Wrong to have extramarital sex Wrong to have homosexual sex		

Note: *For clarity, we have used *approximate* percentage differences as reflected by correlation coefficients. Actual correlations are: Very low = .00-.09 Low = .10-.14; Low moderate = .15-.19; Moderate = .20-.25.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1974-82 (average correlation across years.)

More Republicans than Democrats identify themselves as conservatives, and more Democrats identify as liberals. In this one area, then, party affiliation does relate to political beliefs as expected.

Both ideology and party identification also relate to the most crucial political variable, how people vote in presidential elections. Party is the more important predictor, but ideology is also significant. Ronald Reagan, for example, did 25 percentage points better among conservative Democrats than among liberal Democrats in 1980, according to the CBS/*New York Times* election poll. This held true for Independent and Republican party identifiers as well.

No Future Shocks

But what has happened since the 1980 election? We return to the question we asked at the beginning of this article. Has the country become more conservative? The public, after all, has been exposed to the conservative political views of President Ronald Reagan for three years. The answer from the poll data appears to be, "Perhaps, but not much."

As shown in table 2 there is some indication of a slight decline in the number of self-identified liberals and a slight increase in the number of conservatives since 1980 in the GSS data. The CBS/*New York Times* data show the same trend as the GSS—two percentage points more conservatives and two percentage points fewer liberals. While the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies data also show a two percentage point decline for liberals between 1980 and 1982, they show a one point decline for conservatives as well. The Roper Organization data for 1981 and 1983 show a 3 point increase for liberals and a 4 point decline for conservatives.

Thus, there is hardly unanimity across the polls on this question, but that may not matter. These individual blips are less important than the long gradual movement shown in table 2. As the data show, the liberal label has become considerably less popular than it was in the early 1970s, while the conservative label has become slightly more popular. The strongest and most regular trends in both directions are found in the GSS data, and are reinforced in part by other surveys. The changes, however, are so gradual that they become apparent only over a long time. There appears to have been no change in the correlations between issue position and ideology (table 1) since the seventies.

The gradual shift toward conservatism takes on greater significance when we look back to ideological survey data from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. At those times, liberals consistently outnumbered conservatives. Today, one finds some surveys in which conservatives outnumber liberals by more than a two-to-one margin. While this shift in ideological identification is not yet reflected on specific issues, it may have far more important political consequences. Since data from the last four presidential elections indicate that conservatives do vote differently than liberals, no matter what their party affiliation, the more conservatives there are in the country (and the more they vote), the better the news for conservative Republican candidates.

Moreover, there is one area we did not include in table 1 that might also help President Reagan. The 1983 GSS study repeated four questions about an expanded role for federal government (versus more individual responsibility) in social programs that had been asked only once before (1975); support was down about 10 percentage points on each item. This may well signify that Ronald Reagan's views about the government's role have left some indelible ideological marks on public opinion. When combined with his indisputable personal appeal, the public's changing view about social spending should help secure the president's status as a formidable candidate.

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Table 2
IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
CPS/U. Michigan														
Liberal			19%		21%		17%		19%		16%		15%	
Conservative			26		26		31		27		28		27	
GSS (NORC)														
Liberal					31	30%	29	29%	28		26		27	24%
Conservative					30	30	31	32	34		34		32	35
Gallup														
Liberal	28%	25%										20%		
Conservative	46	45										44		
CBS/*New York Times*														
Liberal							22		22	20%	21	18	20	19
Conservative							30		27	34	30	35	34	32
Roper														
Liberal								25				19		22
Conservative								40				47		43

by William Schneider and I. A. Lewis

The Straight Story on Homosexuality and Gay Rights

Over the past fifteen years, homosexuals have become a visible, organized, and highly active constituency in urban centers throughout the country. Gay voters have demonstrated their clout in municipal elections in cities as diverse as Washington, Houston, and San Francisco. Now they are turning their attention to national politics.

The concerns that head the gay political agenda are national ones:

- extension of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation;
- an end to federal policies restricting homosexual immigration and barring homosexuals from military service and security-related jobs; and
- an increased federal commitment to research on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), the mysterious and devastating disease that has mostly afflicted homosexual males.

The Human Rights Campaign Fund, a gay political action committee, raised over $600,000 in 1981-1982, which made it 55th in size out of over 3,300 PACS in the country. The Democratic party last year accepted an official gay-lesbian caucus. Gay rights has already become an issue in the contest for the Democratic presidential nomination. The 1984 Democratic National Convention is meeting in San Francisco, the widely acknowledged "gay capital" of the United States, and that will make it difficult for party leaders to ignore issues that concern homosexuals in the party platform and convention proceedings. Gay activists are asking for a prime-time television debate on gay rights during the convention; they promise protest demonstrations if they don't get it.

In short, homosexuals are seeking to acquire the status of a recognized and protected minority group in American politics. But are gays—like persecuted minorities before them—an "ethnic" group? Gay activists argue that they are and cite as evidence patterns associated with other ethnic groups in the past. For example, gays have been fleeing America's small towns and suburbs in favor of large urban centers that offer greater tolerance. Once in the cities, gays have found a new atmosphere of security and support. They have built up their neighborhoods by revitalizing decaying urban areas. They have developed a sense of group consciousness. They have organized their own defense associations, political clubs, professional societies, business groups, and community support facilities.

Homosexuals who choose to live openly homosexual lives in a predominantly homosexual environment have acquired all the distinctive characteristics of an urban subculture—extending even to dress, language, and cuisine. Predictably, gays have come into conflict with other urban minorities and have begun to compete with them for power. They have also been accused of clannishness and bloc voting.

All this has been typical of minority groups entering mainstream America in the past. The question is, do other Americans see homosexuals as a minority group with legitimate rights and interests? Are people willing to accord gays the same status and protections as other persecuted minorities? Do the norms of American pluralism apply to gays?

To answer these and other questions about American attitudes toward homosexuality, the *Los Angeles Times* conducted a nationwide survey in September 1983 and a statewide poll of Californians in October. Other survey organizations have investigated American attitudes in this area, and we report on some of those surveys here.

Large numbers of Americans harbor negative views of homosexuality that they no longer apply to differ-

ences of race, religion, sex, or national origin. While people do not accept homosexuality as a way of life, they do not endorse the persecution of homosexuals. The public believes that gays should have the same rights and protections as other Americans, but support falters when it is seen as implying acceptance or endorsement of homosexuality.

The data suggest that negative public attitudes toward homosexuality are likely to change. In the long run, education will make a big difference, since educated people are more tolerant of homosexuality, as they are of most social differences. Other factors may alter public attitudes in the short run. The polls show that gay activists have not been misguided in their campaign to "open the closet door": personal contact with people who are openly homosexual consistently produces greater tolerance for homosexuality. Tolerance is also influenced by what people believe causes homosexuality. The gay rights movement can use both of these factors to influence public opinion. At the same time, the data point to the major obstacles to acceptance faced by gays. One is religion, which in some cases militates against toleration of homosexuality. The other is self-interest, the perception by certain dominant social groups—men and married people, to be specific—that gay rights represents a threat to them.

Acceptance and Discrimination

The public's fundamentally negative view of homosexuality can be seen in the answers given to a question asked in the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys since 1973: "What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?" In six polls taken between 1973 and 1982, the percentage saying homosexual relations are "always wrong" has been consistently high, between 67 and 70 percent. In fact, the data show almost no change over this nine-year period. In 1982, 70 percent felt that homosexuality was "always wrong," 5 percent said "almost always wrong," 6 percent said "wrong only sometimes," and 14 percent "not wrong at all." The comparable figures for 1973 were 70 percent, 6 percent, 7 percent, and 11 percent. Interestingly, the proportions saying "not wrong at all" are slightly higher than the 10 percent of the population estimated by the Kinsey Institute to be predominantly homosexual.

The public was more critical of extramarital sex. In 1982, 72 percent said that "a married person having sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner" was always wrong, 13 percent said it was almost always wrong, 10 percent said sometimes wrong, and 3 percent, not wrong. The figures changed little from year to year. Adultery, it may be noted, is always a conscious decision, while many people believe that homosexuality is not a choice at all. In contrast to the stability of public attitudes toward homosexuality and extramarital sex, there is evidence of some liberalization during the 1970s on the issue of premarital sex. The view that sexual relations between a man and a woman before marriage is "always wrong" declined from 35 percent in 1972 to 28 percent in 1982, while acceptance of premarital sex ("not wrong at all") rose from 26 to 40 percent.

What exactly do people mean when they say homosexuality is "always wrong"? Do they think it is sinful? Not necessarily. In 1977 and again in 1982, the Gallup poll asked, "In your opinion, can a homosexual be a good Christian or a good Jew, or not?" In both years, a five-to-three majority said yes. Do people think homosexuality should be a crime? Not really. Gallup asked, "Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?" In both years, the public was closely divided (43 percent "yes" and 43 percent "no" in 1977; 45 to 39 percent "yes" in 1982). Views on the legality of homosexuality were strongly related to education. In 1982, 61 percent of the college educated thought it should be legal, and 25 percent thought it should not be; the high school educated were split, 43 percent to 41 percent; and the grade school educated felt strongly that homosexuality should not be legal, by 61 to 25 percent.

When Gallup asked, "Do you feel that homosexuality should be considered as an accepted alternative lifestyle or not?" the answer was clearly no—51 to 34 percent in June 1982 and 58 to 32 percent in a Gallup poll taken for *Newsweek* in July 1983, after the AIDS epidemic had been widely publicized. As shown in table 1, a majority of the national public told the *Los Angeles Times* poll interviewers last September that they opposed homosexuality in all cases, compared with 5 percent who personally approved of it and 39 percent who took a tolerant but not approving attitude ("it's all right for other people but not for yourself"). When people say homosexuality is wrong, they seem to mean that it is unnatural or disordered—"there is something wrong with them." It is not necessarily sinful or criminal, but it is not normal.

Gallup also reported in 1982 that

> . . . homosexuals in the U.S. continue to be thought of by the public as leading unhappy, insecure lives despite their efforts to dispel this stereotype. . . . By a five-to-one margin, the public thinks gays are less likely than straights to lead happy, well-adjusted lives. By two-to-one gays are thought to have more drug and alcohol problems than straights.

In fact, the questions Gallup used to reach these conclusions have a systematic bias. Gallup asked, "Compared to non-homosexuals, do you feel that homosexuals are more likely or less likely to . . . lead happy, well-adjusted lives, . . . have problems with alcohol, . . . have problems with drugs?" Such questions virtually require respondents to stereotype: the view that homosexuals are no different from everyone else was not offered or coded as a valid response. The result was that

negative characterizations outweighed positive ones in each case, with a high proportion of respondents (21-38 percent) recorded as "no opinion." In one case, however, the stereotype turned out positively; by 36 to 23 percent, respondents said that homosexuals are less likely to be involved in crime than non-homosexuals (41 percent had no opinion). Since there are no comparable questions in the public domain that include the "no difference" option, it is difficult to test the accuracy of Gallup's contentions.

The contrast between acceptance of homosexuality and acceptance of gay rights can be seen in a 1982 Gallup poll in which, by 59 to 28 percent, people said that homosexuals should have equal rights in job opportunities, up slightly from a 56 to 33 percent margin in 1977. In both years support for equal job rights for gays was greater than support for legalizing homosexuality! By July 1983, support for equal job opportunities had risen further, to 65 to 25 percent favorable, even though, as reported above, acceptance of homosexuality as an alternative lifestyle had gone down. The widespread opinion that homosexuality is wrong is counteracted by the widespread belief that discrimination is also wrong, at least in principle.

In 1977, CBS News and the *New York Times* asked people if they thought it was "OK in a lot of cases" not to hire a qualified person who was either black, a woman, an ex-convict, physically handicapped, or homosexual. In each case, a majority said it would be wrong to discriminate. But the percentages holding this view ranged from 94 in the case of blacks to 61 in the case of homosexuals. One-fifth of the public said that discrimination against gays was "OK in a lot of cases." Should laws be passed to see to it that each group has equal job rights? The answer was yes each time, but the percentages varied from a high of 80 in the case of the physically handicapped down to 50 for homosexuals. The Harris poll asked whether the public supported a "law which outlawed discrimination" against each of ten different groups, including blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and women. At least three-quarters of the public favored such legislation for every group—except homosexuals. In the case of homosexuals, support dropped to 54 percent, with 28 percent opposed.

When people say that discrimination in principle is wrong, they do not seem to mean that discrimination in practice is always wrong. In the same Harris survey, a 48 to 41 percent plurality felt that "homosexuals should be barred from certain kinds of jobs." Majorities said that homosexuals should be allowed to hold jobs as artists, sales clerks, factory workers, company presidents, television news commentators, and members of Congress. The public was closely divided in the case of doctors and policemen, while sentiment was against allowing homosexuals to hold positions as school teachers, school principals, camp counselors, social workers, psychiatrists, and ministers. Gallup also asked about specific occupations and came up with a similar ranking in 1982. Majorities felt that homosexuals should be hired as sales persons and allowed to serve in the armed forces. Homosexual doctors were more narrowly approved, 50 to 38 percent. But majorities believed gays should not be hired as clergymen or elementary school teachers. (In each case, sentiment had become slightly more positive since 1977.) The public does not want to discriminate against homosexuals, but it does not want to have to deal with them too closely or to place them in positions of moral influence, particularly over the young.

Assessing Support

Table 1 shows the results of six questions from the *Los Angeles Times* poll, three that measure attitudes toward homosexuality, and three that assess support for gay rights.

National attitudes toward homosexuality are strongly negative. Majorities or near majorities endorsed the most anti-homosexual position from a choice of three or four alternative responses offered in each case. As noted, most Americans said they completely opposed homosexuality. By 63 to 30 percent Americans described themselves as unsympathetic to the homosexual community; almost half said they were "very unsympathetic." And no less than 63 percent indicated that they would be "very upset" if they had a homosexual child. We devised an index to determine the overall balance of attitudes toward homosexuality. The results were 49 percent negative, 21 percent in between, and 30 percent positive. Californians, however, were more positive (43 percent) than negative (32 percent) in their attitudes.

Questions relating to gay rights elicited more sympathetic responses from the national public. As in the Gallup polls, a majority of Americans favored laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination. By a narrow margin, the public felt that the armed services should not have the right to discharge homosexual soldiers. Sentiment was closely split on the issue of voting for a homosexual candidate for Congress; 50 percent said they would be less likely to vote for a gay candidate, while 46 percent indicated that a candidate's homosexuality would make no difference. Our summary index showed that the public's attitudes toward gay rights were about evenly balanced (37 percent positive, 36 percent negative). Californians, once again, leaned in the positive direction.

Differences between California and the nation also showed up on questions measuring familiarity with homosexuals and ideas about what causes homosexuality. Thirty percent of the national public and 43 percent of Californians said they knew friends or co-workers who were "openly homosexual." Does familiarity affect attitudes toward gays and gay rights? Indeed it does. Among Americans nationwide who personally know an open homosexual, 35 percent were "negative" on our index. Among those who did not know an open

homosexual, the figure was much higher—61 percent. Knowing a homosexual also affected support for gay rights. Thirty-one percent of those who knew homosexuals—and 44 percent of those who did not—opposed gay rights, according to our index. What counted was knowing someone who was *openly* homosexual. Knowing a suspected homosexual made little difference. These same patterns held up in the California data. Negativism

Table 1

	National	California
Homosexuality		
What is your attitude toward homosexuality?		
Personally approve of homosexual relations between consenting adults	5%	13%
All right for other people but not for yourself	39	45
*Oppose it for everyone	52	37
How sympathetic would you say you are to the homosexual community?		
Very sympathetic	6	8
Somewhat sympathetic	24	37
Somewhat unsympathetic	17	25
*Very unsympathetic	46	25
If you had a child who told you he or she was a homosexual, what do you think your reaction would be?		
*Very upset	63	50
Somewhat upset	27	33
Not very upset	4	7
Not upset at all	3	6
Sympathy Index:		
Positive (0 asterisked* responses above)	30	43
Middle (1 * response above)	21	25
Negative (2 or 3 * responses above)	49	32
Gay Rights		
Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?		
Favor	52	59
*Oppose	36	31
Do you think the armed services should be able to discharge a soldier because he or she is a homosexual or a lesbian, or don't you think they should have that right?		
*Yes, should be able to discharge	40	39
No, should not be able to discharge	50	53
If your party nominated a well-qualified person for Congress, and it turned out that he or she was a homosexual, would that make you . . .		
More likely to vote for that candidate	1	2
*Less likely to vote for that candidate	50	40
Wouldn't make any difference one way or the other	45	55
Gay Rights Index:		
Favorable (0 asterisked* responses above)	37	45
Middle (1 * response above)	27	21
Unfavorable (2 or 3 * responses above)	36	34
Familiarity with homosexuals		
Do you know any friends or co-workers who are openly homosexual? (IF NOT) Do you know any friends or co-workers who you *suspect* are homosexuals?		
Yes, know open homosexuals	30	43
Yes, know suspected homosexuals	14	11
No, don't know any homosexuals	53	44
Cause of homosexuality		
In your opinion, what causes homosexuality? Is it . . .		
Something that people are born with	16	23
Something that develops because of the way people are brought up	25	26
Just the way that some people prefer to live	37	31
Not sure	20	19

Note: National sample = 1,653; California sample = 1,889.
Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, September 1983 (National) and October 1983 (California).

about homosexuality and opposition to gay rights fell by one-third to one-half among Californians who knew someone openly gay.

Respondents in both surveys were also asked what they thought caused homosexuality. Three choices were offered: it is "something that people are born with," it is "something that develops because of the way people are brought up," or it is "just the way that some people prefer to live." The last answer, that homosexuality is basically a preference, prevailed in both the national and the California surveys. Slightly fewer respondents cited upbringing as the cause. The least popular explanation was the one supported by the latest evidence from the Kinsey Institute, that people are "born homosexual." Californians were a bit more likely than other Americans to believe homosexuality is inborn, but it was still the answer chosen least often.

Do people's views of what causes homosexuality affect their sympathy for homosexuals and their support for gay rights? Again, our indexes show a strong and clear relationship. Those who believe that homosexuality is "something that people are born with" are significantly more sympathetic and supportive. In the national sample, for instance, 32 percent of those who believed that homosexuality is inborn were classified as "negative," compared with 57 percent of those who saw homosexuality as the result of upbringing or personal preference, or who didn't know what caused it. Opposition to gay rights was expressed by 29 percent of those who saw homosexuality as inborn and 42 percent of others. The California data confirmed these relationships. In both surveys, people who believed homosexuality was the result of upbringing differed little from people who believed it was "just the way some people prefer to live"; both groups expressed very negative attitudes toward gays and gay rights. The key factor creating sympathy for gays is the belief that it is "something that people are born with."

With both factors, familiarity and causation, the trend would seem to be in a direction favorable to homosexuals' interests. Since the late 1960s hundreds of thousands of homosexuals throughout the country have become visible. Our data support the conclusion that, in the long run, visibility of gays will help the gay cause, even if it produces a short-run backlash. That was the case with the black civil rights movement in this country. The initial surge of black activism in the 1950s and 1960s produced a virulent backlash in both the South and the North. Yet poll data have consistently shown a liberalization of attitudes toward integration and civil rights over the past thirty years.

In the case of homosexuals, personal visibility seems to change negative attitudes. Familiarity with gays does not breed contempt. Just the opposite, in fact. Group visibility—the perception of a large and growing homosexual subculture—may, however, have a different effect. It may stimulate a negative reaction unless it is accompanied by the integration of open homosexuals into "straight" society. The voluntary segregation of gays, as of blacks, is likely to be counterproductive; it replaces the closet door with the ghetto wall.

As noted above, some of the most recent evidence supports the theory that homosexuality may be an innate rather than an acquired characteristic.[1] That, too, is good news for the gay community, since the idea that homosexuality is a naturally occurring phenomenon—that gays literally can't help being gay—is associated with greater public sympathy. Gays could then say they are comparable to blacks, Hispanics, women, and other ethnic minorities—groups that were "born that way" and "can't help" being what they are.

In fact, the gay rights movement shifted tactics during the 1970s. Instead of claiming, as early gay activists did, that homosexuality was a sexual preference, gay leaders now advocate the portrayal of homosexuality as a sexual orientation. That was a wise move. Given the fact that most Americans continue to view homosexuality as in some sense "wrong" or "disordered," promoting the idea that gays choose to be that way was an invitation to intolerance.

Is the idea that homosexuality is "something that people are born with" becoming more prevalent? The data suggest that it is, although slowly. The Gallup poll offers people two choices: "Just your opinion, is homosexuality something a person is born with, or is homosexuality due to other factors such as upbringing or environment?" In 1977, 12 percent said homosexuality was something a person is born with; 56 percent said it was due to upbringing or environment (the rest said both, neither, or had no opinion). In 1982, the percentage believing that people are born homosexual had risen slightly, to 17 percent, while the percentage attributing it to environment or upbringing was slightly lower (52 percent). According to the *L.A. Times* data, people who know open homosexuals are more likely to believe that homosexuality is an inborn characteristic (22 percent, compared with 13 percent of those who do not know an openly gay person). In addition, better educated people are somewhat more likely to believe that homosexuality is inborn (see table 2). These relationships suggest that as more gays move out of the closet and as the population becomes better educated, the idea that homosexuality is inborn will tend to grow.

Traditional Disapproval

Of course, familiarity and causation are not the only factors associated with sympathy and support for gay rights. The *L.A. Times* data indicate that negative attitudes are substantially reduced in the more sophisticated sectors of the population—among the college-educated and high-income groups. Opposition to homosexuality is also lower among blacks, Easterners, Catholics, people who consider themselves "non-practicing" in matters of religion, and political liberals. By contrast, negativism is strongest among the poorly educated,

(Continued on page 59)

STATE OF THE NATION

Question: How do you feel that things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly or very badly?

Question: In commenting on how things are going in the country, some people tell us that the problems we face are no worse than at any other time in recent years. Others say the country is really in deep and serious trouble today. Which comes closest to your own feelings—the fact that: Problems are no worse than at other times. . . . The country is in deep and serious trouble. . . .



	Problems no worse than other times	Things in country going fairly well/ very well
March 1974	32%	29%
September	32	30
January 1975	29	23
May	38	40
January 1976	41	46
April	46	52
June	49	50
August	58	—
September	51	—
October	53	56
March 1977	57	—
May	56	65
July	59	69
November	57	64
March 1978	56	53
May/June	46	49
October	47	56
April 1979	33	36
October	27	33
December	33	36
January 1980	24	34
mid-March	20	24
late March	16	21
May	19	21
August	27	30
October	27	31
January 1981	31	27
May	38	50
September	46	53
December	41	43
March 1982	39	38
June	41	40
October	39	40
December	35	35
March 1983	39	45
June	51	58
September	49	56
December	51	60

Note: All sample sizes were over 1,000, except Jan. 1976 = 951; late March 1980 = 917; and Dec. 1983 = 1,000. *All surveys were of registered voters except March 1974, Sept. 1974, Jan. 1975, May 1975, and Jan. 1976.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest three of December 6-8, 1983.

America Is



Question: (So) (As) far as you are concerned, do you think that (following year named) will be better or worse than (present year named)?

Note: Sample sizes: for 1982 = 1,038; for 1983 = 1,037.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 11-December 4, 1983.

Question: (So) (As) far as you are concerned, do you think that (following year named) will be better or worse than (present year named)?

Percent saying next year (1984) will be better



Note: Sample size for U.S. = 1,037.
Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institute, December 1983. U.S. survey by the Gallup Organization, November 11-December 4, 1983.

Standing Taller



Question: Do you expect (following year named) to be a better year for you than (current year named), about the same, or not as good as (current year named)?

Question: Now, at the start of this interview I asked you what (following year named) looks like to you in personal terms. Thinking about the country as a whole, what kind of year do you think (following year named) will be for the nation—better than (current year named), about the same, or not as good as (current year named)?



Note: October 1971 data from studies sponsored by The Roper Organization prior to the Roper Reports. Subgroup data = December 3-10, 1983.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of December 3-10, 1983, (Roper Report 84-1).

The American Journey

Question: Respondents are shown a ten-rung ladder and are thus instructed: Looking at the ladder, suppose the top represents the best possible situation for our country; the bottom, the worst possible situation. Please show me on which step of the ladder you think the United States is at the present time. On which step would you say the U.S. was about five years ago? Just as your best guess, if things go pretty much as you now expect, where do you think the U.S. will be on the ladder, let us say about five years from now? (Cantril/Free/Potomac/Public Research)

NATIONAL



BY SEX



to Malaise and Back

Question: I have some questions about how you'd rate the way things are going in the United States. On a scale of one to ten —if one were the worst possible situation, and ten were the best possible situation—what number would you give to the way things are going in the United States at the present time? Where would you say the United States was five years ago? Remember, one is the worst possible situation and ten is the best possible situation. And, just as your best guess, if things go pretty much as you now expect, how would you rate the United States five years from now? (CBS News/*New York Times* and *New York Times*.)

BY RACE



BY INCOME



Note: For the 1979 survey the high income category = $25,000 and over. For the 1981, June 1983, and November 1983 surveys = $30,000 and over.

Source: William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, *American Hopes and Fears 1976, A Policy Perspective*, Potomac Associates, 1976, Washington, D.C. For 1959 and 1964, Institute for International Social Research; 1971, 1972, 1974, and 1976 Potomac Associates. For 1978, Albert H. Cantril and Susan Davis Cantril, "Unemployment, Government, and the American People," conducted by Public Research, who subcontracted interviewing and data processing to the Roper Organization. The study was funded by the Employment and Training Administration and the U.S. Department of Labor. CBS News/*New York Times*, November 1979 and June 1981 and *New York Times*, June 13-18, 1983 and November 18-22, 1983.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UP

Question: How would you describe the nation's economy today? Would you say it is good, or bad, or somewhere in-between? (If good) When you say the nation's economy is good, do you mean that it is somewhat better than normal, or do you mean that we are in a period of prosperity or do you mean that we are in the midst of a booming economy? (If bad) When you say that the nation's economy is bad, do you mean that it is somewhat worse than normal, or do you mean that we are in a recession or do you mean that we are in a major depression?

How about last year? Would you say the nation's economy twelve months ago was good, or bad, or somewhere in-between?

And next year? Do you think the nation's economy twelve months from now will be good, or bad or in-between?



Note: Categories collapsed for respondent's description of today's economy: "good" = "boom" + "prosperity" + "better." "Bad" = "worse" + "recession" + "depression."

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 11-15, 1983.

Question: Do you think the nation's economy is: getting better, getting worse, or staying the same?



Note: August 1982 sample size = 913. October 1982 data based on those who were certain, probably, or 50-50 chance they would vote in the 1982 election= 84%.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981, through November 17-23, 1981; ABC News, December 11-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30, 1982 through October 5-11, 1982; ABC News, December 7-8, 1982; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 18-22, 1983 through January 12-14 and 16-17, 1984.

Question: During the next year, do you think the economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, January 1981-November 15-16, 1982; and NBC News, January 22-23, 1984.

THE NATIONAL SPIRIT: TODAY

Question: I'm going to read you a few statements. For each, please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with it. . . . It is true in this country that if you work hard, eventually you will get ahead (January 1982) Do you agree or disagree that it is true in this country that if you work hard, eventually you will get ahead? (March 1981, July/August 1983, December 1983)



Note: Sample size for March 1981 = 1,206.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of November 3-7, 1983, and ABC News, December 12-18, 1983.

Question: There's been a lot of talk in the last few years about patriotism in America. Do you consider yourself very patriotic, somewhat patriotic, or not very patriotic?



Note: Sample sizes: for June 1983 = 1,145; for November 1983 = 1,093.

Question: Do you think that Americans should support this country in wartime even if they believe its actions are wrong?



Source: Surveys by the *New York Times*, latest that of November 18-22, 1983.

Question: What are you proudest of about America? Just tell me briefly in your own words. (Civic Service, Inc., 1981) Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as an American? (*New York Times*, 1983)

Proudest of America for freedom (liberty)



Note: No other category received more than 10%. In the 1983 survey "freedom" (generally) = 40% and, "freedom of speech" (cited alone) =10%, "other specific freedoms and combinations" = 19%. Total = 69%.

Source: Surveys by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981, and *New York Times*, June 13-18, 1983.

Question: Some people think that the United States will never again have it as good as we did in the past; others disagree. How about you? Do you think the country has already seen the best times we are going to, or not? (Civic Service, Inc., March 1981) I am going to read a few statements and after each I would like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with each. America's best days are behind it? (ABC/*Washington Post*, January 1982) Some people think that Americans will never be as well off again as they have been in the past. Others disagree and say that over the long run our standard of living will continue to go up. Do you think we have already seen our best days, or do you think things will get better? (*New York Times*, December 1983)



Note: Sample size for ABC/*Washington Post* = 597, and sample size for *New York Times* = 1,145.

Source: Surveys by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 27-30, 1982; *New York Times*, June 13-18, 1983.

THE NATIONAL SPIRIT: 1939

Question: Do you believe: that the great age of economic opportunity and expansion in the U.S. is over or that American industry can create a comparable expansion and opportunity in the future?



Question: Which one of the following most nearly represents your opinion of the American form of government? Our form of government, based on the Constitution, is as near perfect as it can be, and no important changes should be made in it. . . . The Constitution has served its purpose well, but it has not kept up with the times and should be thoroughly revised to make it fit present-day needs. . . . The systems of private capitalism and democracy are breaking down, and we might as well accept the fact that sooner or later we shall have to have a new form of government.


December 1939
Capitalism and democracy are breaking down--eventually we shall have a new form of government 5%
Don't know 11%
The Constitution has served its purpose, but it's outmoded and should be revised 19%
Our form of government, based on the Constitution, is as near perfect as can be--no changes are needed 64%

Question: Do you think your opportunities to succeed are better than, or not so good as, those your father had? (If single woman, ask about mother)



Question: Do you think you are better or less prepared to get ahead than your father was? (If single woman, ask about mother)



Question: Do you think that your son's opportunities to succeed will be better than, or not so good as, those you have? (If no son, ask: if had son . . .; if single woman, ask: if had daughter)



Source: Surveys by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, 1939

POP CYNICISM: ONLY A MODEST RECOVERY

Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?



Trust government to do what's right:	Always	Most of time	Only some/ None of time
1958	16%	59%	25%
1964	14	63	22
1966	18	51	31
1968	7	56	37
1970	6	48	45
1972	5	49	46
1974	2	35	63
1976	3	31	66
1978	3	27	70
1980	2	23	74
1982	2	32	66
June 1983	7	44	48
November 1983	6	40	54

Question: Would you say the government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?



Government is run for:	Benefit of all	Few big interests
1958	82%	18%
1964	69	31
1966	62	38
1968	56	44
1970	45	55
1972	42	58
1974	27	73
1976	27	73
1978	26	74
1980	23	77
1982	32	68
June 1983	38	62
November 1983	34	66

Note: Sample sizes: June 1983 = 1,145; November 1983 = 1,093.

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies, 1958 through 1982; and the *New York Times*, June 13-18, 1983 and November 18-22, 1983.

POLLSTERS: RIGHT TRACK, WRONG TRACK, OR OFF THE TRACK?

ABC/*WASHINGTON POST*

Question: Do you think things in this country today are generally moving in the right direction, or do you feel things have seriously gotten off on the wrong track? (January 1982-April 1983) Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten pretty seriously off on the wrong track? (November 1983-December 1983)



Note: The first January 1983 poll was conducted before Reagan's January 25 State of the Union speech. Second January poll was conducted immediately after this speech. Sample size for both surveys was 415.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 27-30, 1982-October 5-11, 1982; and ABC News, January 25, 1983; and ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 25-March 2, 1983-December 8-13, 1983.

ROPER

Question: Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction today, or do you feel that things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of September 24-October 1, 1983 (Roper Report 83-9).

CBS/*NEW YORK TIMES*

Question: Do you feel things in the country are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten off on the wrong track?



Note: Sample sizes: June 1983 = 1,145; November 1983 = 1,093.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 16-19, 1983 and the *New York Times*, June 13-18, 1983 and November 18-22, 1983.

PENN + SCHOEN

Question: In general, do you think things in this country are generally going in the right direction or are they seriously off on the wrong track? (April 1980) In general, do you think that things in the U.S. are going in the right direction or are they off on the wrong track? (June 1982-October/November 1983)



Note: Sample sizes ranged from 1,000 to 1,025 registered voters.

Source: Surveys by Penn + Schoen Associates for *The Garth Analysis*, latest that of October 29-November 4, 1983.

Party Identification

Question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?



Generally consider self:	Democrat	Republican	Independent
January-March 1979	45%	22%	33%
April-June	45	22	33
October-December	46	22	32
January 4-7, 1980	48	19	33
January 25-28	46	20	34
February 1-4	47	21	32
February 29-March 3	47	25	28
March 7-10	45	21	34
March 28-31	45	22	32
April 11-14	45	25	30
May 2-5	46	22	31
May 16-19	48	22	30
May 30-June 2	47	22	31
June 13-16	49	24	27
June 27-30	46	25	29
July 11-14	47	25	29
August 1-4	48	23	29
August 15-18	51	24	25
September 12-15	47	33	20
October 10-13	45	26	29
November 7-10	42	26	32
November 21-24	43	25	32
December 5-8	42	27	31
January 9-12, 1981	42	27	32
January 30-February 2	43	25	33
February 13-16	42	29	29
March 13-16	41	28	31

Generally consider self:	Democrat	Republican	Independent
April 3-6	42	29	30
April 10-13	39	29	31
May 8-11	42	26	33
June 5-8	41	27	33
June 19-22	45	29	27
June 26-29	43	29	28
July 17-20	37	30	33
July 24-27	40	27	33
July 31-August 3	42	28	30
August 14-17	40	29	31
September 18-21	47	26	27
October 2-5	43	29	29
October 30-November 2	45	27	28
November 13-16	43	26	31
November 20-23	42	25	33
January-March 1982	44	26	30
April-June	46	26	28
July-September	45	27	28
October-December	45	26	29
January 1983	45	24	31
January-March	46	24	30
April-June	46	23	31
July-August	45	25	30
October 21-24	43	28	29
November 18-21	43	26	31
December 9-12	41	26	33
January 13-16, 1984	41	28	31

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 13-16, 1984.

Reagan and

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (named president) is handling his job as president?



Note: In months in which more than one approval poll was conducted, the last results of the month are presented.

His Predecessors

For data see page 34



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 10-12, 1984

Data for pages 32-33

	Truman (4/45)	Eisen-hower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)	Reagan (1/81)
Month took office	—	—	—	—	59%	71%	—	—
After 1st month	—	68%	72%	74%	60	50	71%	55%
After 2nd month	—	59	73	77	66	54	72	60
After 3rd month	87%	74	78	74	60	48	63	67
After 4th month	—	74	75	78	62	42	64	68
After 5th month	—	—	72	75	63	37	63	58
After 6th month	—	71	—	74	63	38	67	56
After 7th month	75	—	76	74	62	37	66	60
After 8th month	—	75	79	—	58	39	54	52
After 9th month	—	65	77	—	56	40	51	56
After 10th month	63	—	79	—	67	52	56	54
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57	49
After 12th month	50	68	79	70	63	46	52	47
After 13th month	—	71	78	—	64	45	50	47
After 14th month	—	68	80	71	53	47	50	46
After 15th month	43	—	78	69	56	41	40	43
After 16th month	—	64	74	69	59	39	43	45
After 17th month	—	61	71	64	54	45	42	44
After 18th month	32	—	66	70	61	46	39	42
After 19th month	—	71	68	66	55	50	43	42
After 20th month	—	66	63	66	51	48	48	42
After 21st month	35	61	62	65	58	47	49	42
After 22nd month	48	57	74	63	57	45	50	43
After 23rd month	60	68	76	66	52	—	51	41
After 24th month	57	70	74	62	57	—	43	35
After 25th month	—	71	70	63	50	—	37	40
After 26th month	54	66	67	61	50	—	42	41
After 27th month	—	68	65	56	50	—	40	41
After 28th month	—	69	64	57	49	53	32	46
After 29th month	55	—	61	54	48	—	29	47
After 30th month	—	72	61	51	50	—	29	42
After 31st month	—	71	63	48	49	—	32	43
After 32nd month	—	—	56	56	—	—	30	48
After 33rd month	—	—	58	47	52	—	31	46
After 34th month	—	77	58	46	49	—	39	53
After 35th month	—	75	—	44	50	—	54	54
After 36th month	36	77	—	49	50	—	58	54
After 37th month	—	76	—	44	52	—	55	57
After 38th month	39	72	—	46	53	—	39	
After 39th month	—	69	—	45	—	—	39	

Note: In months in which more than one approval poll was conducted, the last results of the month are presented.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 10-12, 1984.

LATE POLLS: THE GARY HART PHENOMENON

Question: If the 1984 presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote in each of the following races?

Reagan vs. Mondale		Reagan vs. Hart		Reagan vs. Glenn	
54%	42%	49%	46%	60%	36%

Note: Sample size = 980.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, March 1-2, 1984.

Question: If the election for president were held today, for whom would you vote, President Ronald Reagan, the Republican or for former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat?

Question: Suppose that Senator Gary Hart is the nominee of the Democratic party, if the election were held today, for whom would you vote, President Ronald Reagan, the Republican or Senator Gary Hart, the Democrat?

Reagan vs. Mondale		Reagan vs. Hart	
54%	34%	46%	40%

Note: Sample size = 1,190 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Gordon Black Corporation for *USA TODAY*, March 2-5, 1984.

Question: Suppose the presidential election were being held today. If President Reagan were the Republican candidate and (named candidate) were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (Those who were undecided were asked: As of today, do you lean more to Reagan, the Republican or (named candidate), the Democrat?

Reagan vs. Mondale		Reagan vs. Hart		Reagan vs. Glenn	
50%	45%	43%	52%	52%	41%

Source: Survey by the Gallup organization, March 2-6, 1984.

Trial Heats

REAGAN vs. MONDALE

GALLUP
Registered voters

	Reagan	Mondale	Margin
April 1982	46%	46%	0
June	43	49	5 Mondale
October	47	44	3 Reagan
December	40	52	12 Mondale
February 1983	41	47	6 Mondale
April/May	43	49	6 Mondale
May	42	47	5 Mondale
June	41	50	9 Mondale
July/August	44	42	2 Reagan
August	44	43	1 Reagan
September	47	44	3 Reagan
October	44	50	6 Mondale
November	47	48	1 Mondale
December	51	44	7 Reagan
January 1984	45	45	0
February 10-12, 1984	50	39	11 Reagan

PENN + SCHOEN
(The Garth Analysis)
Registered voters

	Reagan	Mondale	Margin
December 1982	41%	47%	6 Mondale
February 1983	43	44	1 Mondale
April	42	46	4 Mondale
June	47	39	8 Reagan
August	46	43	3 Reagan
October-November	52	37	15 Reagan
February 8-12, 1984	54	38	16 Reagan

ABC/WASHINGTON POST

	Reagan	Mondale	Margin
September 1982	45%	38%	7 Reagan
January 1983	42	44	2 Mondale
February/March	39	48	9 Mondale
April	45	45	0
May	45	42	3 Reagan
June	42	50	8 Mondale
July/August	46	49	3 Mondale
September	44	49	5 Mondale
November	50	43	7 Reagan
December	48	45	3 Reagan
January 12-17, 1984	49	46	3 Reagan

HARRIS
Voters, Likely Voters

	Reagan	Mondale	Margin
March/April 1982	48%	49%	1 Mondale
January 1983	44	53	9 Mondale
March/April	48	46	2 Reagan
June	50	45	5 Reagan
July	49	46	3 Reagan
November	54	42	12 Reagan
December	51	45	6 Reagan
January 12-15, 1984	51	44	7 Reagan

LOS ANGELES TIMES

	Reagan	Mondale	Margin
November 1982	44%	47%	3 Mondale
April 1983	44	46	2 Mondale
May	45	41	4 Reagan
June	41	47	6 Mondale
September	44	44	0
December	45	46	1 Mondale
February 4-9, 1984	50	42	8 Reagan

REAGAN vs. GLENN

GALLUP
Registered Voters

	Reagan	Glenn	Margin
December 1982	39%	54%	15 Glenn
February 1983	40	45	5 Glenn
April/May	37	54	17 Glenn
June	38	53	15 Glenn
July/August	41	45	4 Glenn
August	40	46	6 Glenn
September	42	48	6 Glenn
October	42	49	7 Glenn
November	47	47	0
December	49	45	4 Reagan
January 1984	45	45	0
February 10-12, 1984	51	36	15 Reagan

PENN + SCHOEN
(The Garth Analysis)
Registered Voters

	Reagan	Glenn	Margin
December 1982	40%	46%	6 Glenn
February 1983	41	45	4 Glenn
April	37	50	13 Glenn
June	44	42	2 Reagan
August	41	47	6 Glenn
October-November	50	37	13 Reagan
February 8-12, 1984	58	30	28 Reagan

ABC/WASHINGTON POST

	Reagan	Glenn	Margin
January 1983	41%	44%	3 Glenn
March	38	47	9 Glenn
April	44	42	2 Reagan
May	42	45	3 Glenn
June	39	52	13 Glenn
August	43	50	7 Glenn
September	41	51	10 Glenn
November	48	44	4 Reagan
December	48	43	5 Reagan
January 12-17, 1984	50	41	9 Reagan

HARRIS
Voters, Likely Voters

	Reagan	Glenn	Margin
April 1982	49%	46%	3 Reagan
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March/April	47	48	1 Glenn
June	48	47	1 Reagan
July	46	49	3 Glenn
November	52	44	8 Reagan
December 8-12	49	46	3 Reagan

LOS ANGELES TIMES

	Reagan	Glenn	Margin
November 1982	47%	42%	5 Reagan
April 1983	42	48	6 Glenn
May	42	42	0
June	38	52	14 Glenn
September	41	47	6 Glenn
December	46	44	2 Reagan
February 4-9, 1984	51	35	16 Reagan

Note: For Gallup and Penn + Schoen, figures are for registered voters; for Harris, figures are for voters or likely voters; for ABC/*Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times*, figures are national adults. For complete question wordings in earlier askings, see *Public Opinion* October/November 1983, pages 30-31.

EXAMINING THE EARLY

Question: I am going to read you a list of words and phrases and would like you to tell me whether each one applies more to Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale. . . .



Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters. "Neither" and "Both" were separate categories.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, February 8-12, 1984.



Question: Putting aside how you might vote, I'd like to ask you to compare Mondale with Reagan in some ways. Which one do you think best understands the problems of people like you, Mondale or Reagan? Which one . . . ?

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, December 8-13, 1983.

FRONTRUNNERS

Question: Now I'd like you to rate President Reagan on the following items using a scale from "1" to "6" where "6" is the top rating and means *excellent* and "1" is the lowest rating and means *poor*. (Read list) Now let's do the same thing for former Vice President Mondale. Again "6" means excellent and "1" means poor.

Percent giving "5" or "6" rating:



Note: Sample sizes: for September = 1,016 registered voters; for December = 1,000 registered voters.

Question: Now let's rate President Reagan on how he handles the issues. Using a scale from "1" to "6" where "6" is the top rating and means excellent and "1" is the lowest rating and means *poor*. Now let's do the same thing for how former Vice President Mondale would do if he were elected. Again, "6" means excellent and "1" means poor.

Percent giving "5" or "6" rating:



Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of December 6-8, 1983.

STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY

SEEING IS BELIEVING

Question: Generally speaking, would you say you are a supporter or a critic of President Reagan's economic ideas? (If supporter) Are you a supporter because you think his ideas are right or because his ideas seem to be working? (If critic) Are you a critic because his ideas are wrong or because his ideas don't seem to be working?


Critic = 38%
Supporter of Reagan's economic ideas = 53%
Critic because ideas are not working 27%
Critic because ideas are wrong 11%
Supporter because ideas are right 18%
Supporter because ideas are working 35%
Neither 9%

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 11-15, 1983.

Question: If you had to judge now, do you think President Reagan's economic program is a success or a failure?



Note: "Not sure" was calculated out for comparison purposes. All were less than 10%, except July 1982, "Not sure" = 12%. Sample sizes ranged from 1,246 to 1,256. In a January 22-23, 1984 survey by NBC News, respondents were told "the annual federal deficit is approximately ten times larger now than it was when Ronald Reagan became president." When asked if "you blame Reagan for the growth in the federal budget deficit or not?" 60% of respondents said "do not," and 40% said they "do" blame Reagan.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of December 8-12, 1983.

Question: Now here is a question that asks you to compare the situation today with what it was three years ago, for example: would you say that President Reagan's economic program is a success or a failure? Do you think President Reagan's economic program eventually will be a success or a failure?



Note: Not all response categories shown. For situation today, "Neither" (vol.) = 9%, "Too early to tell" = 5%. For eventually, "Neither" (vol.) = 3%.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 11-15, 1983.

FAIRNESS: REAGAN'S ACHILLES HEEL

Question: Would you say Reagan cares more about serving poor and lower-income people, middle-income people, upper-income people . . . or would you say he cares equally about serving all people?



Note: Sample sizes: February 1981 = 1,205; March 1981 = 1,206; September 1981 = 501; October 1981 = 1,004; May/June 1982 = 1,304 (including 286 unemployed oversample); August 1982 = 913.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of December 8-13, 1983.

Question: Generally speaking, would you say that President Reagan cares more about men, or cares more about women, or would you say that President Reagan cares equally about both sexes?



Question: Generally speaking, would you say that President Reagan cares more about black people, or cares more about white people, or would you say that President Reagan cares equally about people from both racial groups?



Note: Interestingly, in a January 22-23, 1984 NBC News poll, when asked "if a Democrat were elected president in 1984, do you think women in America would be better off than they are now, worse off, or about the same?", 71% said "same," 23% "better," 6% "worse." Also, in a December 6-8, 1983 survey of registered voters by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for *Time*, when asked if the Republican party or the Democratic party would do a better job of "ensuring the rights of women and minorities or don't you think there's any real difference between them?", 56% said "Democrats would do a better job," 30% said "no difference," and 13% said "Republicans."

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 11-15, 1983.

Question: Do you think Ronald Reagan's economic program has been fair to most people in this country, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by NBC News, January 22-23, 1984.

STUBBORN STEREOTYPES

Question: Here is a list of some different kinds of occupations. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether you think it is the kind of occupation that should be pretty much restricted to men, pretty much restricted to women, or equally open to both men and women?



Note: * = less than .5%.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-10), October 29-November 5, 1983.

by Ronald Inglehart

The Fear of Living Dangerously: Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power

The public's introduction to nuclear power was the stunning and terrible news from Hiroshima. That a single atomic bomb had suddenly destroyed 100,000 people was shocking, terrifying, almost supernatural. This apocalyptic first impression has remained linked with anything bearing the name "nuclear" ever since. The majority of the public does not have a clear idea of the distinction between nuclear power plants and atomic bombs—and tends to view nuclear accidents as potential Hiroshima-like explosions. As long as this misconception persists, it will act as a key constraint on Western energy policy.

Such misconceptions persist despite massive media coverage given to nuclear power. Particularly in the months following the accident at Three Mile Island in March 1979, nuclear power was on the front pages and television newscasts almost daily, and was the subject of cover stories in news magazines throughout the Western world. But though millions of words were printed and spoken about nuclear power, the news media failed to convey some of the most basic facts the public needs in order to make informed judgments about it.

To take one crucial example: Only a tiny minority of the American public and the populations of ten European countries are aware that it would be impossible for a Hiroshima-type explosion to take place in the nuclear power plants now operating in the United States. In all countries, the vast majority thought nuclear plants *could* explode, and assigned this prospect various degrees of probability. In the American case, 84 percent believed that an explosion was possible, though 44 percent of those conceded it was "not very likely."

The Western public has been poorly informed on this matter—for such an explosion *is*, of course, impossible. The light water nuclear reactors operating in the United States and Western Europe utilize Uranium-235 enriched to a concentration of about 3 percent. An explosive chain reaction requires a much higher concentration, a concentration that could not be reached by any conceivable accident. Enriching Uranium requires sophisticated technology and complex equipment possessed by only a handful of nations. A Hiroshima-type

Table 1

CAN A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPLODE LIKE AN ATOMIC BOMB? THE PERCEPTIONS OF TEN PUBLICS

Question: People have been talking about the possibility of accidents taking place in nuclear power plants. What about a nuclear explosion like that of the bomb used in Japan in World War II—would you say that an explosion of this type in one of the nuclear power plants now operating in this country is very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or physically impossible?

	U.S.A.	West Germany	France	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Denmark	Italy	Belgium	Ireland	Greece
Very likely	12%	8%	6%	11%	11%	13%	10%	12%	19%	24%
Somewhat likely	27	21	26	30	31	22	31	35	37	41
Not very likely	44	40	47	43	40	43	31	27	20	19
Physically impossible	8	12	10	10	9	9	9	6	4	4
Don't know	6	19	12	7	9	14	20	21	21	12

Note: Sample sizes: U.S. data, 682 telephone interviews with a representative probability sample of the American public. European data, in above order, 1,063, 999, 1,028, 1,259, 1,003, 1,084, 1,006, 983, and 999.

Sources: U.S. data: Survey of Consumer Attitudes, Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, September 1980. European data from the Eurobarometre survey No. 17, sponsored by the Commission of the European Community, April 1982.

explosion could no more take place in one of the existing nuclear power plants than it could take place in a bicycle factory.

As one might expect, levels of education affect knowledge about the subject. Among those Americans whose education did not go beyond high school, for example, only 5 percent were aware that such an explosion was physically impossible; among college graduates, the figure was 17 percent. Though the figures for the college educated were three times higher, they were still remarkably low. Even the best educated among us, it seems, are subject to the worst fears about nuclear plants. During the weeks after the accident at Three Mile Island, even Ralph Nader (graduated with honors from Princeton and Harvard Law School) made such comments as "If Three Mile Island blows up, it'll take eastern Pennsylvania with it."

The greater the possible danger appeared, the greater the news value of the Three Mile Island story. Perhaps for this reason, the mass media did not go out of their way to reassure the public that their worst fears might be unfounded. It is also possible that reporters covering the story were no better informed than the rest of America. Contrary to what most of the public believes, the worst conceivable accident is a meltdown or steam blast that could cause radioactive waste products to leak out into the ground water or the atmosphere —not an atomic explosion.

This misconception may have played a major role in public reactions to reports of a disaster at Three Mile Island. After the excitement had died down, the Kemeny Commission, appointed by President Carter to investigate the accident, concluded that even in this—the most serious accident ever to befall the nuclear industry in the Western world—no one had been physically harmed even slightly, and no lives had been seriously endangered. The most serious damage was to the mental health of the people in the vicinity—who suffered severe psychological stress from worrying about what they *thought* might happen. Part of this psychological stress came from living with a danger that was wholly imaginary: If the residents of the Harrisburg area were like the rest of the American public, the great majority of them believed that the Three Mile Island plant might explode like a huge atomic bomb.

Dangerous Myths

A tendency to use misleading sensationalism when reporting on nuclear power persists to the present, even among some of the most respected and generally reliable news media. For example, *Time* magazine for February 13, 1984, had a cover story entitled "Nuclear Power—Bombing Out?" "Bombing Out" on the cover referred to the nuclear industry's financial difficulties, with no overt reference to nuclear bombs. But it seems likely that the editors were aware that their words had a double meaning—and a misleading one. And in case the reader missed the hint, on page one the cover story's author recalls:

> I had just seen the film *The China Syndrome* and called it farfetched because the chances seemed so infinitesimal that so many things could go wrong and in the necessary sequence. A week later I was in Harrisburg with a line from the film running through my head: "If this thing melts down, it will render an area the size of Pennsylvania permanently uninhabitable."

The article does *not* go on to point out that such an event was impossible—that not even by the wildest stretch of the imagination could an accident at Three Mile Island have left Pennsylvania permanently (or even temporarily) uninhabitable. On the contrary, it leaves the impression that Three Mile Island proved just how realistic such fears really were. With coverage like this, is it surprising that most of the American public doesn't know the difference between a nuclear power plant and a nuclear bomb?

The *Time* cover story is not an example of bad reporting. On the whole, it is carefully researched, balanced, and informative. It is not even anti-nuclear. It concludes that "The nation requires a mixture of energy sources to drive its economy in the future, and nuclear power should be part of that mix." But it is also the latest instance of a widespread tendency the mass media have shown to hint at Hiroshima when they report on nuclear power—perhaps because if it sounds like disaster is in the offing, the story seems much more exciting than if the reader realized that what's at stake is the possibility of a serious industrial accident.

This does not mean that opposition to nuclear power plants is based simply on ignorance. Some very well-informed people oppose them because of concerns about problems such as waste disposal. But uncertainty about the difference between a nuclear power plant and an atomic bomb *does* seem to have a major influence on support for the nuclear option. Among those members of the American public who believe that an explosion is very likely, a clear majority—60 percent—oppose the development of nuclear power plants. Among those who are aware that it is physically impossible, only 12 percent oppose developing nuclear power and 88 percent support it.

The Costs of Safety

Misapprehension on this subject could exact high costs. During the decade preceding 1978, the contribution that nuclear power made to American energy resources grew rapidly. In 1968, it generated less than 1 percent of our total electrical output; by 1978 it furnished more than 12 percent. In the aftermath of Three Mile Island, its development stagnated. In 1984, nuclear power still furnishes only about 12 percent of our electricity.

A decade ago it took about seven years to complete a nuclear power plant. Today it takes up to fourteen years, partly because of regulatory delays; the Japanese still complete them in seven years. The conse-

quences are severe; large amounts of capital are tied up in nonoperating plants and the interest and lost revenue can cost two million dollars a day or more. Understandably, under these conditions, no new nuclear power plants are being ordered, and many of those already ordered have been canceled or redesigned to burn oil or coal. There is a serious possibility that the American nuclear power industry, which led the world until recently, may shut down completely.

No law of nature or economics determines that this must be so. Many other nations have decided to pursue the nuclear option vigorously, and a number have already surpassed the United States in the percentage of electricity they produce from nuclear sources.

Between 1980 and 1985, the Soviet Union will quintuple the amount of electricity it produces from nuclear energy. In 1984, nuclear power plants will generate about 20 percent of the electricity used in West Germany, 30 percent of the electricity used in Switzerland, 35 percent in Taiwan, close to 40 percent in both Belgium and Sweden, and over 40 percent of the electricity used in France. By 1985, nuclear power is expected to supply over half of France's electrical power. After a late start, Japan is now moving ahead rapidly in developing nuclear power, and already is obtaining 24 percent of her electricity from nuclear sources—almost double the American figure. The United States is capable of achieving similar goals; doing so would reduce our dependence on imported oil, help our balance of payments, and reduce pollution. Quite probably, it would also save lives.

If one is genuinely concerned with the safety of the American people, one needs to weigh the risks of *not* using nuclear power along with the risks of using it. If we do not use nuclear power, we will probably use something else, and at present the choices are coal and oil. Nuclear power is not risk-free—but neither are the alternatives. For example, approximately 100,000 Americans have died in coal mine accidents in this century. From the start, nuclear power has been viewed with an almost superstitious awe, and the safety standards imposed on nuclear power plants have been far more demanding than those imposed on coal or oil powered plants. These standards have grown steadily more rigorous, with Three Mile Island bringing an additional wave of tighter safety requirements. In this respect, the anti-nuclear movement has played a constructive role.

The escape of radioactive material from a power plant *could* cause casualties, though in twenty-five years of operation it has never done so anywhere in the Western world. But each year hundreds of miners still die in coal mining accidents and in the United States alone about 300 former coal miners still die from Black-Lung disease each year. No one knows exactly how many additional deaths among the general public could be traced to pollution from coal—but a recent study estimates that 53,000 Americans die each year from industrial pollution caused by burning coal and oil.[1] Accordingly, the American Medical Association has concluded that nuclear power plants are a safer way to generate electricity than coal or oil-burning plants. Any switch from nuclear power to coal, however well intended, would in the long run cost many lives.

Relying on oil might be even more reckless. Like any form of energy, it carries certain unavoidable occupational hazards: a North Sea oil platform collapsed in 1980, killing 120 people in a single accident (which was forgotten within a few weeks). But a far more serious danger in relying on imported oil is that it threatens to involve us in war in the Middle East. This country's Rapid Deployment Force is primarily designed to defend Middle Eastern sources of petroleum against Soviet intervention.

Nothing is perfectly safe. Despite their impressive safety record, nuclear power plants will not be accident-free. On the contrary, if they continue to operate we must assume that people eventually will be killed or injured; but the human impact of such incidents, if they do take place, would probably be on the scale of coal mining accidents or oil drilling accidents—not a nuclear bombing.

Harrisburg could not have become a Hiroshima. Nevertheless, if one imagines the worst conceivable nuclear power plant accident—and ignores its improbability—one can conjure fatality figures that rival Hiroshima's. If everything went wrong simultaneously, and if the back-up systems failed, and the back-up systems to the back-up systems failed, and the plant were situated near a large city, and there were an atmospheric inversion, and if a sufficiently strong wind were blowing in just the right direction, then enough radioactive waste might blow over the city to kill 50,000 people. This is, of course, possible—but it's about as likely as the Worst Imaginable Automobile Accident, which would take place as follows: If everyone in the United States simultaneously got into automobiles, accelerated them to top speed, and had simultaneous head-on collisions, it could kill 220,000,000 people. No one can guarantee that the Worst Imaginable Automobile Accident won't happen—but it's absurdly improbable. Nevertheless, one could argue that the latter accident is the *more* probable of the two.

During the next few decades we will need to reduce our consumption of petroleum, which now provides about half of our total energy supply. But even if we are able to attain *zero* energy growth through rigorous conservation, we will have to make an urgent effort to develop other energy sources. As oil supplies dwindle, we will need everything we can get, including coal, nuclear fission, hydroelectric power, wood, and windmills. In the long run, nuclear fusion or solar energy may provide safe and limitless supplies of energy, but for the present it would be foolish to foreclose any major available options.

[1] See Richard Wilson *et al.*, *Health Effects of Fossil Fuel Burning* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1981).

Table 2

SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR POWER AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS

Question: Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following proposals? . . . Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs. . . . How strongly d you feel? (Figures are for 1983; 1979 numbers in parentheses)

	U.S.A.	United Kingdom	France	Italy	West Germany	Belgium	Ireland	Nether-lands	Greece	Denmark
Agree strongly	32%	17% (23)	19% (22)	26% (16)	16% (22)	19% (19)	9% (12)	16% (13)	16% (na)	10% (14)
Agree	33	47 (40)	34 (30)	31 (27)	38 (33)	25 (25)	27 (27)	18 (23)	11 (")	13 (18)
Disagree	13	16 (12)	17 (18)	18 (18)	22 (17)	18 (20)	24 (18)	21 (22)	10 (")	23 (23)
Disagree strongly	19	8 (9)	15 (16)	15 (24)	14 (17)	20 (19)	20 (24)	37 (37)	37 (")	40 (29)
No reply	3	12 (16)	15 (14)	10 (15)	10 (11)	18 (17)	20 (15)	8 (5)	26 (")	14 (16)

Note: 1979 data not available for Greece. 1983 U.S. data based on 1,500 telephone interviews. 1983 sample sizes for European data, in above order were: 1,348, 1,011, 1,031, 1,049, 1,038, 987, 998, 1,000, and 1,027.

Source: For the United States, Cambridge Reports, Inc., for the Committee on Energy Awareness, June 1983. European data from Euro-barometre survey No. 19, by the Gallup survey affiliates in the respective countries, and sponsored by the Commission of the European Community, June 1983.

As we have seen, six of seven Americans believe that our nuclear power plants can explode like atomic bombs; and about half of them view this event as somewhat or very likely. This mistaken belief is only slightly less widespread in Western Europe. The prevalence of this conviction makes the public, understandably, prone to panic at news reports concerning any type of accident in a nuclear power plant. It also has significant implications for survey research on this topic. In particular, it means that Western publics are extremely sensitive to survey questions that evoke the possibility of nuclear accidents. Indeed, whether one finds a majority for or against continued development of nuclear power may depend on question wording.

The Power of Opinion

Bearing this in mind, what is the current state of public opinion concerning nuclear power in industrialized Western nations? Table 2 shows the percentages supporting and opposing developing nuclear power in the United States and nine Western European nations in 1983, in response to a question that neither plays up nor plays down the possibility of nuclear accidents.

Though the same question was asked in all ten countries, the responses varied widely from nation to nation. As table 2 demonstrates graphically, support outweighed opposition in the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Italy, West Germany, and Belgium. Opposition was stronger than support in Ireland, the Netherlands, Greece, and Denmark.

The cross-national rankings shown in table 2 have been quite stable for Europe during the past several years: The results are similar to those from surveys carried out in 1979 and 1981, using the same question. These stable cross-national differences may reflect long-term historical factors. If so, it is probably significant that support is strongest in Great Britain, the United States, and France—for these are the three nations that have the longest-established and largest nuclear power programs.

Conversely, among the four publics that are predominantly anti-nuclear, only one (the Dutch) has even a limited amount of experience with nuclear power plants; the Irish, Greeks, and Danes have no nuclear power plants.

This could be interpreted as evidence of the decisive influence of public opinion: In those countries where nuclear power is unpopular, nuclear power plants aren't built. And there undoubtedly is a good deal of truth in this interpretation. Public opinion *can* prevent the utilization of nuclear power, as is illustrated by a 1981 national referendum in which the Danish public voted *against* nuclear power—effectively killing the nuclear option in that country.

But it seems very likely that the causal process works both ways. The first nuclear power plant in the world went into operation in Great Britain in 1954. In 1983 (as in 1979 and 1981) the British public was more supportive of nuclear power than any of the other populations surveyed. The nuclear power plants operating in Britain might not be there if the British public were overwhelmingly opposed—but one reason *why* the British public is favorable, in all probability, is that nuclear power has been operating there on a relatively large scale for nearly thirty years, producing electrical power but *not* producing the soot or the thousands of deaths that would be linked with coal-burning plants. For the British public, nuclear power is not particularly new or frightening; it has been around for a long time.

In the United States, a set of myths and misconceptions surround nuclear power plants. The use of nuclear power involves genuine risks, which must not be underestimated. But we should not lose sight of the fact that *overestimating* these risks may be equally dangerous. In all probability, it has already cost a sizable number of human lives.

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The Death of Politics in New Hampshire

by David Moore

It is a tenet of faith among most reporters and political analysts these days that New Hampshire is a state where "retail politics," not "wholesale politics," is required for victory. Loosely translated, that means any candidate who expects to win—or even to do well—in the nation's first presidential primary must, as in the days of yore, engage in old fashioned, face-to-face campaigning: Contenders must knock on doors, talk with the people, and organize volunteer workers, rather than bombard voters with messages from afar via the mass media.

In the view of some observers, Gary Hart's upset victory in the 1984 New Hampshire primary only reinforces the notion that retail politics is crucial in the state: His campaign efforts and organization were generally rated among the two best there.

The notion is accepted by reporters and pundits as well as politicians, but it simply isn't true. If we look carefully at the 1984 campaign—and at earlier contests—we find very little evidence to support the myth.

Getting It Wholesale

In the 1984 primary campaign there were two major fluctuations in voter preferences: the first after Jesse Jackson's trip to Syria to secure the release of Lt. Robert Goodman and the second after the Iowa caucuses.

Jackson's late December trip was given a great deal of mostly favorable publicity, and although he barely campaigned in the state, he moved to the head of the "long-shot" candidate list following his mission. In the October University of New Hampshire (UNH) poll, he received only 1 percent in voter preference; by early February, he was at 8 percent. This surge was clearly a media surge.

The second major fluctuation occurred after the Iowa caucuses. According to ABC News/*Washington Post* polls, Gary Hart went from 12 percent to 30 percent in voter preferences, Mondale from 35 to 30 percent, and Glenn from 23 to 14 percent between February 18-20 and 25-27. The actual results were Hart 40, Mondale 29, and Glenn 13. Such large shifts had not occurred for anyone but Jackson between March 1983 and early 1984, despite extensive one-on-one campaigning. It is hardly plausible that local organizations or one-on-one campaigning caused these shifts within a one-week period. Clearly, the relentless media coverage of Hart's "better than expected" second place Iowa showing and Glenn's "very poor" showing there were key to the shifts in voter preference. Ironically, Mondale's organization was rated by many observers as the most extensive and the best financed in the state, yet Mondale's standing among voters dropped the most dramatically.

The importance of national media coverage is seen also in the 1980 election campaign. The UNH poll in February of 1979 showed Governor Jerry Brown of California acceptable to 49 percent of the voters as either their first or second choice (among Brown, Carter, and Kennedy). Six months later, in September, a UNH poll showed that figure had dropped to 28 percent, even though Brown was the only candidate to campaign to any significant extent during that period. Kennedy's acceptability jumped from 58 to 87 percent, though he had yet to declare his candidacy and had not started campaigning. This boost reflected the extensive (and generally positive) coverage he had received as he contemplated whether to challenge his party's incumbent president. Carter's rating dropped from 64 to 51 percent; he had not campaigned either.

Once Kennedy started campaigning, in October, his rating dropped. That reflected the nationwide reversal of Democratic opinions toward Kennedy and Carter. The Iranian hostage crisis worked to Carter's short-term political benefit, and Kennedy's comments about the Shah and his lackluster performance in an interview with Roger Mudd worked to his detriment. Without any personal campaigning in the state, Carter was able to beat Kennedy (and Brown) decisively in the primary, though those two candidates had campaigned extensively among the voters.

Table 1
WHAT HAPPENED IN NEW HAMPSHIRE?

	BG Dec. 10	UNH Jan. 29-Feb. 7	BG Jan. 31	BG Feb. 12-14	ABC/WP Feb. 13-15	ABC/WP Feb. 14-16	ABC/WP Feb. 15-17	ABC/WP Feb. 16-18	ABC/WP Feb. 17-19
Mondale	45%	38%	42%	39%	42%	40%	37%	36%	34%
Glenn	19	17	19	18	21	18	18	16	20
Hart	6	7	8	10	10	12	15	18	17
Jackson	3	8	10	11	8	11	11	10	12
Sample size	(NA)	(507)	(NA)	(487)	(154)	(148)	(156)	(148)	(152)

Note: For *Boston Globe*, sample was Democrats and Independents. For University of New Hampshire, sample was Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents. ABC/*Washington Post* sample was of registered Democrats and Independents who said they were certain to vote in the primary. Darden Research sample was of Democrats and Independents who said they were likely to vote in the primary. Teichner & Associates (WCVB) sample was of Democrats and Independents who planned to vote. NA = not available.

Thus, the dynamics of the 1980 New Hampshire Democratic primary were almost totally a function of national events reported in the national media, rather than the face-to-face campaigning for which the state is known.

Similarly, in the 1980 Republican primary, Bush's "emergence from the pack" came about not because of his campaigning in New Hampshire, but because of the media's wide coverage of his victory in Iowa, where Reagan had refused to campaign or participate in the debate. Bush's disastrous fall in New Hampshire was due to the Nashua debate only three days before the election. Television played the debate story over and over again. Reagan's confrontation with the moderator showed him a masterful leader and Bush a spoilsport. Until then, polls had shown a close race.

For both the 1980 and 1984 primaries, then, New Hampshire bore all the earmarks of a "media" state, where local campaigning did not prove to be as decisive in the electoral contest as did national media attention.

The Earlier Contests

A close examination of earlier contests shows that the myth of retail politics may not apply to them either. In 1968, Senator Eugene McCarthy's close second to President Johnson was probably not due to extensive organizing and campaigning in the state. McCarthy didn't declare his candidacy until January. Those who voted for him were a mixture of "hawks" and "doves" who opposed Johnson on the war either because they wanted the United States to be more aggressive or because they wanted an immediate withdrawal. They gravitated to McCarthy in a protest coalition made even more prominent by the TET offensive only a few weeks before the primary.

The 1972 primary seems to fit the "retail politics" model to some extent, because McGovern announced earlier and spent considerably more time and energy campaigning in New Hampshire than Senator Muskie did. But I suspect that if public opinion polls had been tracking the race closely, they would have revealed that Muskie's crying incident on the front steps of the *Manchester Union Leader* was far more devastating to his fortunes than McGovern's efforts were. McGovern, it should be recalled, still lost to Muskie by 9 points, and it is conceivable that, prior to that incident, Muskie's lead had been substantially greater than the final vote tally. We know from polls conducted in the 1980 race that the one incident of the Nashua debate resulted in Bush's loss and Reagan's gain of about 15 percentage points each, for a net difference at election time of almost 30 points.

If the crying incident caused even a 5 percentage point erosion in Muskie's vote (for a net gain to McGovern of 10 points) that alone may be responsible for starting the myth that one-on-one campaigning is key to success in New Hampshire. Without that incident, Muskie may have actually reached the "expected" 50 percent level or better (he received 46 percent) and beaten McGovern by 19-20 points. With those results, given the months of campaigning by McGovern, no one would have claimed that New Hampshire was especially sympathetic to long-shot candidates.

But then came 1976 and the emergence of Jimmy Carter. This solidified New Hampshire's image as the state where retail politics is essential for victory. A UNH poll conducted shortly before the election showed that Carter's campaign had contacted more potential voters than had Udall's, though the margin was only several percentage points. And, of course, Carter won by less than six points. Actually 1976 may meet the stereotype of retail politics because no candidate for the Democratic primary that year commanded special media attention. All were relatively unknown nationally. Although the Iowa caucuses were later identified as indicative of Carter's early strength, that contest was not given the media attention it received in 1980. The real attention of the media in 1976 began with the *results* of the New Hampshire primary election, not with earlier stages of the process.

But, of course, the Iowa caucuses will never again be slighted. Thus, whatever the presumed effect of retail politics in an earlier time, the New Hampshire primary today is dominated not by one-on-one campaigning, but by the nature of national media coverage. Certainly no candidate (White House incumbents may be an exception) can afford to be perceived as not doing his fair share of campaigning in any state. That image hurt Reagan in Iowa in 1980 and would hurt a candidate in New Hampshire as well. But barring such negative images, it does not follow that for a candidate to do well in New Hampshire, he must engage in *extensive* face-to-face campaigning, or that such campaigning will even help.

New Hampshire in that sense is similar to the rest of America, where wholesale politics is an unavoidable facet of electoral campaigns, and where one-on-one campaigning is simply not possible with the vast majority of voters. The myth of retail politics in New Hampshire may die hard, for many people would like to believe that it is so, and probably still will.

David Moore is an associate professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire and codirector of the New Hampshire poll.

Table 1
(continued)

ABC/ WP Feb. 18-20	ABC/ WP Feb. 19-21	ABC/ WP Feb. 20-22	WCVB Feb. 21-22	ABC/ WP Feb. 21-23	ABC/ WP Feb. 22-24	ABC/ WP Feb. 23-25	ABC/ WP Feb. 24-26	DRC/ CNN Feb. 25-26	ABC/ WP Feb. 25-27
35%	36%	37%	36%	39%	38%	38%	33%	38%	30%
23	22	18	13	14	14	14	16	15	14
12	12	16	9	22	24	24	26	32	14
12	14	11	7	9	7	6	8	7	8
(156)	(223)	(284)	(NA)	(343)	(351)	(349)	(341)	(500)	(446)

Source: Surveys by Harrison-Goldberg, Inc. for the *Boston Globe;* the University of New Hampshire; ABC News/*Washington Post;* Darden Research Corporation for Cable News Network; Teichner & Associates, Inc. for WCVB-TV and WHDH Radio.

Schneider-Lewis

(Continued from page 20)

those with low incomes, Protestants, Southerners, people who describe themselves as "strongly religious," conservatives, and people over sixty-five years old.

To some extent, these relationships are linked to contact with homosexuals and beliefs about what causes homosexuality. As can be seen in tables 2 and 3, Easterners, Catholics, blacks, liberals, and high-income people are more likely to know homosexuals and to believe their orientation is inborn. Perhaps familiarity with homosexuals and beliefs about what causes homosexuality really aren't the critical variables, but instead, merely stand in for liberalism and education. Tables 2 and 3 reveal that this is not so. In every major population subgroup, the relationships noted above hold true, even for groups predisposed to be anti-gay. Among poor people, people who did not finish high school, conservatives, older people, and the strongly religious, personal knowledge of homosexuals and the belief that homosexuality is inborn have the effect of increasing sympathy for gays, sometimes quite markedly.

Other Factors

The roles of education and religion deserve special attention. Education appears to be linked quite strongly to negative attitudes, even when familiarity and causation are held constant. People who did not finish high school are quite unsympathetic to homosexuals, whether or not they know a gay person or believe homosexuality is inborn. Those college-educated who do not know an openly gay person and those who believe homosexuality is not inborn are still negative about homosexuality. Education seems to be necessary, but not sufficient, to increase sympathy for homosexuals. Personal experiences with gay people and beliefs about the causes of homosexuality are also required to turn attitudes around, even among the well-educated.

Religion is also strongly linked to negative attitudes, as shown by our index. Protestants are more anti-gay than Catholics, and the strongly religious (one-third of the national public) are more anti-gay than the irreligious (one-fifth of the public). Religiosity, of course, measures commitment to traditional morality, and the traditional moral teachings of all Western re-

Table 2

Group	Percent who know open gays	Percent negative on Sympathy Index: Of those who know open gays	Percent negative on Sympathy Index: Of those who don't know open gays
All respondents	30	35	61
East	36	28	49
Midwest	27	35	62
South	24	36	69
West	35	43	63
Men	28	37	61
Women	32	33	62
Married	28	36	64
Unmarried	33	34	57
White	28	35	62
Black	41	37	52
Protestants	28	40	67
Catholics	34	25	52
Strongly religious	23	41	72
Moderately religious	33	37	61
Non-practicing	31	22	50
Less than 12 yrs. school	24	50	69
High school graduates	25	41	59
College-educated	41	22	55
Income under $10,000	28	41	68
$10-30,000	27	38	64
$30-40,000	35	35	56
Over $40,000	37	23	52
Age 18-29	33	31	61
30-36	43	35	52
37-44	32	26	60
45-64	26	40	60
65 and older	17	52	72
Registered Democrats	28	35	61
Registered Republicans	24	22	68
Liberals	41	34	54
Moderates	30	31	56
Conservatives	26	40	67

Note: Sample = 1,653.

Table 3

Group	Percent who say cause is inborn	Percent negative on Sympathy Index: Of those who say cause is inborn	Percent negative on Sympathy Index: Of those who say cause is not inborn
All respondents	16	32	57
East	22	30	45
Midwest	13	26	59
South	14	34	65
West	13	38	59
Men	15	36	57
Women	17	29	58
Married	18	35	60
Unmarried	12	25	52
White	15	34	58
Black	19	32	49
Protestants	14	36	63
Catholics	20	28	47
Strongly religious	15	40	69
Moderately religious	17	28	58
Non-practicing	15	34	42
Less than 12 yrs. school	12	50	57
High school graduates	17	32	59
College-educated	18	22	46
Income under $10,000	15	36	65
$10-30,000	14	30	61
$30-40,000	21	33	53
Over $40,000	20	34	44
Age 18-29	10	28	54
30-36	14	24	48
37-44	15	28	54
45-64	22	37	60
65 and older	16	37	74
Registered Democrats	20	32	59
Registered Republicans	16	24	64
Liberals	19	33	48
Moderates	16	25	53
Conservatives	14	38	64

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, September 1983.

ligions are deeply critical of homosexuality. What is interesting is that religious commitment affects Protestants much more than Catholics. Strongly religious Catholics are only 7 percent more negative than non-practicing Catholics. But strongly religious Protestants are 28 percent more negative than non-practicing Protestants. The same pattern holds true in the case of gay rights.

Moreover, at each level of religious commitment, Protestants are more anti-gay than Catholics. Thus, strongly religious Protestants are 70 percent negative on our sympathy index, while strongly religious Catholics are 44 percent negative. There appears to be an intrinsic link between Protestantism and opposition to homosexuality, one that comes into focus most clearly among religious Protestants. American Protestantism is predominantly sectarian, and sectarian Protestantism is pietistic, that is, it places a strong emphasis on personal salvation and morality. In the 1982 Gallup poll, 44 percent of Protestants and 67 percent of Catholics felt that a homosexual could be a "good Christian."

In general, the same factors tend to be associated with sympathy for homosexuals and support for gay rights. There are two exceptions, however. Men and women do not differ very much in their attitudes toward homosexuality (in the national sample, 49 percent of men and 48 percent of women came out negative on our index). Men are a good deal less favorable, however, to gay rights: 44 percent of men and 30 percent of women were anti-gay rights. Similarly, married people were only 5 points more unsympathetic than unmarried people, but they were eleven points more opposed to gay rights. The issue of gay rights, it seems, tends to separate men from women and the married from the unmarried.

It may not be surprising that men are more likely than women to say that the military should be able to discharge a homosexual soldier. But married people of both sexes are also more likely to take that position. On another of the three gay rights issues we evaluated, 54 percent of men and 47 percent of women said they would be less likely to vote for a homosexual candidate for Congress; 55 percent of married people and 43 percent of unmarried people took the same position.

Why does gay rights meet with greater opposition from men and married people? In the popular perception, and according to scientific evidence, most homosexuals are male. If gays acquire new rights and protections, those rights may threaten non-gay males most directly. In fact, men may see gay rights as more threatening than women's rights, since men still compete mostly with one another. (Most polls show little difference between men and women in their support for women's rights.)

Married people are by definition committed to the institution of marriage, which gives them certain legal rights and privileges. One of the principal goals of the gay rights movement is to obtain comparable rights for gay couples (health benefits, inheritance rights, adoption rights, and tax breaks, for example). It is not hard to see why married people believe that gay rights threaten the institution of marriage.

Conclusion

In sum, there are reasons to believe that sympathy for homosexuals will grow with time. The population is becoming better educated; gays are becoming more visible, and people are beginning to see homosexuality as an innate sexual orientation. All these factors will increase the public's tolerance for homosexuality, even though most Americans will probably continue to believe it is wrong.

The gay rights movement, however, faces a far more difficult situation than the comparable movements for civil rights and women's rights. Powerful institutional forces—religion, gender, and marriage—feel threatened by gay rights. Those interests are not likely to give in without a fight.

[1] Alan P. Bell, Martin S. Weinberg, and Sue Keifer Hammersmith, *Sexual Preference: Its Development in Men and Women* (Indiana University Press, 1981).

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I. A. Lewis is director of the Los Angeles Times *poll.*

Rose *(Continued from page 11)*

stitutions have a higher historical level of success than their European counterparts.

Decline in the effectiveness of government is serious, but it should not be confused with what is far more important in democratic government, namely the maintenance of popular consent. People separate judgments about their own lives from judgments about government institutions, and even more from evaluations of transitory political leaders. Ordinary people can make discriminating judgments; they do not assume that a politician's troubles will necessarily trouble them.

Ironically, President Carter, who raised the question of a national "malaise," provides the extreme illustration of popular discrimination. In October 1979 an ABC News/Louis Harris poll found that while only 16 percent expressed confidence in the president, 73 percent expressed a great deal of confidence in the country, and 81 percent expressed a great deal of confidence in their own ability to sort out their problems. As Sigelman notes, expressions of popular dissatisfaction with a president are just that and no more; they are evidence of "a shortfall of competence not confidence."

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

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Media Coverage of Campaign '84: A Preliminary Report

The audiences of mass media apparently subscribe to the circular belief: "If you really matter, you will be at the focus of mass attention and, if you are at the focus of mass attention, then surely you must really matter."

Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton, 1948

On February 20th, 1984, a few thousand Iowa Democrats and a few hundred leading journalists elevated Senator Gary Hart to the status of a leading contender for the Democratic nomination. From that evening forward Hart was granted the credibility and media attention he had been denied throughout 1983. One week later, Hart demolished Walter Mondale in the New Hampshire primary. What role did the news media play and when did they play it?

Poll-Based Media

As 1983 began, those who were high in the polls were those who had received the most prior media attention —Walter Mondale (former vice-president), John Glenn (former astronaut), and George McGovern (former Democratic nominee). A December 1982 Gallup survey showed that most people had learned the lessons of past headlines and knew Mondale (86 percent), Glenn (69 percent), and McGovern (73 percent). These same three men topped the early list of preferred Democratic nominees.

The survey also showed that fewer than one-third had ever heard of Alan Cranston (30 percent), Gary Hart (22 percent), Reubin Askew (23 percent), or Ernest Hollings (15 percent). Each of these four candidates was named as the preferred nominee by no more than 2 percent of the Democrats polled.

Subsequent news attention throughout 1983 was apportioned so that it almost perfectly paralleled candidate standings in the polls. As shown in table 1, rankings of the volume of coverage on the nightly network news and stories in both the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* followed symmetrically the early candidate standings in the polls.

George McGovern did not announce until October of 1983 and was the only candidate to end the year with any discrepancy between his poll ranking and news ranking. Jesse Jackson also decided to run late in the year, but he had enjoyed considerable coverage with pre-announcement speculation about his candidacy.

Table 1
RANKINGS IN POLLS AND 1983 COVERAGE

	Dec. '82 Gallup	'83 TV time	'83 *Post* & *Times* stories	Dec. '83 Gallup
Mondale	1 (32%)	1	1	1 (40%)
Glenn	2 (14)	2	2	2 (24)
Jackson	– —	3	3	3 (10)
McGovern	3 (6)	8	7	4 (8)
Hart	4 (2)	4	4	5 (3)
Cranston	4 (2)	5	5	5 (3)
Hollings	4 (2)	6	5	7 (2)
Askew	7 (1)	7	8	8 (1)

The 1983 allocations of coverage let the rich get richer. As shown in table 1, the only candidates to improve significantly in the polls during 1983 were those who had dominated print and broadcast journalism— Walter Mondale and John Glenn. (There are no baseline data on Jackson, but his pattern is consistent with this finding.) Conversely, those who were poll poor at the start stayed media poor through most of the year. Having failed to become the "focus of mass attention," they did not "really matter."

Media-Based Polls

Journalists did more than just follow the lead of poll standings in 1983 by continuing to reinforce the preexisting pecking order. They also independently contributed to poll shifts.

Most of the poll fluctuations in 1983 were trivial, well within the range of ordinary sampling error. There were, however, four statistically prominent surges in Gallup polls of Democrats during 1983: John Glenn's ratings shot up between mid-March and the end of April; both Walter Mondale's and Alan Cranston's ratings improved between the end of April and mid-June; and Mondale's ratings jumped between mid-October and mid-November.

Each of these notable gains immediately followed a surge in the combined attention of television, newspapers, and news magazines. For example, Glenn's spring gains came just after he announced his candidacy and obtained favorable profiles in news magazines and elsewhere. Cranston's early summer boost came in the wake of media interest in his Wisconsin straw poll victory and his leadership on the nuclear freeze issue.

In only one instance did major media attention fail to boost a candidate in the polls in 1983: "The Right Stuff" generated enormous press interest. For the first time, a movie lionizing the heroics of a presidential candidate was being released on the eve of the primary campaign. The actor who played astronaut John Glenn was featured on the cover of *Newsweek*.

The October hoopla about "The Right Stuff" brought no gains to Glenn in subsequent polls. Except for this instance, however, periods of relatively intense media attention were followed by upturns for the beneficiary in the next Gallup poll.

The overall pattern is interactive: Prior visibility begets high poll ratings which beget media coverage/legitimacy which begets improved poll standings which beget media coverage/legitimacy. For those with little initial standing, the pattern is fairly stable. Low visibility begets under 5 percent in the polls which begets little media attention/credibility which begets continued low standings in the polls. In every phase, the poll-media cycle depresses or stimulates the other two key elements in campaign dynamics: money and volunteers. The next stage, however, exhibits a radical transformation.

Iowa-Based Media

As soon as the primary and caucus season begins, journalists take an altogether different perspective on the nomination race. They abandon reliance on national polls to rank the candidates. Instead, for the first month, the pecking order is set by the results of the last caucus and primary—no matter how small and unrepresentative they may be. The rollercoaster or juggernaut begins.

To measure the relative attention devoted to the candidates, this researcher analyzed weeknight CBS and NBC newscasts from February 13 (one week before the Iowa caucuses) through March 13 (Super Tuesday). Among the variables coded were the amounts of airtime devoted to each Democratic candidate. Calculated as a percent of the total time given to all Democratic candidates, this measure tells us the relative share of attention assigned to each candidate.

During the week before the Iowa caucuses, airtime allocations still mirrored national polls, with Mondale way out front, and Glenn and Jackson coming in second and third. Most of the rest of the pack were essentially ignored. Hart received 4 percent of the candidate coverage that week, as did McGovern. Hollings and Askew each received less than 2 percent.

The Iowa caucuses changed all of that. On February 20, about 85,000 people attended the Democratic caucuses—*that is less than one-sixth of the people who regularly vote Democratic in presidential elections in Iowa*. In other words, total caucus turnout constituted no more than 17 percent of the half-million Iowa Democratic votes cast in 1972, for example, for McGovern.

This one-sixth segment of the party resides in a state that has gone Democratic only once since siding with neighbor Harry Truman in 1948. Iowa Democrats may be impotent when November rolls around, but, thanks to the news, in February they dwarf Democrats everywhere.

The networks direct enormous attention to these first caucuses—often devoting over one-third of the entire newscast to the race. For the many voters who are just waking up to the contest, these initial Iowa images are crucial.

Although no candidate came close to Mondale's 45 percent of the vote, measured against expectations, three surprises emerged from Iowa: (1) Glenn did quite poorly, with only 5 percent; (2) Hart unexpectedly came in second, though he had only 15 percent (12,600 votes); and (3) McGovern came in a startling third with 13 percent (10,700 votes)—less than 2,000 votes behind Hart.

Despite the tiny size of the electorate, the media verdict was unequivocal, and the self-fulfilling power attributed to the caucuses was monumental:

> Senators Hart and Glenn traded places in Iowa. Hart moved up to number two. Glenn became an also-ran. The effect of this surprising reversal already is being felt in their campaigns.
>
> —Tom Brokaw, NBC News, February 21, 1984.

Iowa produced some far-reaching transformations of news priorities. Ostensibly, Mondale was given his due: "number one by far" (Dan Rather, CBS, February 20); "a big victory for the front-runner" (Tom Brokaw, NBC, February 21). *In the week following his Iowa triumph, however, Mondale actually suffered a decline in his relative share of attention on CBS and NBC newscasts.*

Mondale's relative standing was diminished be-

cause broadcast journalists awarded newfound status to Gary Hart and drafted preliminary obituaries for John Glenn. Hart gained and Mondale suffered most on NBC, where Hart's airtime actually equalled that of Mondale after Iowa—each received almost 30 percent of candidate airtime (see figure 1). Though not quite so dramatically, Hart also gained at Mondale's expense on CBS.

Figure 1
PERCENT OF CANDIDATE AIRTIME
N B C



Hart's relative share of coverage the week after Iowa was ten times what it had been the week before on NBC and five times what it had been on CBS. In the meantime, viewers were told that Iowa was almost fatal for Glenn who "tried to put on a brave front" and whose new goal was "simply surviving" (NBC), hoping for "some emergency oxygen for his badly shaken campaign" (CBS).

One of the curious twists of news coverage was that George McGovern profited not at all from his unanticipated third place in Iowa. McGovern finished close behind Hart, but he did not come close to getting Hart's bonanza of coverage. *McGovern obtained even less coverage, proportionately, after Iowa than before it.* Following Iowa, less than 4 percent of the nightly candidate airtime on CBS and NBC went to McGovern —a tiny fraction of that bestowed on Hart.

Why was McGovern given this peculiar treatment? It may be that the top two Iowa "shocks" (Glenn and Hart) displaced time for the third (McGovern). One other possibility is the perceptual screen of journalists who could not accept McGovern as a serious contender. In either event, the Iowa criterion used to reorder the rest of the lineup was not applied in McGovern's case.

Taken together, the Iowa "surprises" raise another issue. Some might argue that the Iowa outcome really refutes the entire theory that the media confer status—after all, Glenn did far worse, while Hart and McGovern did better, than national media coverage would have predicted. Actually, Iowa only demonstrated (via John Glenn) that prior media attention alone does not guarantee a constituency but only offers an opportunity to assemble one; it does not indefinitely compensate for weak speeches and poor organization.

Iowa also demonstrated that it is still possible for a candidate (Gary Hart) who journalists treat as a dark horse to mobilize 3 percent (12,600) of the Iowans who regularly vote Democratic in presidential elections (500,000) to attend caucuses one evening in February. That little feat forces us not to demolish but only to qualify notions of media status conferral when it comes to small subsets of activists early in a presidential campaign.

At the same time that Hart's coverage soared, there was some restraint. For example, CBS's Bruce Morton observed (February 21):

> It's probably worth reminding ourselves, though, that he [Hart] was after all a distant second. This is not a George McGovern in 1972 coming quite close to Ed Muskie. Now, when you lose three-to-one, you've lost.

Yet despite such occasional comments, two things happened after February 20th: Hart was presented as the leading alternative to Walter Mondale, and Hart's coverage was virtually free of any harsh criticism, unflattering issues, or cynical commentary.

John Glenn was "trying desperately to recharge his batteries" (Brokaw), and Jesse Jackson was "spending a lot of time . . . defensively fielding questions about . . . alleged remarks about Jews" (Rather). McGovern continued to be neglected, and the rest hardly existed in the world of the networks. This left Gary Hart enjoying his Iowa windfall of coverage, exempt from attacks by Mondale (who was ironically attacking Reagan for "amnesia"), and not yet ripe for network inquiries into his name, age, and "new ideas."

On February 28th, Hart beat Mondale by one of the largest margins ever recorded for the winner of a contested New Hampshire Democratic primary.

New Hampshire-Based Media

The unrepresentativeness of New Hampshire is always noted—without, however, seriously minimizing the imputed importance of the primary's outcome. Unlike the Iowa caucuses, the New Hampshire primary does draw as many as two-thirds of the people who vote Democratic in November. Their numbers are still small, however; New Hampshire has gone Democratic only once since the presidential election of 1944.

Following Hart's triumph in New Hampshire, CBS and NBC presented viewers with a two-man race. In the two weeks following New Hampshire, Glenn, with 4 percent of the candidate airtime on CBS and 7 percent on NBC, joined McGovern (5 percent on CBS and 1 percent on NBC) in relative obscurity. Askew, Cranston, and Hollings finally got some coverage when they dropped out of the race.

Hart's free ride from both Mondale and the media

eventually came to an end. His relatively undamaged image began to suffer some attacks.

On March 2, viewers heard for the first time on NBC some sustained criticisms of Gary Hart. That same evening, CBS also began its ventures into critiquing Gary Hart. "Now there are two front-runners," as Bob Simon put it, so it was time for Hart to start taking his medicine.

These scripts offered the serious opening volleys of the classic "attack the front-runner" mode that Michael Robinson and Margaret Sheehan documented so well for the 1980 campaign in *Over the Wire and On TV*. Gary Hart, CBS suggested, mimics John Kennedy. Simon termed Hart "trendy." Not devastating perhaps, but it was a start.

After the digression of Hart's nonbinding win in Vermont, CBS began to pick up steam. Bruce Morton on March 8:

> Gary Hart is the hottest political property around —at least this week. . . .
> Hart's fundamental theme is newness, even though he is just nine years younger than Walter Mondale. . . .
> Newness hasn't stopped Hart from sometimes courting older politicians like George Wallace. . . .
> His invocation of the Kennedys is deliberate. . . .
> Hart has made some proposals . . . but his proposals often don't get as far as the Senate floor. . . .

After Morton finished, Rather read a long studio story about "the touchy question of Senator Hart's age."

Investigative journalism surfaced at about the same time at NBC. On March 9th, NBC featured a major report on Hart's name and age. Both networks, however, saved their strongest salvos for the evening before Super Tuesday.

Super Monday

Monday, March 12, was the last nightly newscast before Super Tuesday's primaries in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, plus caucuses in four Western states. That evening all three networks ran a succession of stories hitting Gary Hart's credibility and image. A summary of that evening's stories illustrates the vigor of the new scrutiny of the new front-runner. ABC, not included in our monitoring, is used here for comparison purposes.

CBS led with a long story that firmly refuted Hart's versions of what he had once said about Cuba and then rejected Hart's interpretation of something he once told the National Women's Political Caucus. The next story focused on interviews with two elderly Florida men whose uninformed support of Hart was based on "his personal style."

After the commercial, viewers heard Senator Glenn ("his battered campaign limped into the South") attacking Senator Hart. And at a Massachusetts rally ("maybe a last hurrah") for McGovern, it was explained that "privately McGovern has expressed deep reservations about Gary Hart." CBS viewers that evening could easily conclude that McGovern's reservations were justified.

ABC led its newscast with an "issue" piece in which Barry Serafin concluded, "In short, it is chemistry and tone, not issues, that appear to be governing the hot new Democratic race." Then came Jack Smith's examination of Hart, looking "beyond the slogans."

What Smith found was a "foundering, poorly managed, and unfocused" campaign until Pat Caddell "provided the packaging Hart badly needed." Smith explained that Hart "is not ashamed of exploiting the clichés" of Kennedy. "By all accounts, though, Hart lacks the Kennedy charm." Shockingly, Hart is "also very ambitious; some who know him say he is driven by it."

Warming to the subject, Smith noted "Hart's moves have sometimes appeared calculated," and reviewed Hart's efforts to acquire "the military record missing from his resumé" and the politically convenient reconciliation with his wife. He went on to list Hart's changes of his religion, his name, his age, and even his signature.

Smith referred to Hart's often unsuccessful record in the Senate, and concluded pointedly that "voters have yet to take their measure of the man—surveys show his momentum so far has been built more on style than content." Voters who judged Hart based on ABC's sketch could not have found a very attractive figure.

That same evening, NBC joined ABC and CBS in their biting and one-sided critiques of Hart—thus creating the kind of astonishing pack journalism that excites conspiracy theorists, outrages those who value diversity, and fascinates content analysts. NBC ran a particularly rough series of stories and quotations about Hart the evening before Super Tuesday. Included were attacks on Hart from Claude Pepper, Walter Mondale, John Glenn, and Richard Viguerie.

Reporter Lisa Myers began: "A noticeably more upbeat Mondale stormed across the South, sounding his new battle cry." Mondale: "Where's the beef? Where's the beef?" Then she introduced "the political patron saint of social security" (Claude Pepper) who offered the unchallenged assertion that Hart wants to cut social security benefits. Next, Mondale was shown questioning Hart's "uncertainty" and "inconsistency."

A few minutes later in a John Dancy story, two friends variously characterized Hart as "basically moderate" (William Cohen) or "liberal" (Leon Shull). But then Richard Viguerie called him a "1980s version of George McGovern" who has been "very clever to package himself" as a nonliberal.

Turning to another perspective, the audience was told about Virginia Volker, a college professor and member of N.O.W., who was said to be "worried about the Gary Hart surge, and a little resentful." Tom Brokaw suggested to her: "Mondale is not a fad, and you believe Gary Hart is."

One citizen for Hart was interviewed that evening. She conceded she leaned toward Hart because she liked "that image," even though "it may not be the best reason to vote for someone." Brokaw wanted to pursue that subject:

> Brokaw: Felice, Mondale says that Gary Hart has no new ideas, that he has no experience, that he's just riding the crest of his popularity. Do you stop and think about that?

Felice admitted "that was probably the issue that bothered me most." On that important NBC newscast, Hart was not once shown defending himself or uttering a single word.

The next day, Gary Hart did win in New England and Florida, and in the caucus states. Mondale, however, was victorious in Alabama and Georgia.

The Day Before

A funny thing happened just before Super Tuesday. It seems that people who made up their minds on the eve of the primary were far less likely to favor Hart than were those who had decided soon after New Hampshire. (It may of course have been just a coincidence that had nothing to do with the blasts from the networks.)

Table 2
WHEN VOTE WAS DECIDED
(CBS/NYT Super Tuesday Exit Polls)

	Last 3 days	After N.H.	Earlier this year	Knew all along
ALABAMA:				
Hart	33%	61%	28%	6%
Mondale	26	11	35	47
Others	41	28	37	47
GEORGIA:				
Hart	35%	72%	24%	8%
Mondale	25	14	28	48
Others	40	14	48	44
MASSACHUSETTS:				
Hart	37%	77%	45%	20%
Mondale	20	8	22	37
Others	43	15	33	43

The CBS/*New York Times* analysis summarized the exit poll findings this way:

> There were indications in the South that the incredible momentum favoring Gary Hart had at least slowed down. Voters in Alabama who made up their minds between the New Hampshire primary and the Sunday before Super Tuesday voted for Gary Hart over Walter Mondale by a margin close to 6 to 1.
> However, support for Mondale and Hart was much more evenly divided among those voters who made up their minds in the 3 days before the primary.

Hart's ratio over Mondale shrank from 6 to 1 (among those deciding during the post-New Hampshire honeymoon) to 4 to 3 (among Alabamans making their choice during the late period of harsh coverage). They found the same pattern in the other two states where they conducted exit polls (see table 2).

In Georgia, almost three-fourths of those who decided soon after New Hampshire went for Hart. Yet, only one-third of those who decided "in the last three days" preferred Hart. Likewise, in Massachusetts, nearly 8 out of 10 of those deciding after New Hampshire favored Hart. Among those deciding when the network honeymoon was over, only 4 out of 10 chose Hart. In all three states, Mondale—as well as Jackson, McGovern, and Glenn—did markedly better among those who made up their minds just before Super Tuesday than among those who decided after New Hampshire.

Power and Status Conferral

Coverage of the race for the Democratic nomination ought to force second thoughts on those who habitually dismiss any theory of overt media political power. All of the available evidence indicates that the race was fundamentally influenced from 1983 onward by news media choices:

- The choice to cast the 1983 roles using survey results—helping Mondale and Glenn.
- The choice to restructure the entire race in 1984 based on the views of one-sixth of the Democrats in Iowa—helping Hart and hurting Glenn, Cranston, Askew, and Hollings.
- The choice to anoint a new major candidate based on the views of 3 percent of the Democrats in Iowa—helping Hart enormously.
- The choice to postpone serious criticism of the newly elevated candidate—helping Hart.
- The choice not to elevate another candidate who fared nearly as well in Iowa and thus the choice to apply the results of Iowa selectively—hurting McGovern.
- The choice to treat the cumulative verdict of Democrats in Iowa and New Hampshire as decisive tests—helping Hart and damaging the rest.
- The choice of whether, when, and how to initiate critical investigative reports on a candidate—hurting Hart starting about March 8-12.

In every instance these media content changes were followed by changes in public opinion.

There is no easy and obvious way to apportion campaign attention. These decisions and choices are invariably difficult. Yet their exercise can cause profound swings in public opinion, especially when they involve candidates about whom the public has yet to form stable opinions. That journalists must make such decisions is unavoidable—but that does not make their decisions any less powerful or any less influential. The power to confer status and mold images does determine, to echo Lazarsfeld and Merton, who "really matters."

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by Michael Jay Robinson and Maura Clancey

Teflon Politics

Ron Nessen likes to say that if it didn't happen on the evening news, then it didn't happen. He should know; Nessen is the only person ever to work from both sides—as a network correspondent and as a presidential press secretary. But what Nessen neglects to say is that even if it *did* happen on the evening news, it still might not have "happened," at least as far as the public is concerned.

We have just completed a national, scientific phone survey of 366 adult Americans (April 14-16), and we are convinced that news coverage—even time on network television—doesn't translate directly into celebrity status or into public awareness. In our poll, whether the question involved Ed Meese's cronies or Gary Hart's original surname, the public enthusiastically exhibited its right *not* to know.

To the Best of Their Recollection

The first item on our questionnaire tapped the public memory about the year's top stories. "Over the last twelve months," we asked, "which news event would you say you remember the most?" We offered no hints.

Questions like this scare people, and about half the respondents who hung up on us during the survey did so after hearing this one. Even those respondents brave enough to continue remembered little about current events, nor did they equate news with political news.

A large proportion of our subjects balked at the idea of remembering a major event—and if they did, we asked them the same question again, giving them as much time as they needed to come up with something—anything. Even so, about one-fourth (23 percent) of our sample could recall nothing in the news from the last twelve months. In fact, the single most memorable news event for the last year turned out to be "can't remember" (see table 1).

Many of those who could recall something came up with events that had taken place two or more years ago—the war in the Falklands, the Tylenol scare, and Brezhnev's death, to name a few. Another fifth of the sample offered nonpolitical events—the sorts of things no self-respecting journalist would consider "real" news: volcano eruptions, weather reports, accidents, and sports news. All told, over 40 percent of our sample mentioned "nothing" or nonpolitical events as what they remembered most in 1983-1984.

To be fair, six of the ten most memorable stories were political (table 1). Nonetheless, our figures suggest the public remembers hard news the way Ronald Reagan remembers hard facts—fitfully, at best. They also suggest that news audiences have at least as great an interest in the mundane as the political. Criminal acts were precisely as memorable as *everything* going on in Central America. Soviet leader Yuri Andropov's death barely surpassed the death of rock/gospel singer Marvin Gaye as the year's most memorable obituary (Andropov having suffered the twin misfortunes of dying outside a major media center and of natural causes, not murder).

Murders and murderers totally outdistanced foreign wars or foreign anything. For example, homicidal maniacs, as a class, proved seven times as memorable as the brutal war between Iran and Iraq.

But it isn't just homespun violence that outdoes

Table 1

TOP TEN MOST MEMORABLE NEWS EVENTS IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS

Can't remember	23%
Beirut bombing	14
Campaign/Elections, general	12
Grenada invasion	7
Space shuttle	6
Marine pullout	4
KAL Flight 007	3
Weather	3
Lebanese war	2
Christopher Wilder	2
Hart campaign	2

politics or foreign affairs—news recollections are about as pedestrian as they are prurient or provincial. In what might be the most memorable finding about less-than-memorable news, the Soviet attack on Flight 007 proved no more newsworthy in the public's collective memory than the year's weather. In fact, the Korean jet massacre—so big in the media—proved only half as salient to the public as news about the U.S. space shuttle program.

These numbers reflect a public far less political than politicians or journalists usually assume, and a public possessing an astoundingly short memory. People recall the politics of yesterday, not the day before. Only four months after Jesse Jackson's stunning success in bringing Lt. Robert Goodman back from his Syrian captivity, for example, a miniscule 1 percent of the public was able to list that series of events among the most memorable. Christopher Wilder, race-car driver turned killer, does "better" than Jackson's rescue mission in refreshing memories because, in part, Wilder made news in April, not in January.

We found public memory about news and world affairs short enough to qualify as mass amnesia. In fact, the thesis that Americans are, more than most, willing to forgive and forget may have less to do with the former than with their astounding capacity for the latter.

Ed Meese and Charles "The Killer" Wick

A week before we conducted our survey, Louis Harris presented America with national polling data that showed the public had decided Attorney General-designate Ed Meese had to go. Our survey indicates that the same public barely knows that Ed Meese was ever here.

We asked our respondents, "Have you heard the name Ed Meese?" One-quarter of the sample said "No." We then asked those who had heard Meese's name why he had been in the news lately. One-quarter of them had to admit they couldn't remember anything at all about Meese, or they told us things that weren't true. ("His recent tragic death" was a shocking example of misinformation.)

Another 10 percent could recall only that Meese had recently been designated as attorney general. Two percent of our respondents said Meese was about to be made secretary of state, which, we concluded, was either misinformation or a hot tip. And murder being much on the minds of our sample, one woman claimed that Ed Meese was a vicious killer—something not even Senator Howard Metzenbaum has intimated.

About a third (36 percent) of the entire sample did link Ed Meese to financial problems, his indiscretion concerning loans, cuff-links, cronyism, or his insensitivity toward hunger in America.

So how did Louis Harris get these people to volunteer an opinion about someone they didn't recognize? Quite simply, he never asked them whether they knew Meese or not. And, by describing his version of what Meese had done before asking for opinions, Harris could be fairly certain that people would have something to say.

Harris's respondents were faced with the following *lead* item—one that was quintessentially Harris in style: "Agree or disagree: Since federal law says that high officials must report all loans they receive, it looks as though Meese violated the law by not reporting a $15,000 loan from a couple who were close friends, both of whom later got federal jobs paying a combined total of close to $100,000 a year." (77 percent agreed, 15 percent disagreed, 8 percent were not sure.)

Looking at the question, we're not surprised at the results. But the real issue isn't so much Harris's methodology as it is the level of knowledge the public possesses about Attorney General-designate Edwin Meese. After all, it makes little sense to argue that Americans want dismissed from office a man about whom they

know nothing.

Perhaps Harris felt safe in assuming people knew Ed Meese. After all, he had dominated a fair share of the news for several weeks. We checked abstracts of the evening news programs for the month of March—the month in which Meese's problems really began. Meese made the network news forty-three times in just thirty-one days, and he was the lead story on eight separate occasions—total news time: 5,100 seconds. But despite Meese's ongoing status as a lead story on network news during the month before our survey, the Meese mess, no matter how generously defined, failed to penetrate the cognitive map of even four Americans out of ten.

Nonetheless, when compared to Charles Z. Wick, problem-plagued director of the USIA, Ed Meese is a celebrity. Wick's case magnifies everything said so far about levels of public information, extensiveness of news coverage, and the tenuousness of the relationship between the two.

Let's be fair. Since the beginning of the year Charles Wick has received only a fraction of the news coverage that Ed Meese has attracted. Still, back in January when Wick was a hot news story, network evening news featured him no fewer than ten times—five times as often as the networks featured Gary Hart during the same four-week period. Ten bad news reports in a month—half of them presented before the first commercial—puts the Wick affair somewhere between a major media story and an inside-the-Beltway press flap.

The facts in the Wick case were anything but trivial. Having lied to the *New York Times*, having slurred Margaret Thatcher and her sex, having secretly taped phone calls with Jimmy Carter and dozens of other private citizens—all in a year's time—Wick might well have become a household word in a world populated with the politically interested. Yet, in our survey three-quarters of the public had never heard his name! A microscopic 2 *percent* of our sample could tell us anything at all accurate about Wick—good, bad, or indifferent. In fact, because Wick was, at the time of our poll, unlucky enough to own the same initials as Christopher Wilder, he was about as likely to be identified as a mass murderer as he was to be linked directly to his secret taping enterprise.

The Economy—What Recovery?

Our initial hunch was that the public would know more about the economy than about recent political scandals. We were right, but barely. Even on basic questions involving unemployment, the public knew only a little more than random responses would predict.

We asked each respondent the following question about the employment picture: "Would you say that *over the last six months* the unemployment rate has gotten worse, leveled off, or gotten better?" Despite the real and dramatic drop in unemployment rates over the last eighteen months, less than half (44 percent) of the respondents chose the right answer—"gotten better." Twenty percent actually said the unemployment rate had "gotten worse." Given that every respondent was provided with three clear choices, chance alone should have netted correct answers from a third of the sample.

The public did even worse on the inflation question. We asked whether "*during the Reagan years* the inflation rate has gotten worse, leveled off, or gotten better?" Just over 60 percent answered this one wrong, saying that the rate had gotten worse or leveled off during Reagan's term. Again, since this was a three-part multiple choice question, one would estimate that a third of the sample would have guessed right by chance alone. The public did only 6 percent better at getting the right answer than probability would allow.

There are several interpretations for these mistaken notions about the economy. First, one could point to the trickiness of the questions, hence the problematic nature of the right answers. For example, the rate of inflation is way down since Reagan took office, but prices are, of course, higher than they were under Carter. Next, one could blame the media for having given so little attention to inflation rates once they abated, and so much attention to unemployment rates once they took off. That's not a bad interpretation, and some of this confusion about the recovery can be linked to the news bias in favor of hyping economic failures and ignoring economic successes. But that bias won't explain why the same public couldn't tell us much about Ed Meese or anything at all about Charles Wick—two topics the media did not, to say the least, play down in 1984. The facts about the economy seem almost as unriveting in the American psyche as the facts about scandals in the Reagan administration.

Campaign '84—Primary Education

At one point in 1984—the ten days between the Maine caucuses and Super Tuesday—pollsters estimate that Gary Hart was picking up three million (!) supporters per day in his quest for the Democratic nomination. At some point people were learning something—at the very least that Gary Hart was alive if not well, and that he was *not* Walter Mondale. In fact, our poll also picked up on some of this.

One set of questions did produce correct answers that went way beyond statistical chance—questions about primaries. As late as April 15—more than six weeks after the fact—over half (55 percent) of our sample knew that Gary Hart had won the New Hampshire primary. Even though 45 percent guessed wrong or didn't know who had won, public awareness of Hart's victory proves that the facts about the New Hampshire primary registered.

Nor is it just the New Hampshire primary that jogs their minds. Practically two-thirds (65 percent) knew (without prompting) that Walter Mondale had

won the week's big primary in Pennsylvania. The media, then, do provide a "primary education" in an election year. Our people knew more about winners and losers in primaries than they knew about anything else. No doubt, the behavior of the news media themselves explains a good deal of this—horse-race journalism in the news produces horse race sensitivity in the public. But, again, news focus doesn't explain fully why winners and losers stick better in the national memory than other day-to-day news events.

Hartpence, Schmartpence

What makes public knowledge of primary winners even more intriguing is that it does not extend to the major campaign issues of the day. Ever since Hart's coup in New Hampshire, for example, all the news media have given big play to Gary Hart's alias: Gary Hart, a.k.a. Gary Hartpence.

The "Hartpence" story represents the second greatest press/campaign issue since the Iowa caucuses —superseded only by the "Hymie" affair, news coverage of Jesse Jackson's public relations wars with the Jewish community. Hart's decision to undergo a formal name-change operation during law school, and his subsequent decision to blame his dead father for the idea, have been near the top of the list of stories about Hart the man and Hart the candidate.

Yet we found that almost two-thirds (64 percent) of our sample neither knew nor could guess which Democrat had received attention for having changed his name—even though by mid-April there were only three Democrats left in the race. Roger Mudd's infamous interview with Senator Hart notwithstanding, the percentage of people actually knowing that Hart had changed his name was, in a three-man field, ever-so-slightly better than a third.

And the Winner Is . . . Wendy's

The Hartpence issue has not, to this point, penetrated very deeply into the electoral consciousness. And, to his credit, Walter Mondale never made much of Hart's original name, or its transformation.

Instead Mondale fought Hart with a campaign slogan from America's fast-food wars. Having done so, Mondale did himself some good, and gave us some insight into the kind of news that does pierce the shield of public indifference.

Throughout March and April, Walter Mondale and the campaign press corps repeated the question "Where's the Beef?", a much less than subtle slam against Gary Hart's new-ideas campaign. And, as it turned out, the public learned more about this silly slogan than it learned about some of the more serious campaign issues of the year.

Without prompting, 44 percent of our respondents could tell us "what slogan from a popular TV commercial Walter Mondale had used to criticize Gary Hart," and a whopping 88 percent of those people could identify the company that had originated the commercial—Wendy's, of course.

Let's put that set of figures in perspective. A slightly larger percentage of our sample could tell us about "Where's the Beef" than could tell us which way inflation had gone under Reagan. The percentage able to cite the Wendy's ad (without multiple choices) was equal to the percentage who could tell us which way the year's unemployment rate was headed (with choices). All this is, of course, terrible news for Reagan fans—and not much better for fans of democratic theory. Wendy's, however, should be delighted.

The Teflon Candidate

Phrase-making counts in politics as well as commercials. And when Pat Schroeder (D.-Col.) retires from the House of Representatives, she may well be remembered most for the phrase she invented to describe Ronald Reagan—the Teflon candidate, the politician to whom bad news never seems to stick. Richard Cohen, *Washington Post* columnist, simply refers to Reagan as "The Great Rondini."

One of the original reasons for conducting this survey was to gauge the thickness of Reagan's Teflon coating. So we asked three questions about Reagan and his administration that might tap the extent to which the Great Rondini can escape the bad press he or his administration receives.

Let's start with church attendance. For months the Democrats had been complaining about Reagan's miserable record at Sunday services. When the school prayer amendment reached the Senate floor (in March), the Democrats made an issue of Reagan's church-going. The White House had to release an embarrassing statement admitting that the president had not formally visited a church since last June—not for nine months.

Though never a major story, the press release and the Democratic charges about Reagan's hypocrisies, did make news in March and April. And, with the facts admitted by the White House, we had a tailor-made case for testing Reagan's Teflon shield. We asked the following item: "Would you say that Mr. Reagan himself attends church services outside of the White House almost every week, two or three times a month, about once a month, less than once a month?"

Thirty percent knew the right answer—either that Reagan goes to church less than once a month or that he hadn't been to church since last spring. But 70 percent didn't know (55 percent) or refused to answer (15 percent). Reagan had a much better churchgoer image than either the facts or his press coverage could possibly justify. Some respondents told us that Reagan must go to church every week, given the way he talks about prayer.

Another pair of questions implies that Ronald Reagan does have a nonstick surface. We asked identical questions about Reagan's ethical principles and those of his staff. Specifically, we asked whether "Reagan is

Table 2
LIKELIHOOD OF FOLLOWING "STRICT ETHICAL PRINCIPLES"

	Ronald Reagan	Members of Reagan administration
Almost all the time	15%	6%
Most of the time	40	29
Some of the time	27	46
Rarely	14	11
Refused	4	7

a man who follows strict ethical principles almost all of the time, most of the time, some of the time, or rarely?" Then we asked the same question about the people who work in the Reagan administration.

As table 2 indicates, Reagan runs well ahead of his staff—twenty points ahead if one considers the first two choices ("almost all of the time" and "most of the time") as the positive response. Still, slightly over 40 percent of our sample chose the negative responses; they consider him less than committed to strict ethical principles.

Apparently, Ronald Reagan is only stick-resistant, not stick-proof—not so much Teflon II as Teflon I, with scratches. Nevertheless, his image is better than that of his administration.

Conclusions

The first conclusion is the least original—the public knows less about politics than journalists or politicians think they know.

The second conclusion derives from the first. For the mass audience, news is not necessarily politics. Violent crimes are more memorable as news events than all but the most dramatic political occurrences. Rupert Murdoch has a much better grasp of news audiences than do his detractors.

The third conclusion is slightly less elitist. We also recognize that it isn't simply the mass public that pays so little attention to what's happening in current events. The case of Ronald Reagan is vintage, but so is the more vivid case of Congressman Ed Markey (D.-Mass.), until recently a candidate for the United States Senate. Two months ago on a Boston talk show, Markey was asked to name the prime minister of Israel. Markey admitted he didn't know, then guessed wrong.

Perhaps even more startling is that—as of early May—only two of the three Democratic contestants for president knew much about Louis Farrakhan and his threats against reporters or Jews who criticize Jesse Jackson. In the Texas TV debate on May 2, Gary Hart had to admit that he was mostly in the dark about the ongoing battle between Farrakhan and the news reporter he had threatened with death back in March. A *Newsweek* poll conducted the last week in April indicates that only about half the public knows about Louis Farrakhan or anything concerning Jesse Jackson's alleged anti-Semitic remarks.

So political leaders do better, but not all that much better than the mass public when it comes to hard facts. Looking at our own survey qualitatively, the results suggest that Eric Sevareid probably has the best overall interpretation of public awareness: Never overestimate their level of information—never underestimate their ability to reason. Our respondents didn't know many answers, but they did seem to know how to think about facts they did possess.

Fourth, polls that tap sentiments about politicians who are virtually unknown to the public ought not to be taken very seriously, or not to be taken at all. What might be more useful is to tap sentiments about something that people do have feelings about—pollsters. For example, why not the following item? "Agree or disagree: When a national pollster asks questions about a politician's problems, knowing that most Americans don't know who that politician is, that pollster may have problems of his own."

Fifth, the news media have some, but by no means total, say in setting the agenda, or controlling what the public learns. Events are just like politicians—some stick better than others in public consciousness, for reasons we don't always understand.

Sixth, slogans seem to work better than abstractions, or even personalities, in penetrating public indifference. News coverage of "Where's the Beef?" and Wendy's did much better at puncturing national consciousness than did coverage of Ed Meese or Gary Hartpence. Apparently the public retains very little from the political messages they receive. Even more dismaying is the distinct possibility that phrasemaking represents the single best strategy in promoting a candidate, an issue, or a theme.

Finally, there is something to the Teflon nature of Ronald Reagan. Reagan runs well ahead of his press and his political advisers. But that fact ought not to detract from the larger truth—that politics is itself Teflon coated. Good news or bad, political messages of all types usually fail to reach their target in any efficient way. And those messages and those news items that do penetrate usually fall out of public consciousness within a few days or weeks. Ronald Reagan has a nonstick surface, but he's not alone. Almost nothing sticks easily or for very long. Politics comes treated with a Teflon coating of its own.

The authors wish to thank John P. Robinson, Robert Feuerherd, Lisa Grand, Robert Heilferty, and Maryanne Wynne for their help in conducting the survey.

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DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENTS

One of the unsolved mysteries about Independents is why they vote Republican so consistently and by such large margins (see figure below). At the same time, when Independents are asked whether they lean more to one major *party*, a larger proportion say they are closer to the Democrats than the Republicans. In overall social and political outlook (pages 24-27), Independents fall somewhere in between the party partisans and look much like the nation at large.

The number of Americans describing themselves as Independents has, with fits and starts, climbed significantly over the last forty years. According to the Gallup data, the proportion was around a fifth in the late 1930s and 1940s; now it is close to a third. Current polls differ: the *Los Angeles Times* poll puts Independents at a high 40 percent of the electorate (page 32).

All polls show more Independents among the young than among the old; the link to educational attainment is much less clear. A set of recent Gallup polls, for example, found Independents making up 29 percent of the grade-school educated and 33 percent of college graduates, a small difference. National Opinion Research Center surveys show the same pattern, with this interesting twist: Independents were a smaller proportion of the young college educated than of the young who had not attended college.

Without a political party to anchor them to a general set of beliefs, Independents seem, in short, to act independently.

E. C. L.

INDEPENDENTS VOTE REPUBLICAN

Question: In the election this November did things come up which kept you from voting, or did you happen to vote? (If yes, voted:) Did you happen to vote for (name of candidate)?



	1948**		
	HST (51%)	TED (46%)	Other (3%)
Dem.	85%	10%	4%
Rep.	7	92	*
Ind.	**47**	**46**	**7**

	1952	
	AES (45%)	DDE (55%)
Dem.	77	23
Rep.	8	92
Ind.	**35**	**65**

	1956	
	AES (42%)	DDE (58%)
Dem.	85	15
Rep.	4	96
Ind.	**30**	**70**

	1960	
	JFK (50%)	RMN (50%)
Dem.	84	16
Rep.	5	95
Ind.	**43**	**57**

	1964	
	LBJ (61%)	BMG (39%)
Dem.	87	13
Rep.	20	80
Ind.	**56**	**44**

	1968		
	HHH (43%)	RMN (43%)	GCW (14%)
Dem.	74%	12%	14%
Rep.	9	86	5
Ind.	**31**	**44**	**25**

	1972	
	GMc (38%)	RMN (62%)
Dem.	67	33
Rep.	5	95
Ind.	**31**	**69**

	1976		
	JEC (50%)	GRF (48%)	EMc (1%)
Dem.	82	18	*
Rep.	9	91	*
Ind.	**38**	**57**	**4**

	1980		
	JEC (41%)	RWR (51%)	JBA (7%)
Dem.	69	26	4
Rep.	8	86	5
Ind.	**29**	**55**	**14**

Note: Results do not include vote for minor party candidates. * Includes less than .5%. **Results for the two Independent candidates are combined. The 1948 results are based on one preelection voting intention poll and two postelection actual vote polls, November-December, 1948.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 7-10, 1980.

INDEPENDENTS: ON THEIR OWN ON THE ISSUES

Question: And, do you think a Republican president or a Democratic president would be better able to control the nation's inflation rate?

Question: In thinking about the outcome of the election this November, do you think a Republican president or a Democratic president would be better able to reduce the federal budget deficit?

Question: What about keeping the United States out of war? Do you think a Republican president or a Democratic president would be better able to keep the United States out of war?

Likely voters



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BUT PARALLEL NATIONAL RESPONSE ON REAGAN

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



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Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling the economy?



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

Question: Which one of the following statements comes closest to the way you feel about President Reagan: "I like Ronald Reagan as a person and I also like most of his policies," or "I like Ronald Reagan as a person but I don't like most of his policies," or "I don't like Ronald Reagan as a person but I do like most of his policies," or "I don't like Ronald Reagan as a person and I also don't like most of his policies."

Source: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, November 12-17, 1983

. . . AND MONDALE



Question: Walter Mondale says that under Reagan the country went through a terrible recession, that the poor and the elderly have suffered unfair budget cutbacks, and that Reagan has brought the country closer to war. Given these statements, who would you vote for—Republican Ronald Reagan or Democrat Walter Mondale?

Note: Sample size = 1,008 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Analysis, February 8-12, 1984

INDEPENDENTS LEAN TOWARD HART

Question: Suppose the choice for president in the Democratic convention this year (1984) narrows down to Walter Mondale and Gary Hart. Which one would you prefer to have the Democratic convention select?



Note: Total sample size = 1,005 (366 Democrats and 322 Independents).
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 11-15, 1984

THE MAKING OF A REAGAN VICTORY?

Question: If the candidates were Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Walter Mondale, for whom would you vote?

Would vote for:	Democrats	Republicans	Independents	National
Reagan	34%	87%	56%	54%
Mondale	58	8	32	38

Note: Sample size = 1,008 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Analysis, February 8-12, 1984

Question: If the 1984 presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan the Republican, and Walter Mondale the Democrat, would you vote for Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale?

Would vote for:	D	R	I	N
Reagan	19%	83%	54%	48%
Mondale	66	5	21	35

Note: Sample size = 1,367.
Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, April 23-26, 1984

Question: Would you like to see Ronald Reagan re-elected as president in 1984? Do you think Ronald Reagan *will* be re-elected as president in 1984?* (Likely voters)

Would like to see Reagan re-elected	D	R	I	N
	24%	95%	63%	59%
Would not	76	5	37	41

Think Reagan will be re-elected	D	R	I	N
	69%	98%	88%	84%
Do not	31	2	12	16

Note: *Not sure calculated out; all were 10% or less except Democrats = 13%.
Source: Survey by NBC News, February 7-8, 1984

Independents: No Distinctive Ideological Outlook on Issues

A STROLL DOWN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD

Question: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear-cut side that people take, and also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out by compromise. But I'm going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it . . . ?

...Passage of an Equal Rights Amendment *



...Imposing the death penalty on those convicted of serious crimes such as murder, kidnapping, etc *



...Greatly increased military defense capabilities for the United States



...Legal abortions for those women who choose to have them



...Allowing prayers in public schools



...A cutback in government regulation of business



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Question: Which of these three economic problems do you think is most important right now: The federal deficit, unemployment or inflation?



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Question: Do you think federal spending on programs for the poor should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?



Source:

ON ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND SPENDING, THE YOUNG ARE SLIGHTLY MORE LIBERAL

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? . . . the military, armaments, and defense.



Question: . . . Welfare.

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Hand card): 1 Extremely liberal, 2 Liberal, 3 Slightly liberal, 4 Moderate, middle of the road, 5 Slightly conservative, 6 Conservative, 7 Extremely conservative.

Note: Liberal = Extremely liberal, Liberal, and Slightly liberal; Moderate = Moderate, Middle of the road; Conservative = Slightly conservative, Conservative, and Extremely conservative. Data combined for 1982, 1982 and 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, January-March, February-April 1980, 1982 and 1983.

Question: Now look at Card GG. (Card shows scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates government should do more, 3 is agreement with both statements, and 5 indicates government is doing too much) Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Question: I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at Card EE. (Card EE shows a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 indicates government should be responsible, 3 is agreement with both statements, and 5 indicates people should take care of themselves.) Some people think the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Question: Look at Card HH. (Card HH shows scale of 1 to 5 where 1 indicates the government should be responsible, 3 is agreement with both statements, and 5 indicates people should take care of such matters themselves) In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctor and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, December 1983.

SOCIAL LIBERALISM

Question: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/black) and white school children from one district to another?

Note: Percentages shown are for Approving. Data combined for 1982 and 1983.

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . the woman wants it for any reason.



Note: Data combined for 1980, 1982, and 1983.

INTERNATIONALISM

Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?



Note: Data combined for 1982 and 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-March, 1980, and 1983.

Independents Demographically Defined

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? (Gallup)

Question: Regardless of how you voted, in politics today do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent? (1980 ABC Exit Poll)

Question: Regardless of how you voted, in politics today do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else? (1982 ABC Exit Poll)

Question: (for chart on page 29) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what? (If Independent, no preference, or other, ask:) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party? (NORC)

Percent who consider themselves Independents

	1983/1984 Gallup	1980 ABC Exit Poll (Voters)	1982 ABC Exit Poll (Voters)
Family income:			
Less than $10,000	27	23	22
$10,000-19,999	32	29	29
$20,000-29,999	32	31	31
$30,000 and over	31	32	34
Gallup higher income breaks:			
$30,000-39,999	31		
$40,000-49,999	34		
$50,000-99,999	31		
$100,000 and over	22		
Education:			
Less than high school graduate	29	21	19
High school graduate	31	23	26
Some college	32	31	31
College graduate	33	35	35
Age:			
Under 30	39	30	29
30-39	35	35	35
40-49	31	28	32
50-59	25	26	29
60 and over	21	21	23
College educated by age:			
Under 30	35	34	32
30-39	37	36	34
40-49	33	35	34
50 and over	29	31	33
Noncollege, by age:			
Under 30	41	29	27
30-39	34	32	33
40-49	30	24	31
50 and over	22	22	24

	1983/1984 Gallup	1980 ABC Exit Poll (Voters)	1982 ABC Exit Poll (Voters)
Occupation:			
Professional/Business	33	NA	NA
Clerical/Sales	31	NA	NA
Manual	35	NA	NA
Farm	28	NA	NA
Other	35	NA	NA
Retired	22	NA	NA
Full-time student	40	NA	NA
Housewife	30	NA	NA
By union membership:			
Union household	30	27	28
Nonunion household	31	30	31
Paid Hourly/Salary:			
Paid hourly	NA	26	28
Salary	NA	32	32
Self-employed	NA	32	33
Unemployed	NA	19	22
Race:			
White	33	31	32
Black	19	16	17
Other	24	26	25
By sex:			
Male	34	33	33
Female	29	26	28
By religion:			
Protestant	29	27	28
Catholic	30	29	30
Jewish	37	32	32
Other	34	26	29
None	47	44	43
By region:			
New England	36	48	44
Mid-Atlantic	28	29	29
East North Central	37	35	31
West North Central	37	31	35
South Atlantic	29	24	27
East South Central	33	21	25
West South Central	30	27	28
Mountain	29	30	30
Pacific	27	23	23

Note:

Source:



For question wording and source, see page 28.

INDEPENDENTS VS. DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS: LESS LIKELY TO VOTE

Question: In 1980, you remember that Carter ran for president on the Democratic ticket against Reagan for the Republicans, and Anderson as an Independent. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

Note: Categories "Not eligible to vote," "Refused," "Don't know," and "No answer" were calculated out. Data was combined for 1982 and 1983.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1982 and 1983.

. . . MAKE UP THEIR MINDS LATER

Question: When did you decide who to vote for? Knew all along. During the primaries. Around the conventions. Since Labor Day. During the last week?


Knew all along
During primaries
Around the conventions
Since Labor Day
During last week
Voters
National 45% 14% 9% 8% 25%
Independents 32% 15% 10% 11% 34%
National with college education 39% 15% 10% 9% 27%
Independent with college education 29% 15% 9% 12% 35%

Note: Sample size = 16,201 voters as they left voting booths. College = Some college & College graduate or more.
Source: Survey by CBS/New York Times, November 4, 1980.

. . . AND LEAST INTERESTED IN ELECTION '84

Question: The campaigns for the 1984 presidential nominations are now starting in earnest. How do you feel about the coming presidential campaign year—are you really looking forward to it, or are you moderately interested in it, or are you bored at the whole prospect of it?


Looking forward to campaigns for 1984 presidential nomination
Moderately interested
Bored at the prospect
Democrats 32% 45% 23%
Republicans 37% 47% 16%
Independents 23% 47% 30%
National 31% 45% 24%

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-10), October 29-November 5, 1983.

Question: Would you say it is almost certain you will vote in the presidential election next fall, or that you probably won't bother to vote, or that you don't know whether or not you'll vote in the presidential election next fall?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-1), December 3-10, 1983.

NO DIFFERENCE ON THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PROCESS

Question: Most people tell us that when they decide how to vote for president, they think mainly about things like a candidate's stand on the issues, their political party, and their judgment about a candidate's character. There might also be other things that affect the way you evaluate a candidate. . . . Does the appearance of a candidate—I mean the way he looks—influence your vote or doesn't that make a difference to you?



Note: Sample size = 573.
Source: Survey by CBS News, February 5, 1984.

Question: Do you think our method of nominating presidential candidates generally produces the best candidates for president, or not?



Note: Sample size = 639.
Source: Survey by CBS News, February 12, 1984.

Question: One of the things being discussed a lot today is the way in which funds are raised and spent for political campaigns and whether or not reforms are needed in this area. Here are some suggestions that have been made as to what needs to be done about political campaign fund raising and spending. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and then call off all those you think should be put into effect? . . . There should be limits set on the amount of money that can be spent on political campaigns—depending on the office involved (President, Senator, Governor, Mayor, etc.). . . . No one person or organization should be allowed to contribute more than a specified ceiling amount to the campaign of a presidential candidate. . . . There should be limits set on the amount of time any one candidate can buy for TV campaign advertising. . . . Cash contributions to a political campaign should be required to be made by check. . . . It should be against the law for a candidate or his workers to use cash in paying for any political campaign expenditures. . . . All private contributions to political campaigns should be outlawed, with money for campaigns raised by using $1.00 of everyone's income tax.





Note: Only those two suggestions receiving the highest number of responses are shown. Multiple responses were allowed per respondent.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, Roper Report 83-1, December 3-10, 1983.

OR CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

Question: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the *people running* these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? (Read each item)

Percent saying they have a great deal of confidence in the leaders of



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, combined data, February-April 1982, 1983, and 1984.

Independents: An Historical Perspective

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Note: Slight variation in question wording over time. In earlier years question was: "Do you consider yourself A Republican, Democrat, Socialist, Independent/Democrat, Republican, Prohibition, or Independent?" For comparison purposes, "Other," "Socialist," and "Prohibition" calculated out. Figures for January-March 1971 through October/December 1979 and January-March 1982 through January-March 1983 based on combined results of several surveys.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization; latest that of January 13-16, 1984.

Question: Regardless of how you have voted in the past, do you consider yourself a Democrat, or a Republican, or an Independent or what? (*Los Angeles Times*) **Question:** Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (CBS/*New York Times*) **Question:** In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (NBC News) **Question:** Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent or what? (NORC) **Question:** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? (ABC/*Washington Post*) **Question:** In politics as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? (Gallup) **Question:** Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what? (Roper) **Question:** Are you a Democrat, Republican, or what? (*Time*/Yankelovich)

Note: For the *Los Angeles Times*, NORC and Roper surveys, categories other than "Democrat," "Republican," or "Independent" were calculated out for comparison purposes. *Time*/Yankelovich sample was 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, December 11-15, 1983; CBS News/*New York Times*, March 21-24, 1984; NBC News, March 8-11, 1984; National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April, 1983; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 12-14, and 16-17, 1984; the Gallup Organization, January 13-16, 1984; the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-2), January 7-21, 1984; and *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, December 6-8, 1983.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

THE REAGAN RECORD

Question: In its dealings with foreign countries and its handling of international problems, do you think the Reagan administration tries hard enough to reach diplomatic solutions, or is it too quick to get American military forces involved?


Registered voters
No opinion
14%
Reagan administration is too quick to use American military force in handling international problems
53%
33%
Tries hard enough to reach diplomatic solutions

Note: Sample size = 1,367 registered voters. In earlier 1984 New York Times polls, answers of this question responses were: "Tries hard enough," 37%; "Too quick to use," 52%; and "No opinion," 11% in January 1984; and 36%, 49%, and 15%, respectively, in October 1983.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, April 23-26, 1984.

Question: On the subject of United States foreign policy, I am going to read you some statements that people in leadership positions have made. Some criticize the president, and others praise him. For each one, please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with each of these statements. . . . Another leader who said that President Reagan gives too much emphasis to military solutions, and not enough to trying to reach political agreements with our opponents.


Registered voters
Agree Reagan puts too much emphasis on military solutions and not enough on trying to reach political agreements with opponents
49%
Disagree
51%

Note: Sample size = 1,500 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, December 8-9, 1983.

Question: Some people say that President Reagan is moving the U.S. closer to war by the use of U.S. troops around the world, while others say his tough actions are preventing even greater problems in the future for the U.S. Which is closer to your view?


Registered voters
Don't know
15%
50%
35%
Reagan is moving the U.S. closer to war by use of U.S. troops around the world
Reagan's tough actions are preventing even greater problems in the future

Note: Sample size = 1,005 registered voters. Responses in 1,000 registered voters in an October/November Penn + Schoen survey were: "Closer to war," 35%; "Preventing problems," 61%; and "Don't know," 4%.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Area, J., February 8-12, 1984.

Question: When it comes to the way President Reagan has dealt with the Soviet Union on the Korean Airplane tragedy, do you think Reagan has . . . gone too far, gone far enough, not gone far enough?



Note: Sample size = 1,376 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, September 29-30, 1983.

Question: Would you say the United States is more secure internationally today than it was when Reagan took office in January 1981, or not?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, January 12-14 and 16-17, 1984.

Question: Now here is a question that asks you to compare the situation today with what is was three years ago, for example. Do you feel that our security is as safe, that we're as strong as we were three years ago? (Code stronger as a volunteered response)



Source: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, December 11-15, 1983.

Question: On the whole, do you think the policies of the Reagan administration are reducing the risk of nuclear war, or increasing the risk or not changing the risk of nuclear war?



Source: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, November 12-17, 1983.

THE VERDICT ON REAGAN'S HANDLING OF LEBANON

Question: Which of these two statements is closer to your views: A. Reagan is handling the situation in Lebanon as well as any president could. B. Reagan is not handling the situation in Lebanon as well as a president should be expected to?



Note: Sample size = 1,206
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 13-15, 1984

Question: Do you think removing the Marines from land in Beirut would be a serious setback for the United States' foreign policy, a minor setback or not a setback at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,206
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 13-15, 1984

AND ON REAGAN'S HANDLING OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is . . . handling relations with the Soviet Union? (ABC News; ABC News/*Washington Post*) **Question:** I'm going to read you some things President Reagan has done or been identified with. Regardless of your overall opinions about Reagan, for each one would you tell me if you approve of President Reagan's position, don't approve of it, or have no opinion? . . . his handling of relations with Russia (Roper) **Question:** Now let me ask you about some specific problems. As I read off each problem, would you tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling that problem? . . . Relations with the Soviet Union (Gallup).



	Approve	Disapprove
December 7-18, 1982	46%	35%
September 22-26, 1983	44	43
September 24-October 1	36	41
October 26	48	43
October 26 and 28	50	42
October 28	53	41
November 3-7	55	33
February 10-13, 1984	43	42

Note: Sample sizes: October 26, 1983 ABC News/*Washington Post* = 1,505; October 28, 1983 ABC News/*Washington Post* = 1,511; October 26 and 28 combined = 1,249.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, December 7-18, 1982; ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 22-26, 1983, October 26, 1983, October 28, 1983, October 26 and 28, 1983, and November 3-7, 1983; The Roper Organization, September 24-October 1, 1983; The Gallup Organization, February 10-13, 1984.

Hard Line, Soft Line: The Public's Views

FOCUSING ON THE EVIL EMPIRE

Agree Disagree Not sure/No answer

Question: Please tell me if you *agree* or *disagree* with each of the following:

Registered voters


When there's a communist takeover in a country, the Soviet Union is usually behind it
85%
9%
6
The real problem with communism is that it has led to military buildup that could lead to war
80%
14%
6
Most communist countries are just puppets of the Soviet Union; they don't decide anything on their own
75%
20%
5
The real problem with communism is that it threatens our religious and moral values
73%
23%
4
Most people living in communist countries would rather have some other type of government
66%
23%
11
We should live and let live. Let the communists have their system and we ours. There's room in the world for both
66%
27%
6
When all is said and done, someday the United States will have to fight the Soviet Union to stop communism
50%
39%
11
However you feel about communism, it may be a good system of government for certain countries
36%
57%
7

Note:
Source:

SEND IN THE MARINES?

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops, if the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe? How about . . . (read list)?

Would favor use of U.S. troops Oppose



Percentage change from February 1981

	+ 10
	5
	+ 14
	11
	+ 5
	0
	+ 11
	11
	+ 4 (Jan. 1982)
	4
	7
	7
	Not asked

Source:

Question: If a Latin American government is in danger of being overthrown by Communists, should the United States send troops to stop them?

If a Latin American government is in danger of being overthrown by Communists...



Note:
Source:

Defense Spending: Keep It Where It Is

Question: Do you think that the defense budget should be increased, decreased, or should it be kept the same as it is now? (December 1978-December 1979, March 1980, and January 1984) Do you think the federal government's spending next year on defense and the military should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? (January 1980 and January 1981-November 1982) In general, do you think that spending on defense should be increased, decreased, or kept the same? (Penn + Schoen, March-April 1984)



Note: Samples in the Penn + Schoen and ABC/*Washington Post* surveys were weighted to reflect the adult population. Responses listed as "increased" and "kept same" were combined. A Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White survey in December 1983 asked respondents whether the United States should be as strong militarily, stronger, or stronger militarily than the Soviet Union. 54% said as strong and 36% said stronger.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, which ran at November 15-16, 1982; *NBC News Update*, January 22-23, 1984; and Penn + Schoen for the Committee on the Present Danger, March 31-April 2, 1984.

NOSTRAE CULPAE

In David Moore's article "The Death of Retail Politics in New Hampshire" (February/March 1984, page 57), we inaccurately reported an ABC News/*Washington Post* New Hampshire-tracking poll figure in table 1. The February 25-27 figures should have been: Mondale 30%, Glenn 14%, Hart 30%, and Jackson 8%. Also, in the August/September 1983 Opinion Roundup section (page 30, "Public Favors Major Defense Commitment), we reversed the notes and sources of the Roper Organization and the National Opinion Research Center surveys on defense spending. We regret any inconvenience these errors may have caused.

Eds.

"Stop sulking! You knew there was no Oscar category for foreign policy."

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Central America: The Public's Ambivalence

Question: Do you think that the Soviets and the Cubans are encouraging terrorism and turmoil around the world or is that not really the case?



Note: Sample size = 1,002 registered voters.

Question. (If yes:) Is it the job of the U.S. to counteract the Soviet and Cuban efforts or is that something we should not get involved in?



Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Cable Arts [illegible] October 29-November 4, 1983.

Question: If the government which the United States supports in El Salvador were about to be overthrown by the rebels, should the United States give the government there four times as much military aid to try to stop the rebels?


If the government of El Salvador were about to be overthrown by the rebels...
No opinion 21%
Should 32%
47%
The U.S. government should not give Salvadoran government 4 times as much military aid to try to stop the rebels

Note: Sample size = 1,443.
Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, January 19-21, 1984.

Question: Would you say that the situation in the Central American country of Nicaragua is a threat to the security of the United States or not?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, January 12-14 and 16-17, 1984.

Question: In recent months, the United States has taken military action in such areas as Grenada and Central America. In general, do you feel that military activities such as these are in the best interests of the nation or not? (If yes, ask:) Do you feel that these actions are in the nation's best interest because they achieved specific foreign policy objectives or because you feel it was important at this time for us as a nation to assert ourselves?



Note: Sample size = 1,758 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, December 6-8, 1983.

Question: Currently in many Latin American countries there is a struggle for power between communist forces on the one hand and right-wing dictatorships on the other. Thinking strictly about what is best for the United States, do you think it is better to have the right-wing dictators in power, or the communists in power?

Question: Now thinking strictly about the average people who live in those countries, do you think they would fare better under a right-wing dictatorship, or under a communist regime?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, Inc. (Roper Report 83-8), June 4-11, 1983.

Presidents and Prime Ministers:

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president? (United States)

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister? (Great Britain)



Note: In months when more than one survey was conducted, the last results of the month are presented. For France: Confidence in = Complete confidence + A lot of confidence. No confidence = Not very much confidence + No confidence at all.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 6-9, 1984 (United States); Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of March 14-20, 1984 (Great Britain); SOFRES for Figaro magazine, latest that of late March 1984 (France); and Gallup-Spain, latest that of October 1983 (Spain).

Charting Popularity

Question: Do you have complete confidence, a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand to resolve the problems facing France today? (France)

Question: Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Mr. (name prime minister) is carrying out his duties as president of the government? (Spain)



	Reagan		Thatcher		Mitterrand			Calvo-Sotelo (and Gonzalez)	
	App.	Dis.	Sat.	Dis.	Conf.	No Conf.		App.	Dis.
1981			**1981**		**1981**			**1981**	
Feb.	55%	18%	Jan.	33%	61%				
Mar.	60	24	Feb.	32	63			Mar.	25% 19%
Apr.	67	18	Mar.	29	65			Apr.	41 15
May	68	21	Apr.	33	60			May	38 23
June	58	30	June	34	61	June	74% 20%	June	39 25
July	56	30	July	31	62	July	71 24	Sept.	29 39
Aug.	60	29	Aug.	29	64	Sept.	62 32	Oct.	25 46
Sept.	52	37	Sept.	28	65	Oct.	64 31		
Oct.	56	35	Oct.	30	65	Nov.	60 35		
Nov.	54	37	Nov.	28	64	Dec.	57 37		
Dec.	49	41	Dec.	25	66				
1982			**1982**		**1982**			**1982**	
Jan.	47	42	Jan.	32	61	Jan.	59 35		
Feb.	47	43	Feb.	30	63	Feb.	58 37		
Mar.	46	45	Mar.	35	57	Mar.	58 36		
Apr.	43	47	Apr.	41	53	Apr.	56 39		
May	45	44	May	56	40	May	58 37		
June	44	46	June	59	36	June	63 33		
July	42	46	July	51	41	July	57 39	July	21 48
Aug.	42	46	Aug.	49	43	Sept.	54 42		
Sept.	42	48	Sept.	46	48	Oct.	51 43		
Oct.	42	48	Oct.	46	46	Nov.	53 43		
Nov.	43	47	Nov.	48	45	Dec.	49 46		
Dec.	41	50	Dec.	46	45				
								(Gonzalez)	
1983			**1983**		**1983**			**1983**	
Jan.	35	56	Jan.	49	45	Jan.	48 47		
Feb.	40	50	Feb.	49	45	Feb.	50 45	Feb.	62 13
Mar.	41	49	Mar.	48	46	Mar.	49 46		
Apr.	41	49	Apr.	49	44	Apr.	54 41		
May	46	43	May	53	40	May	49 47		
June	47	44	June	51	42	June	46 51		
July	42	47	Aug.	53	40	July	40 58	July	56 15
Aug.	43	45	Sept.	50	43	Sept.	43 51		
Sept.	48	42	Oct.	47	46	Oct.	38 56	Oct.	58 22
Oct.	45	44	Dec.	47	48	Nov.	42 54		
Nov.	53	37				Dec.	46 50		
Dec.	54	37							
1984			**1984**		**1984**				
Jan.	54	38	Jan.	48	45	Jan.	47 48		
Feb.	55	36	Feb.	47	47	Feb.	44 52		
Mar.	54	39	Mar.	43	52	Mar.	43 53		
Apr.	54	36							

Note: A late March survey by the French polling firm SVA found Reagan to be more popular than Mitterrand in France: 49% approved of Reagan and 29% disapproved; 41% approved of Mitterrand and 46% disapproved.

Reagan's Foreign Policy Ratings: Surveying the Surveys

Question: (GALLUP) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling our foreign policy—that is, our relations with other nations? (February, March, August, October, and December 1981) **Question:** Now let me ask you about specific foreign and domestic problems. As I read off each problem, one at a time, would you tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling that problem . . . foreign affairs/policy? (February 1982-April 1983) **Question:** Now let me ask you about some specific problems. As I read off each problem, would you tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling that problem . . . foreign policy? (August 1983-February 1984)

Question: (HARRIS) Now let me ask you about some specific things President Reagan has done. How would you rate him on handling foreign policy matters—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?

Question: (CBS NEWS/*NEW YORK TIMES*) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling foreign policy?

Question: (ABC NEWS/*WASHINGTON POST*) (On another matter,) do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling foreign affairs?



	GALLUP			HARRIS				CBS NEW YORK TIMES			ABC WASHINGTON POST		
	App.	Dis.	N.O.		Excel.	Only fair/ Poor	Not Sure		App.	Dis.	N.O.	App.	Dis. D.K./ N.O.
1981				1981				1981				1981	
1982				1982				1982				1982	
1983				1983				1983				1983	
1984				1984				1984				1984	

Note: *For Harris, September 25-29, 1982, October 9-13, 1982, and February 9-11, 1984 respondents were likely voters. Sample sizes were approximately 1,250. The categories "Excellent" and "Pretty good" were combined. "Only fair" and "Poor" were combined. For CBS News/*New York Times* sample size for June 20-26, 1983 = 1,365, September 14, 1983 = [illegible], March 21-24, 1984 = 1,217, April 23-26, 1984 = 1,367 (registered voters). For ABC News/*Washington Post* sample size for October 9-11, 1981 = 1,004, December 11-15, 1981 = 1,208, February 17-18, 1982 = 1,302, March 18-21, 1982 = 1,216, May 24-[illegible], 1982 = 1,[illegible], September 23-26, 1982 = 1,501, October 28 and 29, 1983 = 1,249, February 13-15, 1984 = 1,[illegible].

Source: Surveys by The Gallup Organization, latest that of February 10-13, 1984; Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of February 9-11, 1984; CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of April 23-26, 1984; ABC News and ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of February 13-15, 1984.

by Everett Carll Ladd

Is Election '84 Really a Class Struggle?

What kind of an election is 1984 shaping up to be? In much of the commentary, one answer has been predominant: the contest is sharply cleaving the American electorate. David Broder, for example, wrote an article in January titled "Election '84: A Class Struggle." The piece was strikingly introduced by a half-page illustration of the storming of the Bastille—surely one of the most dramatically polarizing events in the history of western civilization.

Broder argued that "America is split down the middle, on old-fashioned class and income lines, by the policy changes President Reagan and the Republicans have brought to Washington." In this "polarized and politicized America," opinion surveys "even show women lining up against men in the famous 'gender gap.'" The basic division, though, is "an income and class chasm that defines the politics of 1984 in stark terms."[1]

Other observers have offered similar assessments. Reagan "has alienated bigger chunks of the electorate than any previous president," Democratic pollster Peter Hart argues. The president has "revived class differences that have been diminishing for many years and intensified the division between the parties," concludes political scientist William Schneider. ". . . Reagan polarizes Democrats and Republicans more than any other recent president."[2]

Provocative but Wrong

Ronald Reagan's reelection campaign is undoubtedly "polarizing and politicizing" for many people engaged in political and governmental affairs. Every important election polarizes political elites by providing a battleground on which they must compete. And, an incumbent president with a strong personality who has attempted substantial policy changes energizes elites even further, and sets them at each other's throats. This is not, however, what David Broder and others have in mind when they say the current election is unusually divisive. They mean that the electorate at large has been split into warring camps.

This is a provocative—even a dramatic—thesis; it is no small thing to conclude that a "class chasm" has opened up. But is it valid? In view of the rich collection of relevant survey research information available to us, the argument has been subjected to surprisingly little empirical examination. This article reports on the first stages of such an assessment.

Ronald Reagan's presidency certainly gets better marks among the higher socioeconomic groups—whether defined by education, occupation, or income—than among the lower groups, and in trial heats with his most likely Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, Reagan similarly does much better among the former than the latter. Moreover, the range of group differences is greater now than during the Carter administration, when these differences were unusually modest. But the overall picture of Election '84 does not show a country sharply split on class, partisan, or other social group lines.

Social Groups and Presidential Choice

Group differences in voting are as old as free elections, and they have been a persistent feature of American electoral life. Table 1 shows the magnitude of these splits for the nine presidential elections reaching back to 1952. Except for the 1984 data, which are from an early trial heat, the figures are adapted directly from a table that Gallup has published based on postelection polling. Gallup does not include income groups because of the difficulty in comparing categories in their income data over time. Even without them, though, class differences are evident in every election over this span. For each election, the college educated were more Republican than those with only grade-school training, and people with professional and managerial jobs were more Republican than manual workers.

We see some variations from one election to another, but shifts in the extent of class voting have on the whole been strikingly small. The Reagan-Carter distri-

butions in 1980 and those for Reagan-Mondale based on survey trial heats fit comfortably within the established range. Table 1 just isn't consistent with the idea that, to date, Election '84 is especially polarizing.

Partisan Ratings of the President

Presidential approval scores provide another measure of group polarization. If Reagan's candidacy is cleaving the populace, this should be evident in unusually strong support from some groups and unusually sharp opposition from others. But no such pattern is evident.

Let's start with William Schneider's contention that Reagan polarizes Democrats and Republicans more than other presidents. Figure 1 shows the proportion of out-of-power party identifiers who said they approved of the incumbent president's handling of the office, from about 235 Gallup polls from 1946 to the present. Reagan's ratings by Democrats are generally higher than Republican assessments of Truman and are at least comparable to the grades Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter received from their opponents' partisans. Only Eisenhower and Kennedy summoned consistently higher approval ratings from the rank-and-file of the opposition party. Reagan's current approval scores from Democrats, about one-third of whom say they approve his handling of the presidency, are about average for a modern president in his fourth year in office.

Some of the most revealing poll data on partisan polarization come from a *Los Angeles Times* poll of November 1983 (and not yet repeated) that asked respondents to locate themselves in one of the four categories shown in table 2.

Table 1
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING AND VOTE INTENTION
1952-1984

	1952 DDE	1956 DDE	1960 JFK	1964 LBJ	1968 RMN	1972 RMN	1976 JEC	1980 RR	1984* RR
NATIONAL	55%	58%	50%	61%	43%	62%	50%	51%	54%
By sex:									
Male	53	55	52	60	43	63	53	53	59
Female	58	61	49	62	43	62	48	49	50
Difference	5%	6%	3%	2%	0%	1%	5%	4%	9%
By race:									
White	57	59	49	59	47	68	46	56	59
Nonwhite	21	39	68	94	12	13	85	10	18
Difference	36%	20%	19%	35%	35%	55%	39%	46%	41%
By education:									
College	66	69	39	52	54	63	42	53	64
Grade school	48	50	55	66	33	51	58	42	39
Difference	18%	19%	16%	14%	21%	12%	16%	11%	25%
By occupation:									
Professional & Business	64	68	42	54	56	69	42	55	65
Manual	45	50	60	71	35	57	58	46	48
Difference	19%	18%	18%	17%	21%	12%	16%	9%	17%
By age:									
Under 30 years	49	57	54	64	38	52	53	41	55
50 years & older	61	61	46	59	47	64	52	54	51
Difference	12%	4%	8%	5%	9%	12%	1%	13%	4%
By religion:									
Protestants	63	63	38	55	49	70	46	54	56
Catholics	44	49	78	76	33	52	57	47	53
Difference	19%	14%	40%	21%	16%	18%	11%	7%	3%
By party:									
Republicans	92	96	5	20	86	95	9	86	89
Democrats	23	15	84	87	12	33	82	26	25
Independents	65	70	43	56	44	69	38	55	59
Difference	69%	81%	79%	67%	74%	62%	73%	60%	64%
By region:									
East	55	60	53	68	43	58	51	47	50
Midwest	58	59	48	61	47	60	48	51	55
South	49	51	51	52	36	71	54	52	57
West	58	57	49	60	49	59	46	54	55
Difference	9%	9%	5%	16%	13%	13%	8%	7%	7%

Note: 1952-1980 data are from postelection surveys. *1984 data from a Reagan-Mondale trial heat
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 10-13, 1984

Table 2

Question: Which one of the following statements comes closest to the way you feel about President Reagan: "I like Ronald Reagan as a person and I also like most of his policies," or "I like Ronald Reagan as a person but I don't like most of his policies," or "I don't like Ronald Reagan as a person but I do like most of his policies," or "I don't like Ronald Reagan as a person and I also don't like most of his policies."

	Like Reagan/ policies	Like Reagan/ don't like policies	Don't like Reagan/ like policies	Don't like Reagan or policies
By party:				
Democrats	42%	37%	5%	15%
Republicans	80	12	5	3
Independents	55	28	5	11
National	53	29	6	12
By income:				
$10,000 and less	36	40	7	17
$40,000 and more	69	15	5	10

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 12-17, 1983.

The answers they gave don't fit the model of partisan polarization. Democrats were less supportive than Independents or Republicans, of course, but 79 percent of them said they liked the president personally, while 47 percent said they backed his policies.

Turning from partisan to income groups further contradicts the polarization thesis. Those with high incomes are more likely than their low-income counterparts to say they like Reagan and his policies, but the latter hardly express great antipathy. Seventy-six percent of those with incomes under $10,000 a year replied that they like the president personally, while 43 percent liked his policies.

The Income Spread Has Increased Moderately

In forty-two national surveys from the beginning of the Ford presidency in 1974 through February 1984 (the latest available data when this article was written), the Roper Organization asked respondents whether they were strong to moderate supporters, or strong to moderate critics of the incumbent president. Table 3 summarizes the answers given by the occupational, educational, and income groups that are furthest apart, by the young and the old, men and women, and by the four big regional groupings. Overall, the spread in Reagan ratings is similar to those for Carter and Ford—and certainly neither of them was thought of as a polarizing president.

The spread between the high- and low-income cohorts, and between the college and grade-school educated is somewhat greater for Reagan. The margin between the proportion of the highest income stratum saying they were supporters and that of the lowest stratum has ranged between 18 and 29 percentage points during the Reagan presidency; the median is 24 points. During the Carter presidency, the range was 4 to 25, with a median of 14; and for the Ford presidency it was 10 to 18, with a median of 14 points. (Roper did not begin using this question until the end of Richard Nixon's tenure, when Watergate had demolished the president's popular standing.)

A note of caution: Comparisons of income groups over time are tricky, because the range of income categories specified by the various surveys is far from constant. In some instances the highest bracket is much higher, or the lowest much lower, than in others. This is why organizations like Gallup and Roper do not release long trends of responses by income cohorts. In 1976, the highest income category used by Roper ($18,000 and up) began just 17 percent above the actual median family income then; in the 1977 surveys, however, the high ($25,000) was 36 percent above the median; and in 1982 the high ($30,000) was 28 percent over the current median family income. Gallup's high category in 1968 ($10,000 and up) was just 14 percent above the median income of the day, while its high in 1984 ($40,000) is roughly 50 percent above this year's likely median family income. Such variations can be highly influential: Differences by income groups can easily be made to increase, or decrease, depending on how great the range is between the survey's high and low categories.

This having been said, it is still clear that the income group spread under Reagan is somewhat greater than it had been in prior years. It is also clear, however, that the split is not accurately described as a new "class chasm." First, the spread is modestly, not massively, greater. Even more important, neither Reagan's approval scores, nor his standing in trial heats with Mondale, fits the argument that the poor feel especially estranged. Data from a March 21-24, 1984 CBS News/*New York Times* survey are in accord with other polls' findings:

	Reagan vs Mondale		Reagan Approval	
	R	M	Approve	Disapprove
Less than high school education	35%	40%	44%	38%
Family income under $12,500 a year	34	42	41	43

Mondale is ahead of Reagan among the lowest income and educational groups, but not by much. This is not the stuff of a deep class divide.

Men and Women

Interestingly, the Roper "supporters/critics" measure shown in table 3 indicates only a small gap between the proportion of men and women backing the Reagan presidency. The spread was of the same magnitude—very small—during the Carter and Ford presidencies. Other polls and measures have, however, reported a

bigger "gender gap" for Reagan than for his predecessors.

Yet even those polls that report rather large male-female differences in Reagan approval scores—along the order of ten to fifteen points—do not support David Broder's observation of "women lining up against men." However the question is worded, about half of voting-age women now say they favor Reagan's presidency, while about half oppose it.

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN SAYING THEY APPROVE OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY

Survey	Dates	
Gallup	Average of four surveys taken January-March 1984	50%
Penn + Schoen/ *Garth Analysis*	February 8-12, 1984	56
Roper	February 11-15, 1984	48
Time/ Yankelovich	January 31-February 2, 1984	55
Harris	March 15-17, 1984	50

Blacks and Whites

Blacks and whites do fit a general polarization thesis. Part of this pattern did not originate with the Reagan administration, however, and the part that did occurs within the Democratic alliance.

In 1960, Republican Richard Nixon won about a third of the black vote. That was the last time a GOP nominee received significant black support. The national Democratic party swung decisively behind the movement for civil rights, while the 1964 Republican presidential candidate put himself—and to some degree, inevitably, his party—behind the white protest against racial change. The Republicans have never recovered. Reagan's presidency hasn't reversed this alignment, but neither has he caused or intensified it.

In general, racial tensions in 1984 do not compare with what they were a decade and a half ago at the time of George Wallace's runs for the presidency. It is true, however, that Jesse Jackson's candidacy for the Democratic nomination has gained strong, widespread backing in the black community while attracting only negligible support among white Democrats. For example,

Table 3 GROUP DIFFERENCES ON ROPER SUPPORTER/CRITIC QUESTION 1974-1984

Percent describing themselves as supporters:

	FORD								CARTER									
	9/ 74	9/ 74	11/ 74	2/ 75	6/ 75	10/ 75	6/ 76	12/ 76	3/ 77	4/ 77	9/ 77	3/ 78	6/ 78	8/ 78	9/ 78	10/ 78	1/ 79	3/ 79	7/ 79
By region:																			
Northeast	69%	63%	56%	37%	51%	38%	38%	58%	77%	72%	62%	56%	52%	44%	56%	51%	49%	46%	29%
Midwest	75	63	56	48	54	50	48	61	74	68	63	49	45	47	59	51	54	50	40
South	74	64	57	45	50	49	36	72	81	76	65	59	48	56	58	56	60	50	39
West	75	61	52	40	51	46	36	59	71	66	59	48	48	36	53	58	46	47	28
Difference	6	3	5	11	4	12	12	14	10	10	6	11	7	20	6	7	14	4	12
By age:																			
18-29 years	74	64	53	41	52	49	36	59	76	72	65	50	49	46	58	56	52	47	32
60 and over	75	62	64	51	56	46	44	66	77	73	59	56	50	52	59	53	53	56	39
Difference	1	2	11	10	4	3	8	7	1	1	6	6	1	6	1	3	1	9	7
By occupation:																			
Executive/ Professional	82	70	61	53	60	54	45	55	75	66	59	45	41	42	50	47	49	41	37
Blue collar	65	55	46	35	48	40	34	67	78	73	67	52	52	49	60	60	57	51	34
Difference	17	15	15	18	12	14	11	14	3	7	8	7	11	7	10	13	8	10	3
By education:																			
College	80	68	61	48	57	51	44	56	73	69	61	49	44	41	52	52	51	45	34
Non-High school graduate	63	54	46	40	47	37	34	71	79	78	63	62	54	56	59	58	57	54	40
Difference	17	14	15	8	10	14	10	15	6	9	2	13	10	15	7	6	6	9	6
By sex:																			
Male	72	60	52	41	50	45	37	64	75	71	60	50	49	44	54	52	51	45	33
Female	74	67	60	44	53	47	42	63	78	71	65	57	48	50	59	55	56	51	37
Difference	2	7	8	3	3	2	5	1	3	0	5	7	1	6	5	3	5	6	4
By income:																			
Low income	65	57	50	36	47	38	32	71	80	78	64	68	56	57	65	60	55	58	41
High income	83	67	64	52	57	52	46	53	76	63	56	44	41	32	53	47	45	40	32
Difference	18	10	14	16	10	14	14	18	4	15	8	24	15	25	12	13	10	18	9

Note: From September 1974-December 1976 "Low income" = $6,000 and under and "High income" = $18,000 and over. For March 1977-December 1980 "Low income" = $7,000 and under and "High income" = $25,000 and over. From March 1981-February 1984 "Low income" = $10,000 and under and "High income" = $30,000 and over.

Jackson received 79 percent of the black vote in Illinois (according to the CBS exit poll), compared to just 17 percent for Walter Mondale and 4 percent for Gary Hart. In New York, Jackson's share was 87 percent, in Pennsylvania 77 percent. At the same time, only 4 percent of whites voted for Jackson in Illinois, 6 percent in New York, 11 percent in Pennsylvania. This is obviously a kind of polarization, although it was not precipitated by interparty competition.

The Absence of Polarizing Issues

Some elections split the populace more than others because they are dominated by issues that galvanize and fracture. In 1968 and 1972, for example, the Vietnam War was the important issue to many voters, and it divided them deeply. In 1984, however, it is hard to find any issue that at once commands broad public concern and splits the public sharply along group lines.

A substantial proportion of Americans are concerned about the federal deficit, for example, but no group blames largely either Reagan or the Democrats for it. People are uneasy about the situation in Central America, yet only 2 percent told CBS News/*New York Times* interviewers in mid-January that Central America was "the most important foreign policy problem facing this country. . . ." Developments in the Middle East have aroused public concern, and the Reagan administration has been criticized for its handling of such matters as the troops in Lebanon. But the decision to withdraw the troops received general support, and most people do not think the United States sustained a major setback. The school prayer amendment vote in the Senate generated a lively debate, but the general public does not seem deeply divided by the issue.

High-income groups feel more confident that the country is headed in the right direction than do those with low incomes, and they are generally more optimistic about the future. The recovery of public confidence in late 1983 and now in 1984, however, cuts across income and other group lines. For instance, Roper asked its respondents last December to assess what kind of year 1983 had been for them and what they expected of 1984. Every socioeconomic group—from those with incomes of less than $10,000 per year to $30,000 and over, from those with less than a high school education to college graduates—by solid majorities said 1983 was "good" as opposed to "not so good." And each group said that 1984 would be better.

														REAGAN								
8/ 79	9/ 79	10/ 79	12/ 79	1/ 80	2/ 80	4/ 80	7/ 80	12/ 80	3/ 81	4/ 81	7/ 81	9/ 81	12/ 81	3/ 82	6/ 82	9/ 82	1/ 83	3/ 83	6/ 83	7/ 83	9/ 83	2/ 84
42%	33%	34%	50%	49%	49%	42%	31%	50%	59%	68%	58%	53%	51%	41%	45%	44%	33%	38%	45%	40%	42%	48%
41	36	39	52	55	53	48	31	58	63	68	61	55	49	48	49	41	40	39	43	45	44	52
45	42	45	58	63	60	53	40	62	60	68	61	53	50	45	45	45	40	39	50	43	45	47
34	31	35	51	49	56	43	37	57	67	74	64	56	51	50	49	47	50	47	48	49	50	54
11	11	11	8	14	11	11	9	12	8	6	6	3	2	9	4	6	17	9	7	9	8	7
41	34	39	49	54	54	44	36	53	57	66	60	56	50	44	45	44	40	42	45	44	40	51
44	43	43	62	57	55	52	38	59	61	71	64	50	52	47	46	44	43	36	48	46	44	51
3	9	4	13	3	1	8	2	6	4	5	4	6	2	3	1	0	3	6	3	2	4	0
35	30	35	40	55	54	38	27	69	71	77	72	67	57	54	56	53	45	49	51	53	50	59
42	38	40	54	54	56	48	37	54	59	66	55	50	47	38	44	40	35	38	44	38	43	45
7	8	5	14	1	2	10	10	15	12	11	17	17	10	16	12	13	10	11	7	15	7	14
36	32	34	46	50	53	44	30	62	67	73	69	62	57	51	53	51	43	45	50	49	52	53
46	42	45	60	59	55	53	40	49	52	58	48	39	34	35	36	31	34	33	36	32	35	43
10	10	11	14	9	2	9	10	13	15	15	21	23	23	16	17	20	9	12	14	17	17	10
39	34	38	52	53	52	45	31	61	67	72	63	56	53	48	49	48	42	43	48	48	47	52
43	39	40	55	56	58	50	38	55	58	66	58	52	47	43	45	41	38	38	45	41	44	48
4	5	2	3	3	6	5	7	6	9	6	5	4	6	5	4	7	4	5	3	7	3	4
48	45	46	62	59	59	58	43	44	47	53	46	36	33	32	33	30	27	24	32	31	30	36
37	29	32	48	46	51	42	28	67	75	75	70	64	62	57	57	54	45	51	54	55	57	59
11	16	14	14	13	8	16	15	23	28	22	24	28	29	25	24	24	18	22	22	24	27	23

Question: How do you feel about President . . .—at the present time would you describe yourself as a strong supporter, a moderate supporter, a moderate critic, or a strong critic of (the president)?

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-3) latest that of February 11-25, 1984

Figure 1

OPPOSITION PARTY APPROVAL OF INCUMBENT PRESIDENT

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of president) is handling his job as president?



Note: December 1983 and January 1984 points were combined, as were January-March 1984. In months where more than one survey was taken, the last results of the month are shown.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January-March 1984.

There *are* significant group differences on some policy questions, and on the outlook for the future, though their magnitude varies depending on how the questions are framed. The point is that these splits do not square with the interpretation that we are witnessing major class divisions or any unusual form of polarization.

Two Democratic Parties

An intellectual offshoot of this year's preoccupation with class conflict shows the Democrats split between two class-defined factions—apart from the split related to race. On the one side are the young urban professionals—the now fabled "Yuppies"—with their thirst for "new ideas," sallying forth behind Gary Hart. On the other side are the older, blue-collar, trade union, and ethnic Democrats, still captivated by the old ideas of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Their champion this year is Walter Mondale.

This picture of a Democratic class struggle, like the rest of the polarization argument, starts with valid distinctions and then spoils things by vastly overinterpreting them. Gary Hart has generally done better among young Democratic primary voters than among the old; better among the college educated than among those with only grade school training; better among those with professional and managerial jobs than among blue-collar workers, and so on. But the story of the primaries has not been one of a persistent class cleavage.

(Continued on page 51)

by Karlyn H. Keene

Who's the Fairest of Them All?

The charge is familiar enough: Ronald Reagan's biggest weakness is the fairness issue. Buoyed by evidence from public opinion polls, Democrats say that this president is not fair to people like you and me, that he does not care about the poor, and that he is a president of the rich.

None of this is new in American politics. Franklin Roosevelt, you recall, labeled wealthy Republicans "economic royalists" and "princes of privilege," and the charge has plagued the party ever since. United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, a Democrat in this administration, explained the Republican problem in an article she wrote in 1979: "The less inclusive, more privileged, WASPish Republican style is not unrelated to the party's history . . . and it reinforces the doubt that most traditional Democrats . . . harbor about the GOP; a doubt that Republicans *care enough* about the whole, including those who are . . . unable to look out for themselves." What has been a problem for the party has been particularly acute for Ronald Reagan, who made no secret that his views about the proper role of government in meeting needs were fundamentally different from those of previous Democratic and Republican administrations. The political potency—and media acceptance—of Reagan's "unfairness" showed up strikingly on a controversial *Newsweek* cover in April of 1982. Who can forget the dirty-faced little girl and the caption: "Reagan's America: And the Poor Get Poorer"? The administration's sensitivity to this issue is shown by the publication of two lengthy documents: *Fairness Issues* (June 1982) and *Fairness Issues II* (Spring 1983) published by the White House Office of Policy Information.

The Fight for the "Soul of the Democratic Party"

The use of the fairness issue by Democrats against Republicans is not new, but its use by Democrats against one another may be. Walter Mondale says that he will be "an advocate for fairness" (read: Gary Hart will not be), and that "we're about to decide whether we are a generous party or a caring nation." Though Mondale makes similar statements about the general election campaign, he intended these particular remarks to distinguish him from Hart. They appear to be having the desired effect—at least on some Democratic primary voters. Among voters in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania who said that issues such as helping poor people mattered most to them in casting their vote, Mondale led Hart by substantial margins.

Mondale and Hart will probably settle their differences on this and other issues at the convention, allowing them to turn both barrels against Reagan once again. A preview of the Mondale rhetoric came in weekend campaigning before the May 8 primaries: "We've got a government that doesn't seem to understand or care about the problems of the average American, and that has got to stop, and that will stop next fall."

The prospect of firing volleys at Reagan's unfairness makes Democrats gleeful and Republicans uneasy. But the shots may backfire, or at least fail to hit home. Reagan may not be as weak, or the Democrats as strong, as conventional wisdom suggests. Further, the concept of fairness as understood by Walter Mondale may not be the same one Americans hold. And finally, although Reagan is seen more as a president of the rich than a champion of the poor, this may not be an over-

riding issue on election day.

The difficulty of getting a handle on this topic should not be underestimated. In her provocative book, *What's Fair?*, Jennifer Hochschild warns of the landmines that await anyone who examines a topic as "complex and slippery as beliefs about income, property, justice, equality, and the role of government." But public opinion polls can illuminate some dimensions of Americans' understanding of fairness, and particularly their assessment of Ronald Reagan.

The Reagan Problem

A poll taken early in Reagan's term by CBS News/*New York Times* confirms that the charges leveled by Roosevelt and others years ago haven't lost their sting. "Who do you think cares more about the needs and problems of people (like yourself/richer than you/poorer than you), Ronald Reagan or the Democrats?" asked the interviewers. The population split evenly on who cared more about people like yourself; 39 percent said Reagan and 41 percent said the Democrats. When asked about people richer than you, a majority said Reagan cared more, while 30 percent said the Democrats. The numbers were reversed for people poorer than you; slightly more than half thought the Democrats cared more, compared to 30 percent who said Reagan. The differences will provide potent political shorthand for the charge that Democrats hope will move them back into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Even when polls don't contrast Reagan with the alternatives, they show he is vulnerable. As early as the 1980 campaign, several of the polls showed that fairness had the makings of a political issue, at least in the pollsters' minds. In April and June of 1980 and again in January and April of 1981, CBS News/*New York Times* interviewers asked this question: "How much do you think Ronald Reagan cares about the needs and problems of people like yourself?" In all four polls, about seven in ten Americans said Reagan cared a "great deal" or "some" about the problems and needs of people like themselves. Of course, being fair to people like oneself is only one aspect of fairness. How the Reagan administration treats the rich and the poor is another.

ABC News and the *Washington Post* pollsters have asked the following question twelve times since Reagan took office. "Would you say Ronald Reagan cares more about serving poor and lower-income people, middle-income people, upper-income people, or would you say he cares equally about serving all people?" In February, March, and April of 1981 solid majorities said Reagan cared about serving all people equally—the dominant response. About a third said he cared more about serving upper-income people. But since the fall of 1981, between 54 and 58 percent of those surveyed said Reagan cared more about serving upper-income people, and only about a third said he cared about serving all people equally. In a survey taken

Table 1

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself.

	Government should improve standard of living of all poor Americans (Points 1 & 2)	Agree with both (Point 3)	People should take care of themselves (Points 4 & 5)
National			
1975	*40%*	*36%*	*24%*
1983	*33*	*41*	*26*
Less than $10,000			
1975	48	33	20
1983	48	36	16
$10 - 14,999			
1975	39	37	24
1983	36	43	21
$15 - 19,999			
1975	32	42	26
1983	32	40	28
$20 - 24,999			
1975	20	41	39
1983	30	49	21
$25,000 and over			
1975	33	35	32
1983	25	42	34

Table 2

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between.

	Government should do more to solve country's problems (Points 1 & 2)	Agree with both (Point 3)	Government trying to do too many things (Points 4 & 5)
National			
1975	*38%*	*31%*	*30%*
1983	*25*	*39*	*36*
Less than $10,000			
1975	46	30	24
1983	35	41	24
$10 - 14,999			
1975	37	33	31
1983	27	43	31
$15 - 19,999			
1975	31	31	38
1983	28	40	33
$20 - 24,999			
1975	26	33	41
1983	26	37	37
$25,000 and over			
1975	28	32	40
1983	18	37	46

in early April this year, Louis Harris found the public split (48 to 49 percent) in their responses to the statement, "He [Reagan] really cares about working people and minorities and wants to get jobs for the unemployed." Harris concluded, "[T]he perception that the president neglects the less privileged remains a serious flaw in his profile."

Harris also asks a slightly different question—whether the Reagan economic policies will be "fair and equitable for," "be unfair or cause hardship for" or "go too easy on" different groups. When Harris first asked the question in February of 1981, he found that strong majorities or pluralities said that Reagan's policies would be fair and equitable for the elderly, the poor, and people "like you and your family." For all those groups, the perceptions were reversed by April of 1982. In both the ABC News/*Washington Post* and Harris queries, the view that this president was unfair registered almost immediately. It didn't build gradually as the Reagan program took effect or even as the country moved deeper and deeper into recession. By the time his program got under way, President Reagan had lost whatever high ground he had on this issue.

But is the evidence against Reagan as clear as these data suggest? Other evaluations of Reagan's character, perceptions of the Democratic contenders, and the role of government and individual responsibility in our society may mitigate the worst effects of perceptions of Reagan's unfairness.

Personal Bias

Polls are full of contradictions, and data about the Reagan program are no exception. For example, Americans believe that the Reagan program has hurt many, but they believe it will eventually help the overall economy (and presumably them). Fifty-four percent of those interviewed by ABC News and the *Post* this January said budget cutbacks had caused hardship for "many" Americans, compared to 41 percent who said "a few." They believe that the program has hurt some groups disproportionately, but they do not believe Reagan is *personally* biased against any of these groups. The Democrats may be fairer, but Reagan is not *un*fair.

In a Gallup poll conducted in April of 1983, substantial majorities of Americans said Reagan treated wealthy people and business executives fairly. About four in ten said the administration treated middle-income and average citizens fairly. Only about three in ten thought he treated the elderly and the poor fairly. In the same Gallup poll, 50 percent of Americans said the Reagan administration treated blacks fairly, compared to 36 percent who said unfairly. In a December 1983 *Los Angeles Times* poll, 69 percent said Reagan cares equally about serving blacks and whites. A fall survey conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* found that 11 percent of whites and 41 percent of blacks thought Reagan was prejudiced against blacks. The oversample of black Americans in this poll was large enough to allow us to look at blacks by income groups. In no in-

Table 3

Question: In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves.

	Responsibility of government to help people pay medical bills (Points 1 & 2)	Agree with both (Point 3)	People should take care of bills themselves (Points 4 & 5)
National			
1975	*50%*	*29%*	*21%*
1983	*46*	*33*	*21*
Less than $10,000			
1975	56	28	16
1983	54	30	16
$10 - 14,999			
1975	47	30	23
1983	51	32	17
$15 - 19,999			
1975	43	28	29
1983	42	37	21
$20 - 24,999			
1975	47	21	32
1983	43	37	21
$25,000 and over			
1975	34	37	29
1983	41	33	27

Table 4

Question: Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes) have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes).

	Government has special obligation to help Blacks because of past discrimination (Points 1 & 2)	Agree with both (Point 3)	Government shouldn't give special treatment (Points 4 & 5)
National			
1975	*25%*	*22%*	*53%*
1983	*18*	*27*	*56*
Less than $10,000			
1975	30	20	51
1983	24	30	46
$10 - 14,999			
1975	21	21	58
1983	15	27	58
$15 - 19,999			
1975	19	27	54
1983	21	23	57
$20 - 24,999			
1975	24	19	57
1983	16	28	57
$25,000 and over			
1975	27	21	52
1983	15	24	61

come group did a majority of blacks think Reagan was prejudiced, not even those earning less than $10,000. There were substantial differences in white and black perceptions of the impact of Reagan's policies, but most Americans didn't think he was biased. Now that the gender gap seems to be attracting so much attention, the data about Reagan's treatment of women are particularly striking. In the December 1983 *Los Angeles Times* survey, 73 percent of Americans said Reagan cares equally about both sexes. In a January 22-23, 1984 NBC News poll, when asked, "If a Democrat were elected president in 1984, do you think women in America would be better off than they are now, worse off, or about the same?", seven out of ten Americans answered "the same"; only a quarter said "better."

The Democratic Contenders

Democrats have long enjoyed a reputation as the party of compassion and the common man, and recent polls do give them an edge on issues touching on fairness. Majorities in recent polls said that the Democrats would do a better job of helping the poor (Yankelovich, Skelly and White), creating a fair federal budget (CBS/*New York Times*), helping the elderly and the poor get a better break (Harris), and ensuring the rights of women and minorities (Yankelovich, Skelly and White).

The Democratic party's strong lead in these areas makes some comparisons between Reagan and the Democratic front-runners more surprising. Neither Mondale nor Hart does startlingly better than Reagan, and each has problems which could blunt the effectiveness of the charges against the president. In a January 1984 CBS News/*New York Times* survey, when asked, "How much do you think (named candidate) cares about the needs and problems of people like yourself?" 65 percent said Reagan cared "a great deal" or "some," compared to 76 percent who said Mondale. Over twice as many Americans said Reagan rather than Mondale cared "not much," but the positive assessments were closer. In a February 1984 Penn + Schoen poll for *The Garth Analysis*, registered voters were asked whether a list of qualities applied more to Reagan or Mondale. On being "fair to all people" Mondale led Reagan by only 4 percentage points, 41 to 37 percent.

It is premature to give too much weight to polling data that compare Mondale or Hart to Ronald Reagan. But the early soundings do suggest that opinions about the candidate who sees himself as "an advocate for fairness" are ambiguous. The special interest charge that exit polls show as hurting Mondale only adds to his problems in this area. A candidate of special interests is not concerned with the general interest, and he is, therefore, not fair to all. Hart has some potential weakness in this area, visible in his dearth of support among blacks, a group that the Democrats admit they will have to turn out in record numbers to defeat Reagan. Blacks were the only group in the electorate to give Carter a larger share of their vote in 1980 than in 1976, and they have played an important part in Democratic fortunes. In the CBS exit polls, substantial numbers of black voters said helping poor people mattered most to them in voting, and they did not prefer Hart. The ABC News/*Washington Post* analysis of its exit and pre-primary polling data (ten polls conducted through the Pennsylvania primary) concluded that while black voters "equated Reagan with the plague, they remain less than enthusiastic when offered Mondale as an alternative to the president and are even less prone to back Hart."

Intensity

Finally, we simply don't know how important the fairness issue will be when Americans vote in November. Most polls do not measure intensity of sentiment. The *Los Angeles Times* February 1984 poll rates Reagan and Mondale on a battery of questions similar to the Penn + Schoen and CBS News/*New York Times* surveys described above. The *Los Angeles Times* applies a weighting formula to try to determine how important the issues are to potential voters. The data are designed to serve as a benchmark for future tracking—to gauge which issues become more or less important over time. Mondale held a substantial lead over Reagan on the questions that dealt with fairness; but those concerns were significantly less important to people than economic or foreign policy ones.

Welfare State Precepts

If unfairness is the big gun in the Democrats' arsenal, they may be disappointed when it misfires or fails to reach its target. The issue may not be strong enough to defeat Reagan. Other emotions and beliefs are pulling mainstream Americans away from a vision of fairness some say is represented by the liberal wing of the Democratic party and by Walter Mondale in particular. Daniel Yankelovich has described the rift as "a hidden incompatibility between some of the values which support the welfare state and those which characterize the majority of taxpaying Americans." The welfare state, he explains . . .

> tends to define fairness in terms of people's needs and rights, equating the two. If there is a need for education, medical care, or other social services, then it is assumed that one is entitled to it as a matter of legal right. By extension, if it is a right, then the government is bound and obligated to guarantee that it is provided. However, this conception often clashes with older, more traditional concepts of fairness based on the notion of deserving, the vehicles of which are hard work, effort, and dedication, rather than entitlement and need. Over the past few years, these clashes have surfaced more frequently. In troubled economic times, the American public . . . has turned back to traditional values which are

opposed to the ethic of the liberal welfare state.

It is this tension that causes Americans to support help for the poor but to oppose welfare, to believe that Reagan is less than perfectly fair, but continue to give him high ratings. To the extent that the Democratic challenger articulates the old liberal vision, he will be out of step with most Americans. Survey data, while not giving us a precise reading here, provide some interesting clues about our attitudes.

The highly regarded National Opinion Research Center asks four questions about the role of government and individual responsibility in our society. The questions were asked in 1975 and again in 1983. This gives us an opportunity to test Dan Yankelovich's hypothesis that in troubled economic times, Americans are pulled back toward more traditional values. In 1975, economic conditions were relatively good, and in 1983 we were just beginning to emerge from a deep and painful recession. The answers shown in the tables are arrayed on a scale of 1-5, with positions 1 and 2 representing support for a more active government role, 4 and 5 a less active government role (more individual responsibility), and 3 agreement with both. What is significant about these four questions is the number of Americans who place themselves at position 3, agreement with both. Our profoundly nonideological public is torn between the belief that in a society that extends opportunity, the individual must take advantage of it and be responsible for himself *and* our sense of compassion, duty, and responsibility to help those who try hard but can't or don't make it.

The data seem to support Yankelovich's hypothesis, though there has been no dramatic movement. In each of the four questions, fewer Americans supported the "activist" government role in 1983 than had in 1975, except in certain income groups. They moved not to the conservative camp, though, but to the middle ground. What is particularly interesting is the pattern for those with low incomes (less than $10,000). Jennifer Hochschild found that many of those people who would benefit most from redistribution and a more active government role did not support it. Pollster Louis Harris has called the phenomenon "Karl Marx turned upside down." Except in the case of paying for health care, the lowest-income group failed to give majority support to increased government involvement. In each case they were more supportive of an active government role than those with higher incomes, but they still did not give that option the overwhelming support one might expect.

The idea of fairness is, as Jennifer Hochschild says, "complex and slippery"; its political application is even trickier. In 1984 and beyond, the candidate who best captures the public's ambiguity on what's fair will be in step with Americans. For both of the leading Democrats and for Ronald Reagan, it is not an easy task.

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Ladd

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Rather, the 1984 Democratic race has been dominated by a mixture of individual state and regional differences. Hart has been strong among most groups in New England and much of the West, while Mondale has had the better of it among most groups in the big industrial states like New York and Pennsylvania. The results of the Connecticut and New York primaries, coming just a week apart illustrate this strikingly.

In Connecticut, Hart beat Mondale among the young, the college grads, and those with upper-income jobs—but also among the old, blue-collar workers, trade unionists, people with grade-school-only training and low incomes. He was the choice of liberals and conservatives, Catholics and Jews, men and women. New York reversed things completely. Mondale defeated Hart among each and every one of the groups that Hart had beaten him with a week before. If the contest had really been a class struggle between the Yuppies and the Enddies (Elderly New Deal Democrats), the factions would have been more consistent.

The Moderately Divided Electorate

Class differences are familiar in American elections; class chasms are rare indeed. Election '84 thus far has shown plenty of the former, but none of the latter. Neither of the big contests—the one between Reagan and Mondale, and the one between Mondale and Hart—lends itself to a class cleavage explanation.

Steven Weisman of the *New York Times* relates the story of a Reagan appearance among auto workers in Claycomo, Missouri, where "even the men wearing 'Mondale' baseball caps joined in cheering" him. ". . . Whether or not they agree with him and his policies, Americans *like* him."[3] Poll data generally bear this out—and this explains much of why group tensions have been muted. Neither Reagan nor his likely Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, generates deep antipathy, even among those who oppose them. It is hard to have a polarizing election when neither of the major candidates polarizes the electorate.

[1] David S. Broder, "Election '84: A Class Struggle," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, January 16, 1984, pp. 9-10.

[2] William Schneider, "The Divided Electorate," *National Journal*, October 29, 1983, pp. 2200-2210.

[3] Steven R. Weisman, "Can the Magic Prevail?" *The New York Times Magazine*, April 29, 1984, p. 39.

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And Tyler, Too

by Martin Wattenberg

It isn't a crime exactly. Ye can't be sint to jail f'r it, but it's a kind iv a disgrace. It's like writin' anonymous letters.

Mr. Dooley on the vice-presidency

From John Adams to George Bush, the vice-presidency has been derided by political commentators and by holders of the office as well. Adams, the first vice-president, wrote that "My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination ever conceived." Daniel Webster declined his party's offer of the vice-presidential nomination in 1848, remarking that "I do not propose to be buried until I am dead." Thomas Marshall, a two-term vice-president best known for saying "what this country needs is a good five-cent cigar," described the vice-president as being "like a man in a cataleptic state: he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain; and yet he is perfectly conscious of everything that is going on about him." When Calvin Coolidge was elected to succeed him as vice-president, Marshall cabled him a message reading, "Please accept my sincere sympathy." Soon afterward, the vice-president's plight of title without responsibility was immortalized in the fictitious Broadway character of Alexander Throttlebottom, who spends his years as vice-president feeding the pigeons in the park and trying to find two references so he can obtain a library card. John Nance Garner, obviously suffering from what soon became known as the "Throttlebottom complex," quipped that his eight years as vice-president had convinced him that the office wasn't "worth a pitcher of warm spit." And, finally, George Bush summed up the feelings of probably all past vice-presidents when he remarked rather ruefully that, "The buck doesn't stop here."

What is of course neglected in all of these remarks is the potential power of the vice-presidency. As John Adams wrote in his diary: "I am vice-president. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything." Indeed such transformations are not uncommon in American political history. Nine vice-presidents have stepped up to the Oval Office because a president has died or resigned. Webster may have been justifiably concerned about being politically buried, but had he accepted the second spot on the 1848 ballot, he would have become president in 1850 (upon the death of Zachary Taylor). Similarly, Coolidge's election to the vice-presidency in 1920 may have merited Marshall's expression of sympathy at the time, but by 1923 President Harding was dead, and Coolidge was president. All told, vice-presidents have served out twenty-six years of uncompleted presidential terms, and four (Roosevelt, Coolidge, Truman, and Johnson) were subsequently elected to full terms of their own.

Vice-presidents may still be the butt of jokes, but they have begun to take on a greater role in the everyday functioning of the executive branch. Political changes since the New Deal have allowed them to assume more significant duties than in the past. Although vice-presidents are still fairly powerless to influence law-making, presidents have called upon them more often to act as envoys on overseas diplomatic missions, to chair major policy commissions, and to speak publicly for the administration. For example, by February 1984 Vice-President George Bush had logged more than 500,000 miles, visited 58 countries and 48 states, and raised $26 million for the Republican party and individual candidates. He heads eight major administration task forces. In short, some of those pledges made in recent presidential speeches about the importance of the vice-president may actually have been kept. As presidential scholar Thomas Cronin wrote in 1982, the vice-presidency "is now very much a part of the executive branch and the presidential establishment."

Presidents and scholars have been giving more weight to the vice-presidency, but the office is still barely examined. For example, the index in *The American Voter* contains 101 references to the presidential candidates in 1952 and 1956, but only 3 mentions of the vice-presidential candidates—all quotes from ordinary citizens concerned about Nixon possibly succeeding Eisenhower. More important, there has yet to be a thorough empirical investigation of the role vice-presidential candidates play in our elections; though some very sketchy data from commercial polls indicate that they sometimes influence a few votes. One reason for this scholarly neglect is that the vice-president is not an elected official in the usual sense; he is, as Allan Sindler points out, "a by-product of the decision made on the presidential contest." Since the presidency is, of course, the crucial matter at stake, voters' attention should be—and is—focused on candidates for the top slot. Nevertheless, candidates for the vice-presidency are visible during the campaign, and their names do appear on the ballot. Since citizens vote for a two-person team, then it is reasonable to assume that both players affect the decision.

Furthermore, one can make a strong

Table 1
MEAN FAVORABILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (AMONG VOTERS)

	1952		1956		1960		1964	
President								
Dem.	Stevenson	.42	Stevenson	.01	Kennedy	.50	Johnson	1.01
Rep.	Eisenhower	1.08	Eisenhower	1.27	Nixon	.95	Goldwater	.76
	Difference	.66R		1.26R		.45R		1.77D
Vice-President								
Dem.	Sparkman	.01	Kefauver	.26	Johnson	.13	Humphrey	.15
Rep.	Nixon	.31	Nixon	.03	Lodge	.70	Miller	.16
	Difference	.30R		.29D		.57R		.31D

	1968		1972		1976		1980	
President								
Dem.	Humphrey	61.6%	McGovern	47.6%	Carter	61.3%	Carter	55.1%
Rep.	Nixon	67.1	Nixon	66.5	Ford	61.9	Reagan	57.1
	Difference	5.5R		18.9R		.6R		2.0R
Vice-President								
Dem.	Muskie	62.2	Shriver	49.7	Mondale	53.0	Mondale	54.4
Rep.	Agnew	50.7	Agnew	55.0	Dole	52.8	Bush	56.3
	Difference	11.5D		5.3R		.2D		1.9R

Note: For 1952-1964, entries represent the mean number of positive comments minus the mean number of negative comments for each respondent; for 1968-1980, entries are the mean feeling thermometer ratings.
Source: Surveys by the Survey Research Center, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, latest that of 1980.

argument that voters *should* consider the vice-presidential candidate's qualities, given the possibility that he will succeed to the presidency. Well over a century ago, Whig partisans sang praises for "Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too," dismissing William Henry Harrison's running mate with the final verse: "And we'll vote for Tyler, therefore, without a why or wherefore." John Tyler, of course, became our tenth president; he took over when Harrison died in office. It's impossible to tell from campaign rhymes how important vice-presidential candidates used to be to the voters, but we can get some idea what they mean today.

Rating the VPs

Each of the University of Michigan's quadrennial presidential election studies asks people's opinions of the vice-presidential candidates. Perhaps most striking is that a significant proportion of the voting population *do* have an opinion about them. From 1952 to 1964, respondents were asked to volunteer negative or positive assessments of the candidates; after 1964, they rated them on a "feeling thermometer" that ranged from 0 to 100 degrees. Anyone who cited something he liked or disliked (1952-1964), or anyone who placed the vice-presidential candidates at any point other than 50 degrees (neutral) on the thermometer (1968-1980) counts as having an opinion. Of course, far more people could rate the candidates on a scale than could offer any statements about them. On the average, only 37 percent had something to say about each candidate in response to the open-ended questions, while an average of 63 percent rated the candidates on the feeling thermometer.

For the 1952 to 1964 period, Nixon in 1952 and Henry Cabot Lodge in 1960 evoked the most positive public response, while William Miller in 1964 and Nixon in 1956 provoked the least positive. In the later period, the most popular candidates were Edmund Muskie in 1968 and George Bush in 1980, while the least popular were Spiro Agnew in 1968 and Sargent Shriver in 1972. (see table 1).

Home Bases

A vice-presidential candidate is often chosen because he is attractive to a particular region (like Lyndon Johnson and the South in 1960), and he is given the job of cultivating that region during the campaign. Also, a candidate has often had quite a bit of public exposure in his home region prior to being nominated, which makes it likely that he will be better known and more popular there than in the nation as a whole. These are commonplace assumptions that go into selecting a running mate, but they're often wrong. Of all sixteen candidates, only Richard Nixon in 1952, Henry Cabot Lodge in 1960, and Edmund Muskie in 1968 were substantially more popular on their home turf. *None* of the candidates nominated to attract southern support was received much better in the South than elsewhere. In fact, Estes Kefauver was apparently a liability to Democrats in the South in 1956, and even Lyndon Johnson was not any more popular in the South than in the non-South.

Of course, there is the possibility that vice-presidential candidates may offer some help in carrying their own states for the presidential candidates. This much we suspect is true. According to Danny K. Adkison, "the president has carried the vice-presidential candidate's state 85.7 percent of the time" in this century. But has this made the difference to the presidential victor? Apparently not. According to Adkison, "in only one election in the century would the loss of a running mate's home state have resulted in losing the election."

Relationship to the Vote

Of course, the ultimate question is whether vice-presidential candidates have any independent impact on voters' decisions. Certainly, enough people have opinions about them to be a factor, and in some years one candidate was sufficiently more popular than the other to potentially change the election outcome. As might be expected, party identification and attitudes toward the presidential candidates greatly outweigh the vice-presidential candidates' effect on the vote, but their running mates usually had some effect.

Table 2
NET ADVANTAGE OF VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
(controlling for partisanship and presidential candidate popularity)

	Net Advantage	Winner	Winning Margin
1952	.8 R	R	10.7%
1956	1.1 D	R	15.4
1960	.75R	D	.2
1964	.92D	D	22.6
1968	1.5 D	R	.7
1972	.53R	R	23.2
1976	.09D	D	2.1
1980	.21R	R	9.7

Note: These figures are derived from a regression equation predicting the vote from party identification, presidential candidates' evaluations, and vice-presidential candidates' evaluations. The unstandardized coefficient for the vice-presidential candidate variable is multiplied by the mean value of that variable to obtain the net advantage.

Table 2 shows the net advantage of the vice-presidential candidates' ratings, independent of partisanship or the presidential candidates' popularity. In 1952, for example, we can conclude that Richard Nixon contributed .8 percent to Eisenhower's victory.

In all but three elections, the winning vice-presidential candidate did contribute to the presidential candidate's victory, though the effect was always small. In the three exceptional years (1956, 1960, and 1968), the losing vice-presidential contender added to his ticket more than the opposition's running mate added to the winner, but it was not enough to overcome the presidential candidate's lead. In 1968, for example, Edmund Muskie was the more popular running mate, and so he added more to Humphrey than Agnew did to Nixon. This advantage to the Democrats (1.5 percent), though, was insufficient to overcome Nixon's greater popularity, and the Republicans, of course, won.

These numbers look meager, but they are statistically significant. If an election were close, and one vice-presidential candidate were substantially more popular than the other, even small numbers could make the difference between winning and losing.

The Impact of the Choice

In spite of their lack of visibility during the campaign, and their almost complete invisibility the rest of the time, vice-presidential candidates do play some role in voters' decisions. After all, they may become president at any time, and it is perfectly sensible for a voter to take this into account. In addition, the choice of a vice-president is the first binding decision a candidate makes about staffing his administration, and it indicates what kind of people he may surround himself with as president. Perhaps if candidates were more aware of the impact their choice could have, they might choose running mates with greater care.

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by Terry Hartle

The Public and the Teacher Unions: Out of Step on the Basics?

Most of us spend twelve years in them, and all of us pay for them. Yet, despite their importance to our national well-being and the enormity of the annual public investment they command, the public schools usually perk along without much attention paid to them. Right now, though, such bland acceptance has given way to popular and political anxiety. Americans have rediscovered the public schools, and they're not happy.

What spurred the anxiety was a host of critical reports released over the last year, especially the one produced by the federally sponsored National Commission on Excellence in Education. The Commission called for prompt action to address the "rising tide of mediocrity" that "threatens to erode the educational foundations of our society."

The Commission's report seemed to give courage to the quietly discontented. The news media featured the results and, not surprisingly, politicians scrambled to find ways to capitalize on the issue.

President Reagan—who had given little attention to the schools (other than to school prayer and tuition tax credits) while seeking the White House—has since devoted more energy to discussing the state of education than any president in history. His Democratic opponents in turn have portrayed Reagan as a hypocritical born-again educator, reminding the public that he had sought to abolish the Department of Education and cut the education budget. Not to be outdone, they have offered their own—often quite similar—list of education reforms.

One thing is clear despite the partisan bickering: Education will, for the first time in twenty-five years, be a key issue in a presidential election. In 1960, John Kennedy and Richard Nixon debated *whether* the federal government had a role to play in education. This year, President Reagan and his Democratic challenger will take up a variation on the same theme: *What* should the federal government do about a decline in education quality? There are some fundamental differences, though, between the issues raised in 1960 and the 1984 concerns. For one thing, questions about the appropriateness of a federal role in education—an issue that was briefly revived when President Reagan was inaugurated—appear to have been settled. The federal government is in education to stay. But given the huge budget deficits, exactly what the federal government can do about education is, at best, murky.

Yet another change is that in 1984, an unbelievable number of groups have become involved in education, and they make any effort to change policy very complex. Sometimes it seems that every organization with even a remote connection to education has an interest group representing it that believes the real solution to the education crisis is more federal money for its membership.

But there is no more fundamental difference between the two eras than the size and power of teacher unions. In 1960, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA), claimed 50,000 and 700,000 members, respectively. Like most public employee unions two decades ago, the teacher unions were virtually powerless. Teacher strikes were unheard of.

How times change. Today the National Education Association claims about 1.7 million members while the rival AFT represents some 500,000. Today, NEA officials estimate that 90 percent of the nation's teachers carry union cards.

Teacher unions are no longer the benign professional associations they were in 1960. The contract negotiations that now count as part of their mission are often long and tedious. Bargaining often encompasses

such educational issues as class size, classes taught, hiring standards, and textbook selection—all formerly prerogatives of the local school boards. And teacher strikes are frequently part of the bargaining process. Indeed, in 1982-1983, there were 95 teacher strikes.

Moreover, both the NEA and the AFT have become powerful political forces, especially within the Democratic party. This is especially true of the NEA. In 1976 (and again in 1980) the union endorsed Jimmy Carter for president, and the union's votes were instrumental in electing him. In 1979, in what was widely regarded as a political payoff, President Carter sponsored the creation of the Department of Education. In 1980, the NEA sent more delegates to the Democratic National Convention (over 400, a bloc about the size of the California delegation—8 percent of all delegates). More recently, the union has become involved in a number of controversies—such as the nuclear freeze—that are only marginally connected with the school house.

The AFT has been only slightly less visible. As part of the AFL-CIO, it has a long history of political activism. Albert Shanker, the union's president, is widely regarded as one of the nation's most important educators and one of its most forceful labor spokesmen. In recent years the AFT, like the NEA, has also expanded its focus to include a wide range of social issues. The union has, for example, been very concerned about labor union freedom in Poland.

Both unions have taken part in the recent debates over education. In part, their role is defensive—refuting any implication that teachers are somehow responsible for declining educational achievement. Perhaps more important, though, the unions have been involved because many of the suggested reforms focus squarely on the teaching force: higher salaries, merit pay, master teachers, abolition of tenure, stiffer training requirements, tougher evaluations, and differential pay for those who teach subjects short of qualified instructors.

Teacher unions, not surprisingly, have strong views on the problems facing the schools and their potential solutions. Both the NEA and AFT regard the problems to be largely the result of broad social forces. Lack of discipline and lack of public support are more responsible for the condition of the schools, they contend, than inadequately trained teachers. Moreover, they believe improving education will require a much wider range of efforts than simply making it harder to become a teacher or weeding out the least capable of those already in the classroom. In many ways, their views are consistent with public opinion, but they differ in some important areas.

Problems with the Schools

The reports on education point to an apparently limitless list of troubles—declining academic standards, poorly qualified teachers, violence, single parent families, financial problems, poor textbooks, low teacher pay, low quality teaching materials, too much television. The experts' list of problems goes on and on, but the public has consistently identified four issues as the most troubling: discipline, financial support, drugs, and poor curriculum. These four show up regularly in the annual Gallup poll of attitudes toward education.

Since 1969, lack of discipline has been named the major problem facing the schools, with the greatest concern showing up among minority groups and urban residents. Parents with children in parochial schools are also more likely to cite this as a problem—their impetus, perhaps, for selecting private schools.

Lack of discipline is the hardy perennial, but other items fluctuate in their ranking. Drugs, for example, were a major concern in the 1983 Gallup poll, but were less prominent in 1977. "Integration/Busing" was the second most frequently mentioned problem in 1977, the product of intense public concern over highly publicized and occasionally violent efforts to desegregate urban public schools. By 1983, this had fallen to eighth place (see table 1).

Table 1

Question: What do you think are the biggest problems with which the schools in this community must deal? (multiple answers accepted)

Problem	1977	1983
Lack of discipline	26%	25%
Drugs	7	18
Poor standards*	10	14
Lack of financial support	12	13
Difficulty getting good teachers	11	8
Teachers' lack of interest	5	8
Parents' lack of interest	5	6
Integration/Busing	13	5
Students' lack of interest/training	3	5
Crime/Vandalism	2	1

Note: *"Poor curriculum" in 1977.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 13-22, 1983.

Especially interesting is how few of these items can be controlled by school authorities. They can influence "poor standards," but that seems to be the only one on the list. Financial support, for example, comes (or does not come) from the taxpayer and other funding authorities. Lack of discipline is a problem that stems from unruly students, their parents, and judicial decisions that limit the schools' ability to punish those who misbehave. Drugs are a broader social issue, not a problem the schools can solve by themselves. The difficulty finding good teachers is probably attributable to many things—such as low pay, the quality of education schools, and the poor status the profession commands—and is not something the schools alone can address.

Interestingly, some potential problems that the schools can control—mismanagement of funds, administrative problems, teachers' strikes, lack of facilities, overcrowding, and government interference—were mentioned infrequently by the Gallup respondents.

Assigning the Blame

When asked specifically about the responsibility for educational problems, people tend to blame themselves, not the schools. In an August 1982 survey, Penn + Schoen asked "Who is more to blame for our problems in education, the parents or the schools?" The respondents overwhelmingly chose parents: 83 percent to 13 percent. In June 1983, however, only 54 percent picked parents, with the rest almost evenly divided between the schools (24 percent) and "don't know" (22 percent). One explanation for this dramatic change is that the report of the Commission on Excellence in Education may have convinced the public that the schools themselves bore a fair share of the blame for their condition.

A June 1983 survey by the *Los Angeles Times* confirms this finding. The poll asked if the government, teachers, taxpayers, students, or parents were primarily to blame for the poor quality of education. The respondents chose parents (42 percent), the government (36 percent), teachers (25 percent), taxpayers (18 percent), and students (9 percent).

Obviously these results do not absolve the teachers. They were selected by one out of four respondents in the *Los Angeles Times* poll. But the public is clearly inclined to spread the blame around, something the teacher unions are also anxious to do.

Students were cited infrequently as a problem in the *Los Angeles Times* poll, but that is probably a reflection of the question wording. The Penn + Schoen survey asked respondents if the biggest problem facing the schools was bad teachers, not enough funds, undisciplined students, or inadequate facilities. The adjective "undisciplined"—connoting a disruptive group, presumably prone to violence, vandalism, truancy, and drugs—makes a difference: 40 percent of the respondents chose students, 21 percent chose either funds or teachers, and 8 percent selected facilities.

The students themselves have a similar view. The 1979 Gallup Youth Survey asked teenagers to name the biggest problem facing their schools. The most frequent answers offer a rather grim portrait: marijuana/hard drugs (49 percent), class disturbances (30 percent), thieves (21 percent), and fighting (13 percent). The students were not asked what they thought about their teachers—perhaps it's just as well.

Potential Solutions

What to do about the schools is less than clear. The reports on education offer wide-ranging suggestions, and every politician and educator has his own set of reforms. Many of the proposals, as noted earlier, deal with teachers. The teacher unions concur with those who maintain that salaries are too low to attract and retain good teachers, but they have very different views on other reforms involving their members.

The NEA basically opposes merit pay (in favor of a fixed salary scale), teacher testing, master teacher plans, and differential pay. The AFT is less opposed to merit pay, favors the testing of entering teachers (but not those already teaching), supports master teacher plans, and is skeptical about differential pay, but does not reject it.

The public shares both unions' conviction that teacher salaries are too low. According to the 1983 Gallup poll, 35 percent of the public thought salaries were too low, 8 percent thought they were too high, and 31 percent believed they were about right (26 percent reported no opinion). This represents a sharp change from 1981 when only 29 percent felt salaries were too low, and 41 percent thought they were about right.

On several other potential reforms, however, public opinion differs from the views held by teacher unions. While the evidence is not strong enough to suggest that the unions are completely at odds with the public, it is clear that there are significant differences in perceptions.

The public, for example, strongly believes that teachers should be paid on the basis of ability, rather than by years of service or a fixed salary scale, a position the unions are loath to endorse. A June 1983 survey by the *Los Angeles Times* gave respondents several choices about the basis for teacher pay, and the public overwhelmingly chose ability. In brief, 73 percent wanted teachers paid on the basis of ability (50 percent), performance (18 percent), or peer review (5 percent), all ideas consistent with merit pay proposals. Only 20 percent would pay teachers according to training (9 percent), years worked (11 percent), or a fixed scale, the basis of most existing teacher salary plans.

Membership in a union does not appear to affect opinion on this question. A Gallup survey conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in August 1983 asked union members and nonunion members "Should teachers' pay in public schools be determined by how well they teach or should it continue to be based in large part on seniority?" Sixty-one percent of the union members endorsed ability-based pay plans while 35 percent preferred seniority-based systems. Nonunion members approved ability-based pay by a 67 to 28 percent margin.

The phrase "merit pay" itself carries an emotional charge. Teacher groups regard it as a simplistic, unfair, and ineffective idea. Some politicians, however—most notably President Reagan—have presented merit pay as a sure fire way to improve the schools. Despite potential administrative problems, state legislatures are intrigued with the idea, and several states have already adopted variations of merit pay plans.

The public seems to share Reagan's enthusiasm. According to the *Los Angeles Times* poll, the public approves merit pay for teachers by 54 to 39 percent. But perceptions have changed little in the last decade. The 1983 Gallup poll found 61 percent favored paying teachers based on the quality of their work rather than according to a standard scale (31 percent). These figures are almost identical to those that Gallup pollsters found in 1970 when they first asked the question. Gallup did

discover, however, that those who were familiar with the 1983 National Commission on Excellence in Education report, which appeared to endorse merit pay, were more likely to support it than the general public was.

The public is more evenly divided on the issue of extra pay for teachers in understaffed disciplines such as math and science: A 1983 Gallup poll found exactly 50 percent favored higher pay, 35 percent opposed it, and 15 percent had no opinion.

The teacher unions and the public also disagree on the question of master teachers—that is, the use of carefully selected expert classroom teachers who would continue their own teaching and, in addition, serve as models or teach other teachers. The National Education Association has opposed such plans (generally because of the supplemental pay master teachers would receive and uncertainty over how they would be selected), and the idea has been controversial in states such as California, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Florida where state officials have endorsed it. Despite the union's opposition, the notion is increasingly popular, and the NEA has reluctantly begun to help design programs (such as in Tennessee) to assure that their concerns are given attention in legislative debates.

Regardless of the union's positions on this issue, the public applauds the master teacher concept. The *Los Angeles Times* poll found 71 percent of the respondents approved a master teacher idea, with only 22 percent opposed.

A Plus among the Minuses

The evidence on the schools shows some striking patterns. Clearly, the views of the teacher unions differ from the views of the public, especially on the basis for teacher pay, additional pay for teachers in certain fields, and potential designation of master teachers. The public is more willing, as well, to blame teachers for the condition of the schools than the teacher unions are.

But in a number of areas, the views are consistent. Both teacher unions and the public regard drugs and the lack of discipline as major problems. Both believe teacher salaries are too low to attract and hold outstanding teachers. Moreover, the public believes that parents bear a major share of the responsibility for the current state of the schools, a point the unions have emphasized.

The public and the unions agree that teaching is no longer a desirable occupation. Teacher groups have used the recent attention to emphasize that low salaries, limited opportunities for advancement, and lack of recognition are not the ingredients of a highly esteemed profession. The annual Gallup poll asks adults if they would like their children to pursue a teaching career. Over the last fifteen years, the percentage favoring such a choice has declined sharply, from 75 percent in 1969 to 45 percent in 1983. Unfortunately, recent criticism of teachers is unlikely to improve public regard for teaching as a profession or to improve the quality of students who elect to pursue it.

This evidence does not bode well for the public schools. Public opinion about the quality of education has declined steadily over the last decade; problems are plentiful and often beyond the control of educators, and the status and quality of the teaching profession have fallen sharply and seem likely to fall further.

But there is a bit of good news. Opinion polls have regularly shown that proximity improves the way schools are regarded: People with personal knowledge of the schools have a higher opinion of them than those who lack familiarity. Parents with children like the schools better than adults as a group. Those parents with children attending the public schools give them even higher marks. And those who have children in specialized schools—such as academic high schools or vocational high schools—are positively euphoric about them.

If familiarity with the schools breeds not contempt, but its opposite, perhaps all the attention they're receiving—even though negative—may eventually improve their image.

Terry Hartle *is a research scientist at the Educational Testing Service.*

Diamond

(Continued from page 4)

cruise missile, and *Outside* magazine—nice symbol, that—was winning an award for its general excellence in coverage of such stories as Western open spaces.

Finally, whatever growing pains cable and the new media are suffering, energy is clearly shifting in broadcasting. Thanks to CNN's twenty-four-hour news services, viewers need no longer wait until 7 p.m. for national news developments, or stay up until 11:30 for election results. The same open wire that brings sex-and-sensation courtroom drama into homes was also capable of bringing an eye-opening special like the Soviet Ministry of Defense's news conference from Moscow after the downing of KAL Flight 007. The existence of CNN has allowed the three networks to move their evening newscasts a little away from the traditional hot-off-the-wires approach.

Perhaps ten years from now, when the establishment and the upstarts, the insiders and the outsiders, the liberals and conservatives, are surveyed again, it will be possible to say of them what one great journalist, Lincoln Steffens, said of another great journalist, Jacob Riis, in another century: He not only got the news, he cared about the news.

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

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by Ben J. Wattenberg

As the Dust Settles: Centrism at Work in the Participatory State

Since the mid-1960s we have had an explosion of participatory democracy in America—more campaign contributors, more media freaks, more lawyers, more political action committees, more television, more lobbyists, more voter registration drives, more public-interest groups, more media, more activists, more single issue groups, more hit-listers, more direct mail with cute little messages on the outside of the envelope, more think tanks, more special interests, more cash, more clout, and more players—of left, right, and center.

These participatory politics are new politics; they are shaping our public life in important ways that bear understanding as we move into the hot part of another presidential election year.

Yet, when all these new kaleidoscopic pieces are assembled, they emerge as something quite old and reassuring. Specifically this remarkable process of hyperparticipation has led us to a reinvigorated politics of the contentious center. For the moment, these new politics have put Ronald Reagan well ahead in the presidential race. Walter Mondale is behind the curve, and he knows it. But he is a smart professional, and let us remember, Election Day is still months away.

To understand the 1984 equation, we need first to assess the tides and countercurrents that have brought us to where we are.

* * *

Has the participatory explosion been good for us? In the abstract, of course, participation is good for Americans. It is the logical remedy for alienation, it helps people feel that they affect their destiny, it serves as a safety valve for political passions. Moreover, I argue here that participatory democracy has helped to open up our lives, helped spark the engine of our economy, helped improve the quality of life, helped toughen our resolve in a dangerous world. It has kept us away from extremism. Democracy works. More democracy works even better.

Do we have, though, too much of a good thing? After all, viewed in isolation, participatory democracy offers no coherent plan of government, no discipline, no national direction—only the haggling and pressures of the political souk. It gets people playing politics all right, which is good. But is it so democratic, so free-form, that it leads us to dark places?

Conservatives worried deeply about this in the early 1970s. The unleashed passions and potency of do-it-yourself democracy led, they thought, to more license, a softer social code, more regulation, more bureaucracy, more government spending, more inflation, and less defense spending. Liberals—as the conservatives saw it—were in charge of the participatory process. Antiwar, antinuke, feminist, minority, gay, environmental participants dominated our television screens. Under cover of a media barrage, other liberal participants exploited the softened terrain: activist lawyers, new phalanxes of liberal congressional staffers, and public-interest groups lobbied shell-shocked legislators.

It was going overboard, conservatives said.

But by the early 1980s it was the liberals' turn to worry about participatory democracy. The new participants seemed suddenly to form a conservative tide: hit-listers were targeting liberals running for the Senate, campaign money was rolling in to right-wingers and Republicans, the corporate PACs were everywhere, and pro-life women with red roses in their hands had learned how to hassle members of Congress. Under this protective participatory cover, said liberals, Ronald Reagan was destroying the social safety net, polluting the environment, and destroying the possibility for arms control.

It was going overboard, liberals said.

Both sides of the political equation sensed danger: despite its merits, the new participatory democracy could swing us too quickly and too often from one

policy extreme to another. A ship without a rudder will not last long in a storm.

But now we have some history to go by. The ship does have a rudder. The limousine of the participatory state has a steering wheel and brakes. It may creak and groan and careen occasionally, but it eventually gets us where we want to go, and where we ought to be going.

* * *

Consider liberalism.

By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, it seemed that, after decades of glory, American liberalism had taken a wrong turn. The decent impulses were still there, but too often were carried to extremes or subverted.

A liberalism that had once championed vigorous economic growth suddenly looked like it was championing an environmental ethic that seemed to scorn economic growth. A liberalism that had lauded the idea of merit and had denounced quotas turned around and endorsed quotas in all but name. A liberalism that had prided itself on an internationalist posture to combat totalitarianism of both right and left appeared to be turning toward neoisolationism, with political bidding to see who could cut the defense budget the most. All this was energized by new-style political participators: environmentalists, civil rights activists, antiwar demonstrators.

There was more—real and symbolic: a consumer consciousness that was seen to go from legitimate concern for product safety to a posture of antibusiness harassment, a feminism that became strident, an attitude about crime that seemed more concerned with rights of criminals than rights of the victims.

Looming above and beyond all this were hundreds of programs dealing with welfare, health, education, transportation, and housing. Some were very good, some not as good, but all had a common feature: neither governments nor taxpayers were willing to raise enough money to pay for them. The ensuing deficits were believed to be the trigger of a virulent inflation.

All these developments were blamed to a greater or lesser degree on the participatory explosion. Activists combed the halls of Congress, prepared to pummel legislators into shape.

Perhaps the scariest part of the picture was that it was all taking place under relatively moderate presidents: Nixon, Ford, Carter. Accordingly, it was believed that the rise of the ever-leftward, ever-farther-out welfare state could never be halted, would never even plateau, would never be made responsible, until and unless disaster struck. The electoral sum of all the special interests seemed to add up to more than 50 percent of the voters. The special interests were in control. Hence, the reasoning went, there was no way to restrain runaway participatory liberalism.

It was inexorable.

Problem: There were surely decent sentiments in this participatory spasm: environmental reform, women's rights, consumer protection. There were bright and vigorous people coming into the process. But there were grievous excesses as well.

Question: How would a perfect political system operating in a country with perfectly wise voters respond to such a situation?

Answer: Curb the excesses. Keep what's good. Keep the new players playing. Search for a healthy counter-agenda to throw out the excesses; foster it by harnessing it to the new participatory process.

* * *

That's about what happened. As the 1970s wore on, the conservatives began aping their liberal counterparts, occasionally coming up with new twists. Business groups began to organize: more lobbyists, more public relations people, more corporate advertising, and, of course, a sophisticated utilization of political action committees. The conservative ideological groups intensified their efforts and found the necessary real and symbolic issues. The Panama Canal "giveaway" was one; property tax reform was another; opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment was a third. Savaged by Watergate, the Republican party—always the better organized of the major parties—intensified its efforts at candidate recruitment, campaign finance, polling, and advertising.

Furthermore, while liberal participatory activists may have energized their special-interest voters, they failed to convince many Americans about large parts of the liberal agenda. In fact, America was changing its mind about some very important ideas. Here is the way an attitudinal road map looked at about the time Ronald Reagan took office:

Table 1

	Government Spending "Too Little" On Defense	Inflation "Most Important" Issue	"Big Government" Is Biggest Threat to Nation
1959			14%
1964		4%	
1967			49
1968	8%		46
1969			
1971	11		
1972		27	
1973	13		
1975		57	
1976	22		
1977			39
1979			43
1980		74	
1981	51		46

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization

Many other liberal attitudes were coming under sharp challenge. As criminality increased, the view that toughness was required grew stronger. As recessions formed in the late seventies, there was less talk of environmentalist slow growth and more talk about how

to spur the economy back to vigorous growth. The latter-day agenda of the civil rights movement—busing, quotas—remained extremely unpopular.

Conservatives, of course, took advantage of the turning of the tide of ideas. But it is very important to note that conservatives were able to do so only selectively. For, while the public rejected some of the liberal agenda, they also bought some of it—the best parts.

Thus, conservatives could be against busing and quotas, but would be punished if they were seen to be against civil rights (most of them were not). Environmentalism became a motherhood issue; it could (properly) be picked at near its edges on the ground of stunting economic growth, but no one ran for office on a platform of dirty air or water. Similarly, a candidate could oppose ERA, but would suffer if the public thought he was against equal opportunity for women. The best remained.

So: On the left it was to be observed that this new-fangled, participatory, special-interest democracy self-corrects just like the old-fangled democracy did.

When it goes too far, it's a loser. This meant that by the late 1970s we heard Republicans claiming that if you wanted to vote for the special-interest participation party—the party of welfare mothers, union bosses, peaceniks, soft-on-crime professors, big spending bureaucrats, black activists, harsh feminists, antigrowth environmentalists—why, then, by all means vote Democratic. On the other hand, if you were interested in voting for the party that had America's best interests at heart—not special interests—why, then, vote for your friendly Republican. (So powerful was this theme that even liberal Democrats used it on other liberal Democrats, to wit Gary Hart's anti–special-interest, union-bashing attacks against Walter Mondale in early 1984.)

* * *

It was on such grounds that Republicans started winning many elections that they used to lose. Most notable was Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980.

It was said then—and is still said now by some who should know better—that Reagan won simply because people didn't like Carter. It is also true that a bicycle moves because its wheels turn. But why do the wheels turn? Why did Americans come to dislike Jimmy Carter?

Being well liked politically is different from being well liked by your friends and neighbors. When voters *agree* with a candidate, when they think he is successful in moving toward goals they share, then they "like" the candidate. Remarkable traits of character will be discovered to back up their view. A candidate will be seen as wise, warm, and witty; it will be remembered that he was born in a log cabin. The reverse is also true. Jimmy Carter became unpopular because he became the symbol of so many things that American voters had come to dislike.

But by 1980, by accident or design, by ignorance, foolishness, or inadvertence, Carter had come to be identified with the Liberal participatory agenda. *That* feeling was *then* personalized; people said *then* they didn't like Carter.

And, all the interest groups in America, with all their activists, and all their pressure holds, couldn't give much help to the candidate (Carter) who opposed their nemesis (Reagan). Interest groups had become a large part of Carter's problem. As it turned out, the political sum was a lot smaller than the total of all its political parts.

The ongoing nightmare that haunted conservatives turned out to be only a passing bad dream. A bigger welfare state, ever-leftward domestic liberalism, and more neoisolationism were not inexorably determined by the continued growth of left-of-center participatory advocacy. That process was corrected through counter-participation by activists and by the common sense of voters.

Inexorability is not a word in the vocabulary of democracy.

* * *

Now consider conservatism. A similar pattern reveals itself and can be sketched in quick strokes.

By 1981, another fear about participatory democracy surfaced: that the right, the conservatives, and the business community had learned to play special-interest dollar democracy so well, so potently, that they could shut out the rest of America. The "new era" was viewed by some pundits as one that would guarantee continuing political ascendancy for conservatism and for Republicans. Inexorability was said to have moved from left to right.

That didn't happen either.

Reagan started out well. A chastened band of Democrats was heading back to the center. A new era consensus formed during the early Reagan period. Although the press concentrated on magnifying small differences, there was a rather remarkable agreement, across party and ideological lines, endorsing the basic lines of the Reagan program: an increase in the defense budget, a diminishment in the rate of growth of domestic programs, a closer scrutiny of regulatory excess.

But just as the Democratic left learned in the seventies, so the Republican right learned in the early eighties: if you try to go too far in the new world of participatory politics, you get slapped down. Moreover, when the activists are in the administration, their every move is highly visible, which is politically damaging.

The Reagan team drifted near the outer edge of their mandate and sometimes went outside of it. The opposition and the media made the most of this.

Americans wanted tax cuts all right, but when the perception formed (bolstered by at least some reality) that the Reagan cuts were tilted toward "the rich" and for "businessmen," the Reaganauts were harmed.

Americans did not want busing and quotas, but neither did they want a president to endorse tax exemp-

tions for segregated schools.

Americans wanted a crackdown on welfare chiselers, but not on poor people. They wanted more military spending, but not if it meant cutting college tuition help for their own kids.

Americans did not want to be weak or to give in to the Soviets, but they did not like the idea that the president might be dawdling on arms control talks.

Americans did not like environmental zaniness on the left. Stopping a dam to save a snail darter was bizarre. But James Watt, Reagan's man at the Department of Interior, looked like a screwball from the opposite end of the spectrum.

Then there was the great social security flap. In May of 1981, Reagan blithely sent a message to the Senate proposing cuts and caps in the system. After all, he seemed to say, I was elected to roll back big government. The Senate, by a vote of 96-0, quickly told the president exactly what he could do with his proposal.

Reagan and many of his conservative cheerleaders, his participatory platoons, his special-interest shock troops, had misread the American public. They felt, correctly, that Americans were disaffected by big government. But while Americans don't like big government, they don't want to do away with the services provided by big government. This gives conservatives some running room to shape policies, but nowhere near a free hand.

And so, the Reaganauts—like their Democratic predecessors—earned the label "tools of special interests." These were not welfare mothers, unions, minorities, or gays. Their special interests, their activist participators, were perceived as "fat cats," "right-wingers," "moral majoritarians," "the military-industrial complex"—all squeezing the little guy.

So: just as Republicans had successfully attacked Democratic participatory hyperliberalism, Democrats attacked Republican participatory hyperconservatism, with some real success. The Democrats called their assault "the fairness issue," which is one that properly throws fear into Republican hearts. For at its root, it is the issue that elected Democrats to high office for fifty years.

* * *

And then what happened?

Ronald Reagan did not become President of the United States because he is unskilled in political wiles. That is not the way the game works. Nor are Democrats the plurality party because they stay out of touch with voters.

Think how Reagan reacted. As he saw the trouble that right-wing activist positions were causing him, Reagan presented his views in a more moderate way. Contrary to the conservative view, there is no closet liberal villain who refuses to "let Reagan be Reagan." I have the strange sense that it is Reagan who controls who Reagan is.

Soon we heard that "the pragmatists" were winning the battles in the White House—beating the Reaganauts. And for a while it seemed as if no man in American history had worked harder to establish and maintain the safety net than that great social democrat, Ronald Reagan. No one cared more about arms control. Things at the EPA changed: Administrator Anne Burford suffered from ring-around-the-collar and was replaced by squeaky clean William Ruckelshaus. James Watt went home, crippled.

As with liberals earlier, the conservatives' excesses were purged. But, as in the liberal instance, many of the sound impulses stayed on, and were at least partially implemented: stronger defense, less regulation, more reliance on the free market, less growth of government programs.

Much the same moderating process had gone on in the Democratic party. One need not be a political genius to understand that no-growth, soft-on-defense, and big spending are non-starters these days. Today, Democrats denounce deficits, endorse industrial policies designed to foster growth, and come out for moderate defense increases.

* * *

What happened on both sides of the spectrum? Democrats used special interests to their great benefit—and then got into trouble with them. Republicans used special interests to their great benefit—and then got into trouble with them. Excesses on both sides were purged from without and from within. The fights go on. Good impulses and active people on both sides were brought into the system. Both sides now compete for the high ground of the center. In its early and benign mode, the new politics of activist participation helps a candidate or a party. In its other mode it is destructive.

When all the dust settles, we end up about where we ought to be, with the best from both camps: both parties pursuing economic growth, maintaining a moderately strong safety net, endorsing environmental progress, calling for strong defense, preparing to negotiate arms reductions.

Of course, differences remain, mostly near the margin. Those differences are what elections are about in a vigorous, progressive, contentious, centrist, participatory democracy. (I think Reagan is too far to the right on some social issues; I worry that Democrats may not be tough enough on foreign policy.)

* * *

The participatory state exhibits a beautiful symmetry. The pendulum goes left; the pendulum goes right; checks on both sides keep the pendulum from swinging too far from the center; Democrats move right; Republicans move left. All is tidy.

Except, of course, it is never quite that simple. Not only the pendulum, but also its centerpoint, keeps moving. Compared to the early 1960s, today's centerpoint is to the left. Compared to the early 1970s, the centerpoint is to the right. It may, for example, go somewhat

further right, even as everyone is diving for the center.

* * *

After all the hoopla, after all the screams about special interests, after all media blitzi about the sleaze factor, after all the talk about generation gaps and gender gaps, after all the talk about how new black registrants will change the electoral mix—it is passing strange, but, even with the participatory eruption, we end up right back at the healthy essence of the American democratic system: the struggle for the center of the political spectrum.

And, as this is written a few weeks before the Democratic Convention, it seems clear that Ronald Reagan got to the center first. He will be hard to dislodge.

There are at least three major tactical reasons that allowed Reagan to get there firstest with the mostest.

First, the policy imperatives of the presidency pull the executive toward the center. Sooner or later he's got to cut the deck and deal the cards with the environmentalists, with the economists, and with the Soviets.

Second, Reagan had no opposition for the nomination. Reagan had no Reagan pinning him to the right, the way Reagan pinned Gerald Ford in 1976.

Third, Jesse Jackson's candidacy torpedoed the Democratic rules process. The idea was to get a winner early in the game. Iowa and New Hampshire would cut the Democratic field down to two or three candidates. Super Tuesday would either seal it up or surely reduce the field to two. Another few weeks and the head-to-head combat would be resolved.

At that point, the nominee would be able to race for the center of the spectrum, putting some distance between himself and the more egregious demands of the special interest activists who can so easily pressure candidates during a close contest. Had that happened, Reagan would not be as far ahead as he now is.

But a clean, fast outcome typically needs a two-person race. After all, it's hard to get down to one person before you get down to two persons. When Jesse Jackson stayed in the race—even though he won few delegates and very few states—that made it a three-man race, and the equation changed.

Hart had an early chance for a quick knock-out of Mondale. He didn't quite make it. Had Jackson not stayed in, Mondale then would have cleaned up Hart by acquiring black votes that instead went to Jackson.

With the race alive, with all the participatory demons of the left active and swinging, Mondale (and Hart) got pulled lefter and lefter. Consider Hart: as a senator, he had put together a respectable defense and foreign policy posture since his early McGovernite days. But under activist pressure he Vietnamized his campaign. Central America, he said, would lead to war, to hundreds of thousands of dead American boys, whose function was to be "bodyguards for dictators."

Mondale tried to hold the line, but as long as the race was on, as long as he felt the participators of the left could sabotage his efforts, he clearly had to trim—on Central America, on nuclear power, on immigration reform, on quotas, on a host of other issues. Surely, as long as the contest was kept alive by Jackson's presence, he could not go to the center—which in the Democratic party means going to the right.

The tangled course of the primaries and the convention temporarily pulled Mondale back into the morass of left-wing special-interest politics, while Reagan was escaping right-wing special-interest politics.

And so, the National Organization for Women demanded a woman for vice-president, and NOWniks tried to bully Mondale on that issue. Had Mondale wrapped it up early, he could have told those participating Democrats to go fiddle, and looked strong in doing so. Instead, he said something like, "well, uh, maybe. . . ."

And so, Jesse Jackson went to Central America, denounced the U.S. in Panama, praised communists in Nicaragua, and at a university in Havana bellowed, "Long live Castro! Long live Che Guevara!"

Upon returning to the U.S., Jackson met with Mondale. Still leashed by the threat of participatory retaliation in a not quite locked up convention, Mondale did not feel able to criticize Jackson for applauding communist revolutionaries. Instead, Mondale met with Jackson and said they were working together. A Mondale aide in Minnesota was quoted this way: "There's a lot of truth in much of what Jesse has said in this campaign. . . . He is one of us. . . . He's a Democrat and true to Democratic ideals. He's never tried to mimic Reagan."

At the time, according to a *New York Times*/CBS poll, only 18 percent of the whites in America had a favorable opinion of Jesse Jackson. Still, Mondale apparently felt the need to swallow hard and keep Jackson on board.

Can Mondale, free at last after the convention, scramble back to the center by election day?

It is a very difficult, but not impossible, chore.

As the center section of this issue of *Public Opinion* shows, Mondale can't win unless he carries some states in the South and West—the more conservative and moderate areas of the nation. The Fiftieth Percentile voter—Medianman—lives somewhere south of the Mason Dixon line and west of the Mississippi River.

So Mondale must run a non-liberal campaign to get close. That means he must eschew the runaway negativism and hyperbolic anti-Reaganism so favored by the participatory left. It means Mondale must be able to withstand liberal taunts that he is waging a "Me too" campaign.

After all, Reagan got to the center first by putting his zealots in the closet, and that's not a bad recipe for Mondale.

Those are the rules of centrism in the participatory state.

Ben J. Wattenberg is an AEI senior fellow and co-editor of *Public Opinion*.

NON-TRIVIAL PURSUIT

(THE UNCONVENTIONAL CONVENTION BOARD GAME WHERE THE STAKES ARE HIGH AND THE PLAYERS WILD)

THE STATES: ELECTORAL VOTES IN 1984



ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE: 1952-1980

New England	52	56	60	64	68	72	76	80
Connecticut	R	R	D	D	D	R	R	R
Maine	R	R	R	D	D	R	R	R
Massachusetts	R	R	D	D	D	D	D	R
New Hampshire	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Rhode Island	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	D
Vermont	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Middle Atlantic								
New York	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	R
Pennsylvania	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	R
New Jersey	R	R	D	D	R	R	R	R
East North Central								
Ohio	R	R	R	D	R	R	D	R
Michigan	R	R	D	D	D	R	R	R
Illinois	R	R	D	D	R	R	R	R
Indiana	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Wisconsin	R	R	R	D	R	R	D	R

West North Central	52	56	60	64	68	72	76	80
Minnesota	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	D
Iowa	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Missouri	R	D	D	D	R	R	D	R
North Dakota	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
South Dakota	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Nebraska	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Kansas	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
South Atlantic								
Delaware	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	R
D.C.	—	—	—	D	D	D	D	D
Maryland	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	D
Virginia	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
West Virginia	D	R	D	D	D	R	D	D
North Carolina	D	D	D	D	R	R	D	R
South Carolina	D	D	D	R	R	R	D	R
Florida	R	R	R	D	R	R	D	R
Georgia	D	D	D	R	X	R	D	D
East South Central								
Kentucky	D	R	R	D	R	R	D	R
Tennessee	R	R	R	D	R	R	D	R
Alabama	D	D	D	R	X	R	D	R
Mississippi	D	D	X	R	X	R	D	R

West South Central	52	56	60	64	68	72	76	80
Arkansas	D	D	D	D	X	R	D	R
Louisiana	D	R	D	R	X	R	D	R
Oklahoma	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Texas	R	R	D	D	D	R	D	R
Mountain								
Arizona	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
New Mexico	R	R	D	D	R	R	R	R
Colorado	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Wyoming	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Montana	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Idaho	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Utah	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Nevada	R	R	D	D	R	R	R	R
Pacific								
California	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Alaska	—	—	R	D	R	R	R	R
Hawaii	—	—	D	D	D	R	D	D
Oregon	R	R	R	D	R	R	R	R
Washington	R	R	R	D	D	R	R	R

D = Democratic
R = Republican
X = Minor party

ELECTORAL VOTES BY STATE, 1984



Thomas Skladony, a research assistant for AEI's Congress Project, contributed to the design of the Opinion Roundup section on electoral college votes.

AND THE WINNER IS . . .

Predict the election! 270 electoral votes are needed to win the election on November 6. Using the electoral vote squares on page 20 as a guide, either blacken the appropriate number of vote squares for each state you believe your candidate will win, or cut out the squares on page 20 and place them in this grid.

A POSSIBLE CLUE? THE RFN² INDEX

The RFN² Index is a listing of those states won by Republican candidates Reagan (1980), Ford (1976) and Nixon (1972 and 1968).

Alaska	3
Arizona	7
California	47
Colorado	8
Idaho	4
Illinois	24
Indiana	12
Iowa	8
Kansas	7
Montana	4
Nebraska	5
Nevada	4
New Hampshire	4
New Jersey	16
New Mexico	5
North Dakota	3
Oklahoma	8
Oregon	7
South Dakota	3
Utah	5
Vermont	3
Virginia	12
Wyoming	3

Total Electoral College vote in RFN² states: 202

Note: RFN supplement: States won by Reagan (1980), Ford (1976) and Nixon (1972 and 1968): Alaska (3), Arizona (7), California (47), Colorado (8), Idaho (4), Illinois (24), Indiana (12), Iowa (8), Kansas (7), Montana (4), Nebraska (5), Nevada (4), New Hampshire (4), New Jersey (16), New Mexico (5), North Dakota (3), Oklahoma (8), Oregon (7), South Dakota (3), Utah (5), Vermont (3), Virginia (12), Wyoming (3), Maine (4), Michigan (20), Washington (10). Subtotal: 42. Cumulative total: 244.

New England

Vote for President, by Region

Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics





VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Maine	39%	61%	42%	46%	10%
New Hampshire	35	64	28	58	13
Vermont	36	63	38	45	15
Massachusetts	54	45	42	42	15
Rhode Island	47	53	48	37	14
Connecticut	40	59	39	48	12

Note: In 1980, for Vermont, Other = 21%.

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Maine	41%	58%
New Hampshire	42	57
Vermont	23	69
Massachusetts	69	30
Rhode Island	52	47
Connecticut	54	45

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income (1980)	Unemployment rate (1983)	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R			White	Black	Other
Maine	1	0	115	69	1	1	0	2	$5,768	7.6	99%	*	1%
New Hampshire	0	1	167	250	0	2	1	1	6,966	4.4	99	*	1
Vermont	0	1	78	100	1	1	0	1	6,178	5.3	99	*	1
Massachusetts	1	0	162	36	2	0	10	1	7,458	5.6	93	4%	3
Rhode Island	1	0	114	36	1	1	1	1	6,897	6.2	95	3	2
Connecticut	1	0	110	77	1	1	4	2	8,511	4.6	90	7	3

* = less than 5%.

Notes: For vote for U.S. House by region and state, in each state the percentages are based on the sum of votes cast for candidates receiving the most votes cast for representative at large in states where only one member is elected. In split vote states, a county is counted as part of the state where a majority of its voters cast for the party that won the state. In ties, the Republican and Democratic vote is counted where cast for the party candidate.

Middle Atlantic

Vote for President, by Region



Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
New York	41%	59%	44%	47%	8%
New Jersey	37	62	39	52	8
Pennsylvania	39	59	42	50	6

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
New York	56%	41%
New Jersey	56	43
Pennsylvania	53	46

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income	Unemployment rate	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	(1980)	(1983)	White	Black	Other
New York	1	0	123	87	1	1	20	14	$7,498	7.3	80%	14%	7%
New Jersey	0	1	64	56	2	0	9	5	8,127	6.6	83	13	4
Pennsylvania	0	1	126	127	0	2	13	10	7,077	9.8	90	9	1

date by ending by Earley. Each year's data are for September open primary. In Florida, Arkansas, and Oklahoma, state law does not require tabulation of votes for unopposed candidates. In Florida, District 4 was not opposed. In 1980 and Districts 6, 12, and 17 were unopposed. In 1982, in Oklahoma, District 3 was unopposed. In 1980, 1980 data for Arkansas is for District 2 only. For social characteristics, data were collected in 1980, 1982, and 1983. Democrat or strong Democrat = not strong Democrat, Independent = Independent, near Democrat, or Independent, near Republican. Republican = strong Republican, not strong Republican, Liberal = extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal. Conservative = extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative. For political makeup, there were one or more independent state legislators in California, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. There were vacancies in the state legislatures of Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.

These notes and sources are for pages 22-30.

East North Central

Vote for President, by Region



Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Ohio	38%	60%	41%	52%	6%
Indiana	33	66	38	56	5
Illinois	41	59	42	50	7
Michigan	42	56	43	49	7
Wisconsin	44	53	43	48	7

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Ohio	54%	44%
Indiana	49	51
Illinois	58	42
Michigan	59	39
Wisconsin	53	46

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income (1980)	Unemployment rate (1983)	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R			White	Black	Other
Ohio	1	0	79	53	2	0	10	11	$7,285	11.0	89%	10%	1%
Indiana	0	1	61	89	0	2	5	5	7,142	10.0	91	8	1
Illinois	0	1	103	74	1	1	12	10	8,066	9.3	81	15	5
Michigan	1	0	83	65	2	0	12	6	7,688	11.7	85	13	2
Wisconsin	1	0	77	64	1	1	5	4	7,243	8.9	94	4	2

Sources:

West North Central

Vote for President, by Region



Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



* Less than 5%

VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1972		1980			1982	
	D	R	D	R	I	D	R
Minnesota	46%	52%	46%	43%	9%	55%	44%
Iowa	40	58	39	51	9	53	47
Missouri	38	62	44	51	4	57	43
N. Dakota	36	62	26	64	8	72	28
S. Dakota	46	54	32	60	6	51	49
Nebraska	30	70	26	66	7	22	77
Kansas	29	68	33	58	7	46	53

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income (1980)	Unemployment rate (1983)	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R			White	Black	Other
Minnesota	1	0	119	82	0	2	5	3	$7,451	6.8	97%	1%	2%
Iowa	0	1	87	62	0	2	3	3	7,136	6.1	97	1	1
Missouri	0	1	132	65	1	1	6	3	6,917	8.8	88	10	1
N. Dakota	0	1	76	83	1	1	1	0	6,417	5.4	96	*	4
S. Dakota	0	1	25	80	0	2	1	0	5,697	4.7	93	*	7
Nebraska	1	0	non-partisan legislature		2	0	0	3	6,936	4.8	95	3	2
Kansas	1	0	69	96	0	2	2	3	7,350	4.8	92	5	3

Note: * = less than 5%

ter, General Social Surveys, February-April 1982, 1982 and 1983; Political makeup: for Governors, U.S. Senate, U.S. House, National Journal, October 29, 1983, pp. 2235-2239; For state legislatures, Book of the States, 1984-85, pp. 108-109; For racial composition, 1980 Census; Per Capita Income, Statistical Abstract 1984, p. 448; for unemployment, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, March 1984, p. 56.

South Atlantic

Vote for President, by Region



Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Delaware	39%	59%	45%	47%	7%
Maryland	37	61	47	44	8
D.C.	79	21	75	14	9
Virginia	30	68	40	53	5
W. Virginia	36	64	50	45	4
N. Carolina	29	69	47	49	3
S. Carolina	28	71	48	49	2
Georgia	25	75	56	41	2
Florida	28	72	38	56	5

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Delaware	53%	46%
Maryland	68	32
D.C.	82	15
Virginia	47	52
W. Virginia	63	37
N. Carolina	54	44
S. Carolina	54	45
Georgia	74	25
Florida	59	41

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income	Unemployment rate	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	(1980)	(1983)	White	Black	Other
Delaware	0	1	37	25	1	1	1	0	$7,449	7.6	82%	16%	2%
Maryland	1	0	165	23	1	1	7	1	8,293	6.2	75	23	2
D.C.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8,960	10.9	27	70	3
Virginia	1	0	97	42	0	2	4	6	7,478	5.6	79	19	2
W. Virginia	1	0	118	16	2	0	4	0	6,141	10.2	96	3	1
N. Carolina	1	0	146	24	0	2	9	2	6,133	7.8	76	22	2
S. Carolina	1	0	142	26	1	1	3	3	5,886	8.1	69	30	1
Georgia	1	0	205	31	1	1	10	1	6,402	6.9	72	27	1
Florida	1	0	116	44	1	1	13	6	7,270	8.1	84	14	2

East South Central

Vote for President, by Region

Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



* Less than 5%

VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Kentucky	35%	63%	48%	49%	2%
Tennessee	30	68	48	49	2
Alabama	26	72	47	49	1
Mississippi	20	78	48	49	1

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Kentucky	59%	40%
Tennessee	59	40
Alabama	70	28
Mississippi	57	41

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income	Unemployment rate	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	(1980)	(1983)	White	Black	Other
Kentucky	1	0	104	33	2	0	4	3	$5,978	10.3	92%	7%	1%
Tennessee	0	1	82	48	1	1	6	3	6,213	9.8	84	16	1
Alabama	1	0	129	11	1	1	5	2	5,894	12.5	74	26	1
Mississippi	1	0	164	8	1	1	3	2	5,183	10.4	64	35	1

West South Central

Vote for President, by Region



Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



Party



Political ideology



Union membership



Religion



Race/Ethnicity

VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Arkansas	31%	69%	47%	48%	3%
Louisiana	28	65	46	51	2
Oklahoma	24	74	35	61	3
Texas	33	66	41	55	2

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Arkansas	52%	48%
Louisiana	65	27
Oklahoma	63	36
Texas	65	33

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income	Unemployment rate	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	(1980)	(1983)	White	Black	Other
Arkansas	1	0	125	10	2	0	2	2	$5,614	9.2	83%	16%	1%
Louisiana	1	0	132	10	2	0	6	2	6,430	10.6	69	29	1
Oklahoma	1	0	110	39	1	1	5	1	6,858	7.9	86	7	7
Texas	1	0	140	41	1	1	21	6	7,205	6.8	79	12	9

Mountain

Vote for President, by Region

Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



* Less than 5%

VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Montana	38%	58%	32%	57%	8%
Idaho	26	64	25	67	6
Wyoming	30	68	28	63	7
Colorado	35	63	31	55	11
New Mexico	37	61	37	55	6
Arizona	32	65	28	61	9
Utah	26	68	21	73	5
Nevada	36	64	27	63	7

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Montana	52%	45%
Idaho	47	53
Wyoming	29	71
Colorado	47	51
New Mexico	51	49
Arizona	42	56
Utah	30	64
Nevada	49	50

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income	Unemployment rate	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	(1980)	(1983)	White	Black	Other
Montana	1	0	79	71	2	0	1	1	$6,589	8.2	94%	*	6%
Idaho	1	0	33	72	0	2	0	2	6,248	7.5	96	*	4
Wyoming	1	0	36	57	0	2	0	1	7,927	5.9	95	1%	4
Colorado	1	0	39	61	1	1	3	3	7,998	5.5	89	4	8
New Mexico	1	0	69	43	1	1	1	2	6,119	9.0	75	2	23
Arizona	1	0	33	57	1	1	2	3	7,041	7.1	82	3	15
Utah	1	0	22	82	0	2	0	3	6,305	7.4	95	1	5
Nevada	1	0	40	23	0	2	1	1	8,453	8.3	88	6	6

Note: * = less than 5%

Pacific

Vote for President, by Region



Vote for U.S. House, by Region

Social characteristics



VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATE

	1972		1980		
	D	R	D	R	I
Washington	39%	57%	37%	50%	11%
Oregon	42	52	39	48	9
California	42	55	36	53	9
Alaska	35	58	27	54	7
Hawaii	37	63	45	43	11

VOTE FOR U.S. HOUSE, BY STATE

	1982	
	D	R
Washington	53%	46%
Oregon	57	43
California	50	47
Alaska	29	71
Hawaii	90	—

POLITICAL MAKEUP

	Governor		State Legislature		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		Per Capita Income	Unemployment rate	Racial composition		
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	(1980)	(1983)	White	Black	Other
Washington	0	1	80	67	0	2	5	3	$8,073	10.2	91%	3%	6%
Oregon	0	1	57	33	0	2	3	2	7,557	10.4	95	1	4
California	0	1	73	46	1	1	28	17	8,295	8.2	76	8	16
Alaska	1	0	26	32	0	2	0	1	10,193	10.0	77	3	19
Hawaii	1	0	63	13	2	0	2	0	7,740	6.1	33	2	65

VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1968-1980

REGION AND RACE

Vote in presidential race



Note: For 1976 and 1980, White/Other = White + Other, but number of Others is very small.

Questions: NORC: (If voted in 1968 presidential election:) Did you vote for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace? (1972 and 1973 data combined) (If voted in 1972 presidential election:) Did you vote for McGovern or Nixon? (1973 and 1974 data combined) (If voted in 1976 presidential election:) Did you vote for Carter or Ford? (1977 and 1978 data combined) (If voted in 1980 presidential election:) Did you vote for Carter, Reagan, or Anderson? (1982 and 1983 data combined)

Gallup: For 1968, 1972, and 1976, asked of those who voted in the presidential election(s): Did you happen to vote for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace? (1968) Did you happen to vote for McGovern or Nixon? (1972) Did you happen to vote for Carter, Ford, or McCarthy? (1976)

CBS News/*New York Times*: In the presidential election whom did you just vote for? (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Eugene McCarthy, Lester Maddox, Didn't vote for president) (1976); (Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, John Anderson, Ed Clark, Barry Commoner, Didn't vote for president, Other) (1980)

ABC News: For whom did you vote for president?

Notes: For all groups, "Other" has been calculated but for comparison purposes. "Political ideology" was not available for 1968. For NORC, 1972, "Political views" was not asked in 1972 or 1973; data are based on 1974 only. "Liberal" = Extremely liberal + Liberal + Slightly liberal. "Moderate" = Moderate. "Conservative" = Extremely conservative + Conservative + Slightly conservative. 1968 Gallup data based on respondents 21 years old and older. Voting age in 1968 was 21. Sample size for CBS News/*New York Times* 1976 = 15,201 voters as they left voting booths. ABC News 1980 sample size = 9,742 voters as they left voting booths.

Sources: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1972 and 1973 for 1968 presidential vote, 1973 and 1974 for 1972 election, 1977 and 1978 for 1976 elections, 1982 and 1983 for 1980 election. The Gallup Organization, November 9-14, 1968, November 10-13, 1972, and November 12-15, 1976. CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1976, and November 4, 1980. ABC News, November 4, 1980.

Questions, notes, and sources are for pages 31-39.

PARTY AND IDEOLOGY

Vote in presidential race

Note: For ideology, no data available for 1968.

*For question wordings, notes, and sources, see page 31.

PARTY BY IDEOLOGY



Note:

EDUCATION

Vote in presidential race



Note: Gallup had the only available postelection data about the 1976 election by education. This postelection poll produced a higher Carter margin than that shown by actual election statistics. Although absolute figures are skewed, the data regarding this group is valid.

*For question wordings, notes, and sources, see page 31.

AGE

Vote in presidential race

Voted for Democratic candidate | Republican candidate | Independent candidate

1968 (Gallup)

40%	44%	16%	18-29 years *
40%	47%	13%	30-44
43%	47%	10%	45-59
43%	48%	9%	60 and over

Humphrey/Nixon/Wallace

1972 (Gallup)

50%	50%
35%	65%
35%	65%
29%	71%

McGovern/Nixon

1976 (CBS News/*New York Times*)

52%	48%	18-29 years
50%	50%	30-44
47%	53%	45-59
47%	53%	60 and over

Carter/Ford

1980 CBS News/*New York Times*)

45%	44%	11%
36%	56%	8%
39%	56%	5%
41%	55%	4%

Carter/Reagan/Anderson

Note: *For 1968, 21-29 years.

RELIGION

Vote in presidential race



*For question wordings, notes, and sources, see page 31.

RACE AND ETHNICITY

Vote in presidential race

SEX AND SEX BY EDUCATION

Vote in presidential race



Note: Gallup had the only available postelection data about the 1976 election, by sex and education. This postelection poll produced a higher Carter margin than that shown by actual election statistics. Although absolute figures are skewed, the data regarding the relative relationship between these groups are valid.

*For question wordings, notes, and sources, see page 31.

OCCUPATION AND HOUSEHOLD UNION MEMBERSHIP

Vote in presidential race



PRESIDENTIAL TRIAL HEATS:



Note: In the final surveys for each race, undecideds are allocated among the candidates. Sample for each survey is registered voters.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of October/November, 1980.

AN HISTORICAL REVIEW



* Actual vote

REAGAN VS. MONDALE TRIAL HEATS

	January	February	March		April		May		June	
GALLUP										
Trial	45R 45M	50R 39M	50R 45M	54R 42M	54R 41M	52R 44M	50R 46M	52R 43M	53R 44M	56R 37M
Margin	0	11R	5R	12R	13R	8R	4R	9R	9R	19R
Date	(1/13-15)	(2/10-12)	(3/2-6)	(3/16-18)	(4/6-9)	(4/11-15)	(5/3-5)	(5/18-20)	(6/6-8)	(6/22-25)
HARRIS	54R 42M 12R (1/12-15 + 2/9-11)		55R 41M 14R (3/1-3)	57R 37M 20R (3/15-17)					56R 41M 15R (6/7-11)	
ABC News/ *WP*	48R 46M 2R (1/12-17)	50R 43M 7R (2/13-15)					51R 43M 8R (5/16-22)			
PENN + SCHOEN/ *GARTH ANALYSIS*		54R 38M 16R (2/8-12)							52R 39M 13R (6/12-17)	
CBS News/ *NYT*	48R 32M 16R (1/14-21)	49R 37M 12R (2/21-25)	50R 33M 17R (3/5-8)	51R 31M 20R (3/21-26)	48R 35M 13R (4/23-26)					50R 35M 15R (6/23-28)
ROPER			47R 40M 7R (3/17-24)					49R 38M 11R (5/29-6/3)		
LA TIMES	50R 42M 8R (2/4-9)					53R 41M 12 R (4/28-5/3)				
TIME/ YANK-ELO-VICH	51R 41M 10R (1/31-2/2)									
GORDON BLACK/ *USA TODAY*		57R 35M 22R (2/17-21)	54R 34M 20R (3/2-6)	54R 35M 19R (3/13-17)		54R 39M 15R (4/26-5/2)		58R 35M 24R (5/29-6/1)		

LATE POLLS:

		R	M	Margin
ABC News/*WP*	July 5-8	51%	44%	7
Harris	July 2-7	52	44	8

Questions: Gallup: (Suppose the 1984 presidential election were being held today.) If President Reagan were the Republican candidate and Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (If undecided, ask:) As of today, do you lean more to Reagan, the Republican, or to Mondale, the Democrat? **Harris:** Now suppose (in 1984 this November) the election for president were between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and former Vice President Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose (today), would you vote for Reagan or (for) Mondale? (Jan.-Feb.) Now suppose in the November (1984) election it is between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose right now, would you vote for Reagan or for Mondale? (March) **ABC/Washington Post:** If the 1984 presidential election were being held today and the candidates were Ronald Reagan the Republican and Walter Mondale the Democrat, for whom would you vote? **Penn + Schoen/Garth:** (In 1984, there will be a presidential election) If the candidates were Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Walter Mondale, for whom would you vote? **CBS News/New York Times:** If the 1984 presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and Walter Mondale, the Democrat, would you vote for Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale? **Roper:** Now, suppose the presidential election were being held today with Walter Mondale as the Democratic candidate and Ronald Reagan as the Republican candidate. Which would you like to see win? (If undecided or don't know) As of today, which candidate do you lean to more: Mondale the Democrat or Reagan the Republican? **LA Times:** If the November general election for president were held today, and these are the candidates, which, if either, would you vote for: Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, or President Reagan, the Republican? **Time/Yankelovich:** Supposing the election for president was being held today and you had to choose between Mondale the Democrat and Reagan the Republican, for whom would you vote, Mondale or Reagan? **Black/USA Today:** If the election for president were held today for whom would you vote: President Ronald Reagan, the Republican, or former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat?

Notes: Gallup sample sizes: Jan. 13-15 = 1,139; Feb. 10-12 = 1,330; Mar. 2-6 = 1,008; Mar. 16-18 = 1,241; Apr. 11-15 = 1,005; May 3-5 = 1,004; May 18-20 = 1,231; June 6-8 = 1,011; June 22-25 = 908 registered voters. Harris: Jan.-Feb. results from two surveys conducted Jan. 12-15 (sample size = 1,251 of which 972 were likely voters), and Feb. 9-11 (1,262 likely voters); Mar. 1-3 = 1,227 likely voters; Mar. 15-17 = 1,270 likely voters; June 7-11 = 1,251 likely voters. ABC News/*Washington Post*: Feb. sample size = 1,206; May = 1,511. Penn + Schoen/*Garth*: Feb. sample size = 1,008 registered voters. CBS News/*New York Times* sample sizes: Jan. 14-21 = 1,002; Feb. 21-25 = 995; Mar. 5-8 = 1,244; Mar. 21-26 = 862; Apr. 23-26 = 990; all were registered voters. For Roper, "Favor/Lean to Mondale" = Favor Mondale + Lean to Mondale; same is true for Reagan response. *Los Angeles Times* sample size = 1,898 registered voters. *Time*/Yankelovich sample size = 1,000 registered voters. Black/*USA Today* sample sizes: Feb. 17-21 = 1,272; Mar. 2-6 = 1,190; Mar. 13-17 = 1,312; Apr./May = 1,441; May/June = 1,272 (Some part of all the *USA Today* samples were registered voters.)

Sources: Surveys by the Gallup Organization; Louis Harris and Associates; ABC News/*Washington Post*; Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*; CBS News/*New York Times*; The Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-4); *Los Angeles Times*; *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White; Gordon Black Associates for *USA Today*.

by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein

Congressional Elections: What's Ahead

Smart political analysts don't put money on their predictions—and for good reason. They know how unpredictable politics is. In the summer of 1982 many of them were proclaiming confidently that liberal Democratic Senators Don Riegle of Michigan and Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio faced tough reelection bids, while John Danforth, a Republican from Missouri, looked like a shoe-in. In the fall, though, Riegle and Metzenbaum won easily (each received 58 percent of the vote), and Danforth barely squeaked through with 51 percent.

Those summer projections were logical and rational. Five prominent liberal Democrats had been defeated in 1978, and seven more had suffered the same fate in 1980. Many expected the trend to continue, making Riegle and Metzenbaum vulnerable. Danforth, on the other hand, was a respected Republican senator who appeared to represent the interests of his state well, and who seemed to have no serious or well-financed challenge ahead. But issues changed; Riegle and Metzenbaum ended up with weak challengers, and Danforth had the race of his life against the feisty state senator, Harriet Woods.

Congressional elections always seem to have their share of surprises, demanding caution from prognosticators. Nevertheless, as the 1984 contest approaches, the political siren beckons insistently once again. We are prepared to predict, at least broadly, the shape of things to come in the Senate and House contests. One thing we do know for certain: many things will change between now and November. Much will depend on the candidates themselves, on how issues develop at the national level and filter down to the states, on events now unknown, and on the ability of President Reagan and challenger Mondale to set the national issue agenda in the fall.

The Senate Scenario

In the United States Senate, we rarely see substantial party shifts from one election to another. Even when the House shifts by party margins of forty seats, the Senate rarely changes by more than a few. When it does, the change is usually cataclysmic. But that has happened only three times since World War II. Outside of those three elections (1946, 1958, 1980), the average Senate change in elections since the war has been fewer than three seats. History suggests, then, that we won't see a major shift in party control of the Senate in 1984.

There are reasons for this, in addition to the laws of probability. First, the presidential contest does not look like the one we had in 1980, so a Reagan victory is unlikely to extend to other races as it did then. This year's contest lacks the emotional "Let's get rid of the rascals" mood that Reagan used so effectively to campaign against Democrats in 1980. Indeed, even if there is a comfortable Reagan win, it will be more like the GOP victories of 1956 or 1972. In both years, Republican presidential victories were accompanied by *Democratic* gains in the Senate. Second, if a presidential contest is relatively close—and many analysts expect this to be the case this year—we usually don't see a major trend toward either party, at least in the Senate. Senate Republicans have nineteen seats up this year compared to the Democrats' fourteen. To be sure, the Republicans, who have more seats at risk, would be helped by a Reagan victory—but only in cutting their losses. A third reason for expecting only a small shift in the Senate relates to Republican abilities and performance in recent contests. In the last four Senate contests, the Republicans have won the lion's share of the close races. A substantial number of Senate seats have been decided by the narrowest of margins, by 51 or 52 percent. In 1980, had 50,000 votes shifted to the Democrats in strategic places, the party would have continued to hold the Senate. In 1982, a shift of only 35,000 votes would have enabled the Democrats to regain control. In both cases, the GOP's stunning successes in the close races—winning three-fourths of them—kept them at the Senate helm.

The Republican successes in these contests are not simply coincidence. The GOP has several advantages, the most important of which is the money available to their Senate candidates from the party's treasury. Though the two parties' candidates combined raise approximately equal amounts, individual Republicans in need can get crucial additional funds through the national party. Thanks to efforts begun by Bill Brock (who served as chairman of the Republican National Committee) in the early 1970s, the Republican party committees can provide the maximum contributions to their candidates. This central source helps give the Republicans

the ability to funnel money to their candidates in key close races during the final weeks of a campaign. That can, and has, made all the difference. And, as the examples of Metzenbaum, Riegle, and Danforth suggest, the close races in the summer aren't necessarily the close races in the fall. The Democratic candidates don't have the national party money; they raise funds individually, and the safe candidates have not been overly generous about using their own money to assist shakier fellow Democrats, even though those Democrats might be able to win.

Senate Retrospective

There is another factor to consider in order to understand Senate elections. The Senate operates on a finely tuned six-year cycle that keeps bringing the body back toward a central balance. A Senate election is shaped first and foremost by the Senate contests six, twelve, and eighteen years earlier. A big win by either party one year creates a greater vulnerability for that party six years later. To illustrate how this works for the 1984 contests, we need to look back at 1978, 1972, and 1966. The Republicans had a very good year in the Senate in 1978; that followed a moderately good year in 1972, and a better than average year in 1966. As a result, the Republicans will have more seats up in 1984 (nineteen to the Democrats' fourteen) and are, by definition, more vulnerable. The Democrats are less vulnerable. Those who won in 1978 were strong enough to swim against the Republican tide that year (and, for many, in the good GOP years of 1972 and 1966). The class of 1978, with several Republicans who have been blessed by good political fortune in the past and several Democrats who have conquered adversity, starts with a Democratic edge, which can be blunted or sharpened by events this fall.

Candidate recruitment efforts that began, in many cases, over a year and a half ago, will also affect the Senate outcome. Look back four years ago: Low esteem for Jimmy Carter in the spring of 1979—when recruitment efforts began—created an atmosphere in which more Republican challengers than usual were willing to take on Democratic incumbents. At the same time, potential contributors looked more favorably upon Republican challengers than they might have had Carter been strong. And all this made potential *Democratic* contenders for Senate seats nervous. Thus, thanks to the political atmosphere more than a year before the election itself, the Democrats were disadvantaged.

In the spring and summer of 1983, when crucial recruitment efforts were under way for 1984—it was the Republicans who had the jitters. The public's mixed assessment of Ronald Reagan made both parties jumpy, but the contest looked especially volatile for the GOP. And, it looks like the Republicans suffered a little more in the recruitment game than did the Democrats. In Delaware, for instance, Republican Governor Pete Dupont bowed out of the Senate race, leaving Joe Biden in fairly good shape. West Virginia's former Governor Arch Moore decided not to tackle the then likely Democratic nominee, Jay Rockefeller, for the Senate seat being vacated by Jennings Randolph. Republican Congresswoman Claudine Schneider of Rhode Island agonized in public for months, but then decided not to challenge Democratic incumbent Claiborne Pell.

In last summer's uncertain atmosphere, the Democrats also lost some of their better potential candidates. Colorado Governor Richard Lamm decided not to take on incumbent Republican Senator Bill Armstrong. Democratic Governor William Brennan decided not to run against Senator Bill Cohen of Maine. In Wyoming, Governor Ed Herschler decided not to challenge Republican Senator Alan Simpson. So

IF THE CONGRESSIONAL

	Democrat	Republican
July 27-30, 1946	50%	50%
August 17-20	52	48
August 31-September 3	52	48
September 14-19	49	51
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	44	53
July 11-14, 1950	53	47
July 30-August 4	53	47
August 21-24	62	38
September 18-21	54	47
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	49	49
July 17-20, 1954	59	41
August 6-9	59	41
August 27-30	57	44
September 16-20	55	45
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	53	47

	Democrat	Republican
July 11-14, 1958	63	37
July 30-August 4	58	42
August 20-25	60	41
September 10-15	61	39
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	56	43
June 28-July 3, 1962	64	36
July 26-31	59	41
August 23-28	63	37
September 20-25	62	38
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	52	47
July 8-13, 1966	62	38
July 29-August 3	64	36
August 19-22	57	43
September 8-13	61	39
September 30-October 6	59	41

many factors go into deciding whether or not to run that it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions about this year's races or earlier ones: personal considerations clearly play a part, as do a candidate's perceptions of his own ability to raise money, and his reading of the political climate. One intriguing development in recent years may relate to all these factors, and an additional one: Increasingly, talented governors from both parties have declined opportunities to run for the United States Senate, at least partly because the prestige of the body has declined.

The Races to Watch

Seven seats are thought of as particularly vulnerable for the Republicans this year—nobody would be surprised if they changed hands. The obvious weak spots are those where Republican incumbents are retiring. In Tennessee, where Howard Baker declined to run again, the Democrats have come up with one of their strongest candidates, Congressman Albert Gore, Jr. The Republicans have no challenger of comparable strength there. In Texas with John Tower's retirement, the Republicans are in a slightly better position. But the Lloyd Doggett–Phil Gramm contest there will be close.

It's not only the open seats that will have lively contests. North Carolina may be the race of the year in 1984. On election eve, the networks will probably devote more coverage to this race between incumbent Jesse Helms and Democratic Governor Jim Hunt than to any other contest except for the presidency. The polls show that the race has narrowed, but only a diehard gambler would bet the mortgage money on the outcome. Gaffe-prone conservative Republican Senator Roger Jepsen of Iowa faces a strong challenge from Representative Tom Harkin; conservative Republican Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire has a strong potential challenge from Democratic Representative Norman D'Amours. In Mississippi, Republicans have always had a hard time winning statewide contests. This time the Democrats are not as divided as they have been in the past, and former Governor William Winter, if he gets his slow-starting campaign on track, will provide incumbent Republican Thad Cochran stiff competition. Increased black turnout in the South will also help the Democrats. In Illinois, Democrats have nominated a strong challenger, Paul Simon, to run against Chuck Percy, who won narrowly in 1978. Those seven races will be the prime ones to watch.

At this early stage, we can identify as well a second tier of vulnerable seats for the Republicans, where Democratic prospects are less encouraging, but where upsets could occur. In Minnesota, where the Democrats originally thought they had a good opportunity, Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz looks strong. The Democrats are poorly financed and badly divided (Joan Growe won their convention endorsement on the nineteenth ballot but faces a primary challenge), but the possibility of a Mondale victory at the national level could boost their candidate. In Virginia, though Republican John Warner is not particularly strong statewide, he does not face a well-known, well-financed challenger; Republican Bill Armstrong of Colorado may be pushed if the Democrats nominate Carlos Lucero, a strong Hispanic candidate.

Six seats are generally regarded as safe bets for the Republicans: South Carolina, Alaska, New Mexico, Maine, South Dakota, and Oregon. In three additional Republican seats, those held by Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas, Jim McClure of Idaho, and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, the odds against an upset are overwhelming.

Democrats, then, have a good chance in seven Republican seats, and an uphill but fair chance in three—a good start from their perspective. On the op-

ELECTIONS WERE HELD TODAY . . .

	Democrat	Republican
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	51	48
July 10-13, 1970	58	42%
August 1-4	61	39
August 25-September 1	58	42
September 11-14	58	42
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	53	45
August 2-6, 1974	68	32
August 16-19	65	35
September 6-9	64	36
September 27-30	65	35
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	58	41
July 21-24 and August 4-7, 1978	57	43
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	54	45
February 29-March 3, 1980[1]	59	41
June 13-16	58	42
August 1-4	59	41
August 15-18	63	37
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	50	48
June 16-19, 1981[2]	52	48
September 18-21	57	43
October 2-5	55	45
October 30-November 2	59	41
January 8-11, 1982[3]	54	46
January 22-25	57	43
February 5-8	60	40
April 2-5	61	39
April 23-26	61	39
April 30-May 3	58	42
May 14-17	58	42
June 26-30	55	37
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	56	44
April 6-9, 1984	55	45

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1984. For Actual Democratic and Republican Vote: *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2*, p. 1084 (for 1946-1970); *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977*, p. 500 (for 1972); *1979*, p. 505 (for 1974-1978); *1981*, p. 484 (for 1980).

posite side of the ledger, Republicans start off much weaker. At this stage there are only three Democratic seats where Republicans have a fighting chance—Massachusetts (because of Paul Tsongas's retirement) and Montana and Michigan, where incumbent Democrats Max Baucus and Carl Levin hold less than forbidding leads. Of these, only in Massachusetts are the odds even or better for a gain.

Altering the House Landscape

The House is not the Senate, and House elections have their own distinctive features. For most House elections, the defining characteristic is a well-financed incumbent facing a weak or nonexistent challenger. The number of House seats that are seriously contested every two years depend on several factors, especially the candidates' perceptions of opportunities and their willingness to come forward. Party strategies play a role, too.

While most years provide relatively few House contests, 1984 will be one of the years in which there are even fewer than usual: most political analysts estimate between fifty and sixty seats at most. To run a serious race for the House, a candidate must begin working not two or three months before the current election, but two or three months after the last election. The crucial decisions are made in the spring and summer of the year before the election.

This year, the pickings for both parties look pretty slim. The residue of reapportionment played a role in this calculation. Overall, it tended to solidify or entrench seats for both parties. The Democrats had more to say about the division of congressional turf after the last census because they controlled more of the state legislatures. Consequently, there may be fewer seats that can be characterized as "Republican," but those that can are much *more* Republican than they were before. Reapportionment did have some state-by-state effects. In California, Democratic seats are relatively safe because of reapportionment. In New Jersey, the Democratic plan for reapportionment was thrown out, and the Republican plan was accepted. That may make it possible for the Republicans to pick up a couple of seats. But the key point is that reapportionment has reduced overall the number of competitive seats in the House.

Another important factor in assessing the prospects for changes in the House is the number of retirements or voluntary departures. Without the advantage of incumbency, many seats that have been in one party's "safe" column for years may shift. Veteran conservative Republican Melvin Laird's retirement in 1968 provides an example of this; liberal Democrat David Obey was elected to his seat and has held it safely since. So, a large number of open seats can create opportunities that otherwise would not exist. But in 1984, the number of open seats is small.

The Republican party's superior recruitment efforts will also affect the fall elections. The GOP has an impressive organization that seeks out strong candidates, encourages them to run, and offers them help and money. If the Republicans are able to outspend the Democrats dramatically, that is going to make a difference. But it probably won't happen. Because there is a sufficiently small number of seats where resources can be brought to bear, it is unlikely that Democrats will be underfunded in key targeted races. Labor help may be a significant offsetting factor in some cases, both directly and indirectly, as the movement gears up to support Walter Mondale.

Another factor will be the national tide, though the coattail effect in the House has been inconsistent. In the Eisenhower landslide of 1956, for example, the Republicans actually lost two seats in the House. And, in 1972, in Richard Nixon's sweeping victory over George McGovern, the Republicans picked up only twelve seats. As it did with the Senate, history suggests that Reagan will not pull vast numbers of new Republicans into the House.

A united party, as the Republicans had in 1980, can contribute something. In 1972, the reelection and party effort concentrated on the presidential race, to the detriment of the House contestants. In the 1980 campaign, Reagan appeared with congressional candidates on the steps of the Capitol to urge public support for the five-part Republican program. This good will, buttressed by national advertising and national party resources, contributed to Republican success four years ago. Of course, Republican and Democratic candidates will decide individually just how to posture themselves this year vis-à-vis the president. Some Republicans found it to their advantage in 1980 and 1982 to point out how they differed from Reagan. This year, candidates will attempt to tie their fortunes to, or sever them from, the president, depending on the district.

Add all these factors together, and you end up with a minuscule collection of real contests. If you combine the toss-up category with those that are leaning you end up with about twenty-five to thirty Democratic incumbents who are in some danger and about fifteen to twenty Republicans. That gives us perhaps fifty seats that could change hands. It's hard to imagine, under these circumstances, a shift of more than ten, or at most fifteen seats either way. For a combination of reasons, most House seats in 1984 are solid. In the end, the number of real contests in the House may be the same as in the Senate.

There is one additional point to make about 1984's congressional elections. There is a key difference between the House and the Senate. In the Senate races this fall, Republicans are going to run for reelection on their records, because they are the majority party. As a result, they have been preaching and practicing the politics of compromise. But in the House, minority party Republicans will be more anxious to run against Washington and to confront the opposition. Many House Republicans, and especially the younger, more partisan members, have been pushing the president to run against Washington. These lawmakers have also been prodding their minority leader, Bob Michel, to adopt their more confrontational themes and strategies. Their approach led to the explosion in the House involving Tip O'Neill, Newt Gingrich, and television coverage of House floor proceedings.

As GOP senators preach moderation, pragmatism, conciliation, and responsibility, GOP House members will preach fire and brimstone, ideological confrontation, and "blame it all on Washington." Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan, as he has for four years, will shift back and forth between these themes and tactics, hoping he can maintain the delicate balance into 1985 and beyond.

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Public Opinion

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THE [illegible]RIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Average American:

eats 4 lbs of food each day

66% feel young for their age

3 in 10 consider themselves overweight

spends 5¢ of each food dollar at vending machines

median age for first marriage is 25.4 for men, 22.8 for women

reads at least two books a year

drives 3,899 miles each year

eats 93 lbs of sugar a year

is twice as happy as average West German

laughs 15 times a day

average man spends 4 hours a year tying his tie

has 4.6 cavities

is exposed to 1,800 commercial messages each day

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Cover background: Quilt handcrafted during the early part of this century by Mary H. Strickler, Shenandoah Valley, Virginia.

THE FACTS OF (EVERYDAY) LIFE

TOP TEN DAYDREAMS

Question: Most people spend at least a small part of their waking hours daydreaming and thinking about different things. Some of those daydreams may be complete flights of fancy, others just simple, like a hungry person thinking about lunch time. Here's a list of some things people might be expected to daydream about from time to time. (Card shown respondent) Could you look it over and call off the things, if any, that you ever daydream or think about? Just call off the letters . . . Traveling to different places around the world; Being rich; Being smarter—understanding things better; What your future life will be like; Having a better job; Things that happened in the past; Having someone back again in your life who was important to you in the past; Living in a different area of the world; Living in some past time; Living a completely different life than you do; Being a great artist, musician, or writer; Knowing a lot of different people that you don't know now; Being friends with a person or persons whom you admire but don't know; Being famous; Being a great athlete; Being beautiful or handsome; Having great power and influence; Getting even with someone who has wronged you; Having a romance with a handsome or beautiful star; Being involved somehow with the media, TV, movies; Being elected to political office.



Note: Top ten responses only are shown. Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-3), February 11-25, 1984.

SPACE CADETS

Question: If you had a chance in your lifetime to travel in outer space, would you do so or not?


Would travel in outer space if had a chance
Would not
National 48% 52%
By sex:
Male 57% 43%
Female 39% 61%
By education:
Less than high school graduate 27% 73%
High school graduate 40% 60%
Some college 58% 42%
College graduate/ Post graduate 61% 39%

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, November 15-16, 1982.

FIRST THINGS FIRST: FOR THE OLD, BETTER HEALTH; FOR THE RICH, MORE WEALTH

Question: If you could have one of the following happen to you in the next year, which one would you want the most? Better health, more income, a better love life, none of the above?


Better health
More income
Better love life
None of the above
Would like to have in the next year
National 40% 45% 7% 7%
By age:
18-34 years 20% 63% 9% 7%
35-49 years 38% 48% 4% 10%
50 and over 64% 24% 5% 7%
By income:
Less than $15,000 47% 42% 5% 5%
$15,000-$25,000 35% 51% 8% 6%
Over $25,000 38% 46% 6% 9%

Note: Sample size was approximately 1,200.

Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, September 24, 1982.

VANITY FARE

YOU MAKE ME FEEL SO YOUNG

Question: Generally speaking, do you feel young for your age, old for your age, or what?


Generally feel young for my age
Old for age
Feel my age
National 66% 12% 22%
By sex:
Male 64% 13% 22%
Female 67% 11% 22%
By age:
18-29 years 55% 21% 24%
30-44 years 75% 5% 20%
45-59 years 66% 11% 23%
60 and over 67% 11% 22%
By education:
Less than high school graduate 56% 19% 25%
High school graduate 68% 12% 21%
Some college 72% 8% 19%
College graduate/ Postgraduate 75% 2% 22%

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 3-6, 1982.

DIETING: THE REAL GENDER GAP

Question: When it comes to the amount and kinds of food you eat, which of these statements best describes your current eating habits? (Card shown respondent)


I am on a diet under a doctor's supervision
I follow a planned diet, but not under a doctor's supervision
I don't follow any planned diet but I tend to watch the amount and kinds of food I eat
I eat pretty much what I want to
National 6% 5% 38% 51%
By sex:
Male 6% 5% 30% 61%
Female 7% 6% 44% 42%
By age:
18-29 years 1% 3% 36% 60%
30-44 years 4% 5% 39% 52%
45-59 years 8% 5% 42% 45%
60 and over 15% 5% 35% 45%
By education:
Non-high school graduate 9% 5% 26% 60%
High school graduate 5% 4% 36% 55%
College 5% 4% 47% 43%

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-1), December 3-10, 1983.

NOT QUITE A NATION OF 10s

LOOKING GOOD . . .

Question: People also feel differently about their looks. How would you rate your looks on a scale of 1 through 10, with 1 the lowest rating and 10 the highest rating?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-4), March 17-24, 1984.

. . . AND BETTER

Question: Here is a list of ways to enhance a person's looks. (Card shown respondent) If you could receive free, one of those things, which one would you choose? Just call off the letter. . . .



Note: * Not asked

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-4), March 17-24, 1984.

A LITTLE ROMANCE

Question: Would you describe yourself as: (Read list) very romantic, somewhat romantic, not very romantic, or not romantic at all?



Note: Sample size was approximately 1,200.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, January 26-31, 1982.

LOVE AT FIRST SIGHT: WOMEN WARIER

Question: Do you or do you not believe that it is possible to fall in love at first sight?



Note: Sample size was approximately 1,200.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, January 31-February 4, 1983.

CHIVALRY LIVES

Question: Do you think traditional customs like men helping women to open doors, put on coats, helping them into cars, etc., should be preserved or discarded?



Note: Sample was approximately 1,200.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, October 15-20, 1983.

THE DATING GAME: MEN STILL PICK UP THE TAB

Question: Who do you believe should pay for an evening's entertainment in a dating relationship? Would you say the man, the woman, whoever earns more, whoever asked for the date, or each person should pay their own way?



Note: Sample size was approximately 1,200. * = 0.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, September 24, 1982.

AND THE MATING GAME

Question: Which one of the following would be most important to you if you were looking for a mate or lasting relationship? (Physical attractiveness, intelligence, sense of humor, good income, or similar interests)



Note: Sample size = 1,207.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, September 6-11, 1983.

TRUST: FAMILY AFFAIRS

Question: When it comes to being honest with you about anything that is really important, would you say your spouse is honest with you . . . almost all the time, most of the time, about half the time, only some of the time, or hardly ever?



Note: "Hardly ever" = less than 5%

Question: Have you ever seriously suspected your spouse of having an affair with another person?



Note: Sample size = 1,207.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, July 11-14, 1984

WHOM DO YOU TRUST?

Question: Think of the one person you could count on the most if you were in serious trouble. Who is that . . . a family member, a friend, a fellow worker, your boss, a priest, clergyman, rabbi, some other person?



Note: Sample size = 1,207.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, July 11-14, 1983.

I'VE GOT A SECRET

Question: Would you say that there is or is not anyone outside your family that you could tell any secret to with complete confidence that he or she would never tell it to anyone else?

Is not
20%
There is someone outside family to whom you could tell any secret with complete confidence that he or she would never repeat it
80%

Note: Sample size = 1,207.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, July 11-14, 1983.

NEED VS. GREED

Question: Now, here is a list of all different kinds of things. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and tell me for each one whether you personally pretty much think of it as a *necessity* or pretty much as a *luxury* you could do without?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-1), December 3-10, 1983.

PRIZED POSSESSIONS

Question: Of course, all the things you own may be important to you in one way or another, but which one or two of the things on the list do you enjoy owning the most? . . . (Asked of and based on those who own three or more items)



Note: Multiple responses per respondent. Responses not shown: Home computer, Walkman type radio or tape player, Movie camera, Electronic TV game, Electric typewriter, Video disc player, Video camera, None, Don't know. All were 1% or less except "Don't know," = 2%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-3), February 12-26, 1983.

LIFE IN THE SLOW LANE

Question: We all have activities and responsibilities that make up our daily lives. We look forward to some of them; others we don't look forward to at all. Would you read down this list of activities and call off the ones, if any, that you usually enjoy or look forward to during a day? . . . (Card shown respondent)



Note: Multiple responses per respondent. "None" = 1%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-1), December 3-10, 1983.

HOW WE SPEND OUR PRIME TIME

Question: On the average day, about how many hours do you personally watch television?

Average hours per day spent watching television



Note: 9 hours or more = 2%

Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1983

Question: How often do you read the newspaper—every day, a few times a week, once a week, less than once a week, or never?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1983

Question: (Now, about some of your activities) When was the last time you . . . ate at a restaurant, other than a fast food restaurant? Was it within the last day or two, within the last week or two, a month ago, two to three months ago, or longer than three months ago? . . . went to a movie?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 3-8, 1982

E.T.: EARTHBOUND TERRESTRIALS

Question: Have you made one or more flights on a commercial airliner in the past 12 months?



Note: Sample size = 1,200.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, October 1-6, 1983.

WHAT ABOUT *PUBLIC OPINION*?

Question: Here is a list of a number of different kinds of magazines. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and call off any that you happen to read fairly often, that is at least 2 issues out of 4?



Note: Multiple responses per respondent. Top ten choices only shown. Other magazines on the list were: *McCall's* (9%), *Consumer Reports* (7%), *US News & World Report* (7%), *Redbook* (6%), *Popular Mechanics* (6%), *Cosmopolitan* (5%), *Life* (5%), *Playboy* (5%), *Smithsonian* (4%), *Business Week* (4%), *Money* (4%), *Popular Science* (3%), *Car and Driver* (3%), *Penthouse* (3%), *Forbes* (3%), *Psychology Today* (2%), *Fortune* (2%), *New Yorker* (2%), *Rolling Stone* (2%), *Road and Track* (2%), *Us* (2%), *Ms* (1%), *Scientific American* (1%), *National Review* (1%), *Atlantic* (1%), *Harper's* (1%), *Dun's Review* (1%), *The New Republic* (1%), *Saturday Review* (less than 5%) and None (24%). *Public Opinion* was not on the list, alas.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-1), December 3-10, 1983.

A FEW OF OUR FAVORITE THINGS

AM I BLUE?

Question: You may like some colors for some things, and other colors for other things, but if you had to name one color as your favorite color, which color would it be?



Note: Thirteen other colors were the favorite of 2% or less.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-8), August 13-20, 1983.

HOT DOGS AND PASTA

Question: There are many different styles of food and cooking—regional and national. Which of these kinds of foods and cooking do you really enjoy? (Card shown respondent) Which of these kinds of foods or cooking, if any, have you *never* had the occasion to try?



Note: Multiple responses per respondent.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-1), December 4-11, 1982.

BASEBALL STRIKES OUT

Question: If you had a choice between watching a very important baseball game involving your favorite team, or watching a very important football game involving your favorite team, which would you pick?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 24-28, 1983.

AMERICAN BANDSTAND: OUR TOP FIVE

Question: Here is a list of different types of music. (Hand respondent card) Would you please read down that list and tell me which of these types of music you listen to fairly often . . . Symphony, Opera, Chamber music, Folk music, Country/Western, Country rock, Hard rock, Soft rock, New wave, Reggae, Soul, Jazz, Big band music, Popular vocalists, Show tunes, Disco, Easy listening music, Latin music, Gospel music, Hymns, other religious music?



		By sex:		By age:				By region			
	National	Male	Female	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Country/Western	48%	48%	49%	41%	51%	55%	49%	33%	54%	52%	52%
Easy listening music	44%	38	49	36	47	49	48	39	53	37	51
Soft rock	36%	38	35	65	43	18	6	34	40	32	40
Popular vocalists	28%	24	31	29	33	27	22	30	30	24	31
Big band music	26%	27	26	14	15	38	43	23	31	23	29

Note: Top five responses only for national. "Hard rock" was the response of 38% of 18-29 year olds.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-6), June 4-11, 1983.

MICHAEL JACKSON THRILLS THE PUBLIC

1984

Respondents correctly identifying public figures


Michael Jackson (Entertainer/performer) 93%
Chris Evert Lloyd (Sports star) 83%
Margaret Thatcher (Foreign head of state) 72%
Lee Iacocca (Corporation president/chairman) 61%
Herschel Walker (Sports star) 58%
Luciano Pavarotti (Entertainer/performer) 57%
Warren Burger (Supreme Court Justice) 51%
George Shultz (Cabinet officer) 49%
Harold Washington (Mayor) 35%
Jesse Helms (U.S. Senator) 29%
Mario Cuomo (Governor) 22%
Roger Smith (Corporation president/chairman or Entertainer) 16%
Charles Brown (Corporation president/chairman) 2%

Question: Now, I'd like to ask you about a number of people, some of whom are better known than others. (Card shown respondent) Using this card, would you tell me to your knowledge who these people are?

Note: Respondents were asked to match names of public figures with a list of professions. The correct responses are indicated beneath each name.

The Roper Organization accepted "governor" for Harold Washington and "mayor" for Mario Cuomo.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-6), May 29-June 3, 1984.

AH YOUTH!

Question: Which one of the following times of life do you think is the most enjoyable for adults . . . 18-24 years old, 35-49 years old, 50 years and older?


18-24 years old most enjoyable time of life
35-49
50 and over
National 41% 39% 20%
By sex:
Male 47% 34% 19%
Female 36% 44% 20%
By age:
18-34 years 60% 31% 10%
35-49 years 28% 57% 16%
50 years and older 26% 38% 36%

Note: Sample size was approximately 1,200. "No opinion" calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for the Merit Report, January 17-20, 1983.

The Ser

SATISFACTION GUARANTEED . . . ALMOST

Question: Now here is a list of a number of different things. (Card shown respondent) Would you go down that list and for each one tell me how satisfied with it you are or whether it doesn't apply to you? . . . are you completely satisfied with it, fairly well satisfied with it, not too satisfied with it, or not at all satisfied with it?



Note: * = less than .5%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-7), July 10-17, 1982.

ious Side

HEALTH AND WELFARE DEPARTMENT

Question: How would you rate your general health—as excellent, good, not very good, or poor?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-2), January 9-23, 1982.

Question: Is there anybody in your household who is chronically sick—that is, someone who needs serious medical treatment or hospitalization fairly often?



Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, March 1-6, 1982.

Question: Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to . . . buy clothing your family needed, . . . pay for medical or health care, . . . buy food your family needed?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 27-30, 1984.

Question: What about your children? Do you think they will be better off than you are financially or not when they reach your age? (For people who say they have no kids, then ask:) Well, then, suppose you did have children, do you think those children would be better off financially or not when they reached your age?



Note: Sample size = 1,007.
Source: Survey by ABC News, December 15-18, 1983.

PHEARS AND PHOBIAS

Question: (I'm going to mention some things that worry some people a great deal and others not very much. After each, please tell me whether it worries you a great deal, a good amount, not very much, or not at all.) How much do you worry about having your home burglarized? Do you worry about it a great deal, a good amount, not very much, or not at all?



Source: Survey by ABC News, December 7-18, 1982.



Question: Everybody has fears about different things. But some are more afraid of certain things than others. Sometimes people fear things more than perhaps they should logically. I'm going to read a list of some of these fears. For each one, would you say whether you're afraid of it, whether it bothers you slightly, or whether you're not at all afraid of it. First, flying on an airplane.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-3), February 11-25, 1984.

THE SEAMY SIDE: DOPE, DRINK, AND DANGER

Question: Do you know anyone who uses . . . marijuana (pot), cocaine (coke) . . . or not?


Marijuana
Do know someone 36%
Do not know anyone who uses marijuana 64%
Cocaine
Do know someone 15%
Do not know anyone who uses cocaine 85%

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, October 29-November 1, 1982.

Question: (Asked of those who drink alcoholic beverages) About how often would you say you drink alcoholic beverages?


Those who drink alcohol
Every day 9%
Almost every day 8%
About 2-3 times a week 20%
Once a week 20%
About 2-3 times a month 13%
Once a month 11%
About once every 2-3 months 7%
Every 6 months or so 5%
Almost never 5%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 11-14, 1983.

Question: Have you ever been threatened with a gun, or shot at?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1984.

Question: Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1984.

I (DON'T) ENJOY BEING A GIRL

Question: All things considered, in our society today, do you think there are more advantages in being a man, or more advantages in being a woman, or that there are no more advantages in being one than the other?



Note: Sample size = 1,309.
Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, November 11-20, 1983.

BOSOM BUDDIES

Question: Are you more comfortable with women or men as friends?



Note: Sample size = 1,003.
Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Parade* magazine, November 21-December 12, 1983.

STILL A MAN'S WORLD

Question: And who would you trust more to be your (bus driver/doctor/accountant), a man or a woman?



Note: Sample size = 1,309.
Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, November 11-20, 1983.

IN THE FAMILY WAY

Question: Do you think a woman must marry and have children in order to be fulfilled as a woman? Do you think a man must marry and have children in order to be fulfilled as a man?



Note: Sample = 1,000 women.
Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Glamour* magazine, September 7-16, 1982.

Question: Again thinking of families where both husband and wife work full time, I'd like you to tell me who you think should have the primary responsibility for taking care of various household tasks—the husband or the wife. How about preparing the meals—who should have the primary responsibility? . . . How about staying home from work to care for a sick child? . . . And, taking out the garbage?



Note: Sample size = 1,207.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, May 10-15, 1983.

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AT HOME AND AT WORK

Question: Would you be willing to leave your job and relocate if your spouse was offered a better position?



Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Parade* magazine, November 21-December 12, 1983.

Question: In families where both husband and wife work full time, whose job demands should take priority?


Wife's 1%
Neither/No opinion 15%
In families where both husband and wife work full time, husband's job demands should take priority 47%
Whoever makes the most money 37%

Note: Sample size = 1,207.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, May 10-15, 1983.

GUILT

Question: If you earned more than your husband or partner, would it make you feel uncomfortable or guilty? Do you think that if you earned more than your husband or partner, he would feel uncomfortable or guilty?


Women's response
Yes
No
If you earned more than husband or partner, it would make you feel uncomfortable or guilty
15%
85%
If you earned more than husband or partner, it would make him feel uncomfortable or guilty
43%
57%

Note: Sample size = 1,000 women.

Source: Survey by Mark Clements, Inc. for *Glamour* magazine, September 7-16, 1982.

DRIVEN TO DISTRACTION

Question: In general, to what extent do you think that an attractive female working with mostly males is or is not a distraction to the males . . . very distracting, somewhat distracting, not very distracting, or not distracting at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,221.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, June 27-30, 1983.

WOMAN'S DAY



Question: Now, if you were free to do either, would you prefer to have a job outside the home, or would you prefer to stay home and take care of your house and family?

Note: Sample size for 1983 = 1,309.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, 1974 and 1980; CBS News 1982; and *New York Times*, November 11-20, 1983.

TRADEOFFS

Question: What is your primary reason for working . . . Satisfaction or economic necessity?



Note: Sample size = 1,003.

Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Parade* magazine, November 21-December 12, 1983.

Question: Do you think women should stay at home if they have young preschool children?

Note: Sample = 1,000 women. Of those women 18-24 years old, 62% felt women with young preschool children should stay at home. Of those women 55 or older, 81% felt that way. Of those employed full time, 61% felt that way; part time = 71%; those not employed = 80%.

Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Glamour* magazine, September 7-16, 1982.

QUESTION WORDING FOR PAGES 38-39.

GALLUP

(Suppose the 1984 presidential election were being held today.) If President Reagan were the Republican candidate and Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (If undecided January 1984—May 3-5, 1984, ask:) As of today, do you lean more to Reagan, the Republican, or to Mondale, the Democrat?

Suppose the presidential election were being held today. If Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate and President Reagan were the Republican candidate, which would you like to see win? (Those who were undecided were asked:) As of today, do you lean more to Mondale, the Democrat, or to Reagan, the Republican? (May 18-21, 1984—July 6-9, 1984)

Now I'd like to get your honest opinion on this next question. It doesn't make any difference to me how you vote . . . I only want to record your opinion accurately. If the presidential election were being held today, which would you vote for—the Democratic candidates, Mondale and Ferraro, or the Republican candidates, Reagan and Bush? (Those who were undecided or who named other candidates were asked:) As of today, do you lean more to Mondale and Ferraro, or to Reagan and Bush? (July 13-16, 1984 and August 10-12, 1984) For the September asking, the order of the candidates was reversed.

Note: Sample size for March 2-6 = 1,008; April 11-15 = 1,005; May 3-5 = 1,004; June 6-8 = 1,011; June 22-25 = 1,195; August 10-12 = 1,384; September 7-9 = 938.

HARRIS

Now suppose (in 1984/this November) the election for president were between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and former Vice President Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose (today), would you vote for Reagan or (for) Mondale? (January-February 1984, June 7-11, 1984—July 20-24, 1984)

Now suppose in the November (1984) election it is between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose right now, would you vote for Reagan or for Mondale? (March 1-3, 1984—March 15-17, 1984)

Now this November, the choice is between Ronald Reagan and George Bush for the Republicans and Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro for the Democrats. If you had to choose, would you vote for Reagan and Bush, the Republicans, or Mondale and Ferraro, the Democrats? (August 5-9, 1984—September 5-9, 1984)

Note: January/February survey results from two surveys conducted January 12-15, 1984 (sample size = 1,251 of which 972 were likely voters) and February 9-11, 1984 (sample size = 1,262 likely voters). March 1-3, 1984 = 1,227 likely voters; March 15-17, 1984 = 1,270 voters; June 7-11, 1984 = 1,251 likely voters; June 2-7, 1984 = 1,259 likely voters; July 20-24, 1984 = 1,620 eligible voters of whom 1,264 were likely voters; August 5-9, 1984 = 1,627 eligible voters of whom 1,287 were likely voters; September 5-9, 1984 = 1,999 eligible voters of whom 1,211 were likely voters.

ABC NEWS/*WASHINGTON POST*

If the 1984 presidential election were being held today and the candidates were Ronald Reagan the Republican, and Walter Mondale the Democrat, for whom would you vote? (January 1984—July 1984)

The candidates in the November presidential election are Reagan and Bush for the Republicans, and Mondale and Ferraro for the Democrats. Suppose the election were being held today, for whom would you vote, Reagan and Bush or Mondale and Ferraro? (September 6-11, 1984)

Note: Sample size = 1,206 for February 1984; July 5-8 = 785.

PENN + SCHOEN/*THE GARTH ANALYSIS*

(In 1984, there will be a presidential election) If the candidates were Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Walter Mondale, for whom would you vote?

Note: Sample size for February 1984 = 1,008; for June 1984 = 1,005.

CBS NEWS/*NEW YORK TIMES*

If the (1984) presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and Walter Mondale, the Democrat, would you vote for Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale? (March 1984—July 1984)

If the presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan for president and George Bush for vice president, the Republican candidates, and Walter Mondale for president and Geraldine Ferraro for vice president, the Democratic candidates, for whom would you vote? (If undecided) Well, as of today, do you lean more toward Reagan and Bush, or more toward Mondale and Ferraro? (September 1984)

Note: Sample size for March 21-24, 1984 = 1,217; for April 23-26, 1984 = 1,367; for July 12, 1984 = 747 registered voters; for September 12-16, 1984 = 1,135 registered voters.

(Continued on page 48.)

Note: If sample sizes are 1,500 and above, they are not reported here.

SEE HOW

REAGAN VS. MONDALE TRIAL HEATS

	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH		APRIL	
GALLUP (registered voters)						
Trial	48R 47M	52R 42M	50R 45M	52R 44M	54R 41M	52R 44M
Margin	1R	10R	5R	8R	13R	8R
Date	(1/13-16)	(2/10-13)	(3/2-6)	(3/16-19)	(4/6-9)	(4/11-15)
HARRIS (likely voters)		54R 42M 12R (1/12-15 + 2/9-11)	55R 41M 14R (3/1-3)	57R 37M 20R (3/15-17)		
ABC News/ *Washington Post*	48R 46M 2R (1/12-17)	50R 43M 7R (2/13-15)				
PENN + SCHOEN/ *GARTH ANALYSIS* (registered voters)		54R 38M 16R (2/8-12)				
CBS News/ *New York Times* (registered voters)	48R 32M 16R (1/14-21)	49R 37M 12R (2/21-25)	50R 33M 17R (3/5-8)	51R 31M 20R (3/21-24)	48R 35M 13R (4/23-26)	
ROPER (certain registered voters)			47R 40M 7R (3/17-24)			47R 40M 7R (4/18-28)
Los Angeles Times		50R 42M 8R (2/4-9)				53R 41M 12R (4/28-5/3)
TIME/ YANKELOVICH (registered voters)		51R 41M 10R (1/31-2/2)				
GORDON BLACK/ *USA TODAY*		57R 35M 22R (2/17-21)	54R 34M 20R (3/2-6)	54R 35M 19R (3/13-17)		54R 39M 15R (4/26-5/2)
GALLUP/ *NEWSWEEK* (registered voters)			54R 42M 12R (3/1-2)			
NBC News			60R 34M 26R (3/8-11)			

THEY RUN

MAY		JUNE		DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION JULY 16-19	JULY	REPUBLICAN CONVENTION AUGUST 20-23	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
50R 46M 4R (5/3-5)	53R 42M 11R (5/18-21)	53R 44M 9R (6/6-8)	56R 37M 19R (6/22-25)	53R 39M 14R (7/13-16)	53R 41M* 12R (7/27-30)		52R 41M* 11R (8/10-12)	55R 40M* 15R (9/7-9)
		56R 41M 15R (6/7-11)		52R 44M 8R (7/2-7)	50R 48M* 2R (7/20-24)		54R 42M* 12R (8/5-9)	55R 42M* 13R (9/5-9)
51R 44M 7R (5/16-22)				51R 44M 7R (7/5-8) (registered voters)				56R 40M* 16R (9/6-11)
		52R 39M 13R (6/12-17)						
			50R 35M 15R (6/23-28)	52R 34M 18R (7/12)			54R 38M* 16R (8/5-9)	57R 35M* 22R (9/12-16)
	48R 40M 8R (5/29-6/3)			49R 40M 9R (7/7-14)				52R 37M 15R (9/15-16)
						56R 29M 27R (8/25-30)		
						45R 31M* 14R (8/7-9)		
	58R 35M 23R (5/29-6/1)							57R 35M* 22R (9/4-11)
				49R 43M* 6R (7/12-13)	46R 48M* 2M (7/19-20)			57R 39M* 18R ((9/6-9)
				60R 33M* 27R (7/8-10)			58R 35M* 23R (8/12-14)	62R 32M* 30R (9/9-11)

Note: Unless otherwise noted, samples were of adults nationwide and question referred to Reagan vs. Mondale.

* = Reagan/Bush vs. Mondale/Ferraro.

WHAT'S MY SIGN?

Question: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?



Note: Astrological signs were determined by respondent's birthdate.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984.

by Barbara G. Farah

Delegate Polls: 1944 to 1984

Polling delegates became a big business in 1984. The three television networks, the wire services, some of the print media, and at least two private organizations (the National Women's Political Caucus and the LTV Corporation) launched major operations to poll these individuals. For the media, delegate surveys had once been considered a luxury. In 1984's competitive media market, they had become a necessity.

Most of this year's delegates, Democratic and Republican, had anticipated neither the frequency of polling nor the comprehensiveness of the questions they would be expected to answer. Democratic delegates were polled more heavily than their Republican counterparts for the obvious reason that the Democratic nomination contest was close. Each of the Democratic delegates received about a dozen telephone calls from the media pollsters, some lasting as long as fifty-five minutes.

The networks pursued the delegates relentlessly, often beginning the efforts months before the conventions. Democrats reported being tracked down at their summer homes, their relatives' dinner tables, business conferences, and their vacation spots in the United States and abroad. By the time they reached San Francisco and Dallas, the Democrats and Republicans had learned to respond almost automatically to questions concerning their presidential and vice presidential choices and their views on economic, social, and foreign policy issues. An array of demographic details completed the picture.

Given the extent of this year's efforts, it is hard to believe that *no* network delegate surveys were taken before 1968. Before that, non-systematic delegate counts based largely on conversations with the candidates and state party chairmen provided the networks the information they needed.

In 1968, CBS News established the first media delegate poll. Martin Plissner, who designed the poll, recalls that he wanted to survey the delegates, not only to ascertain their choices for vice president and president in a systematic way, but also to be able to provide reporters with detailed information about the individual delegates. By doing this, CBS's coverage would be different from that of the other networks.

CBS's new venture had an unexpected effect for the network in 1968. That year the network had learned from its survey that Richard Nixon was leading by only a few delegate votes. They also learned that Nixon's support among southern delegates was "soft." Indeed, their poll hinted that a Reagan upset was possible. This information made CBS News more cautious than the other two networks in projecting an early winner. The 1968 poll also provided some valuable information for the Democratic party. The McGovern-Fraser commission was set up in 1968 to reform the party rules. Although the party knew that the proportion of women, blacks, young people, and other minorities represented among the delegates was low, the 1968 survey results showed them how poorly represented these groups were. They also made it possible to compare the Democrats to the Republicans. In 1968, for example, only 13

percent of the Democratic delegates were women, in contrast to 17 percent in the Republican party.

CBS News remained virtually alone in its polling effort for the next three presidential election years. Other media made limited attempts to poll delegates, but only CBS News could claim to have reached over 90 percent of the delegates in each of these years. Between 1972 and 1984, the network expanded its polls to include more questions on issues. The network also introduced comparisons of delegates and party rank and file, through the CBS News/*New York Times* surveys.

The areas covered by the 1984 surveys were strikingly similar. The vice presidential choice was a major topic in the Democratic delegate polls. Though most polls compared the opinions of Mondale, Hart, and Jackson supporters on this and other questions, the *New York Times* varied the theme by focusing on the opinions and preferences of delegates and the superdelegates. The *Times* found that Mondale's support came disproportionately from the superdelegates.

Republican delegates were the subjects of fewer polls because the contest outcome was so certain. But the media that did poll the Republicans all noticed a predominance of delegates who considered themselves ideologically conservative.

The Academic Angle

Scholars discovered convention delegates several decades ago, long before the media did. Academic surveys have been more limited, however, focusing on one party, or one state, or a subset of delegates. The one exception is a 1956 survey of convention delegates, conducted by Herbert McClosky and his colleagues, which explored how representative the delegates were of party rank and file. McClosky and his colleagues concluded that Democratic elites were closer ideologically to both the Democratic and the Republi an rank and file than the Republican elites were to their own party identifiers.

This same theme has been echoed in subsequent studies of convention delegates and seemed particularly appealing in the reform politics era. Jeane Kirkpatrick, currently ambassador to the United Nations, argued in *The New Presidential Elite*, a book based on surveys of the 1972 delegates, that Democratic reform politics had exaggerated the differences between the Democratic leaders and their rank and file and consequently had made the Republican leaders appear more in tune with the issue positions of the Democratic electorate. By 1976, John Jackson and his research team at the University of Michigan had found that the dominance of Democratic moderates at the convention that year had helped to reestablish the usual symmetry between partisan leaders and their followers.

A study of 1980 convention delegates and their rank and file conducted by Warren E. Miller, M. Kent Jennings, and myself, indicated that the Republican leadership was, as it had been in 1956, out of step with the ideological preferences of their followers. The Democratic party leaders held issue positions closer to those of their own rank and file as well as to those held

Table 1

DELEGATE SURVEYS: FORTY YEARS APART

	1944		1968		1976		1984**	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
By Sex:								
Men	89%	91%	87%	83%	67%	69%	49%	54%
Women	11	9	13	17	33	31	51	46
By Education:								
High school or less	24	23	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	12
Some college	18	18	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	25
College grad	12	16	19	—	21	27	20	28
More than college degree	46	41	44	34	43	38	51	35
Average age (in years)	52	54	49	49	43	48	44	51
By Occupation:								
Lawyer	38	37	28	22	16	15	17	14
Union leader	2	—	4	—	6	—	6	—
Executive	9	10	27	40	17	30	14	26
Other profession/teacher	24	35	8	2	26	12	36	27
Public official	11	6	13	13	12	9	9	6
Housewife	6	5	*	*	7	15	4	13
Never attended convention before	63	63	67	66	80	78	74	69
By Ideology:								
Liberal	*	*	*	*	40	3	50	1
Moderate	*	*	*	*	47	45	42	35
Conservative	*	*	*	*	8	48	5	60

Note: *Questions not asked in these years. **1984 figures are a combination of the CBS News poll, the *New York Times* poll and the *Los Angeles Times* poll; the 1968 and 1976 figures come from the CBS News poll. The occupation categories are not exactly the same for the 1944 study and the later polls. That will explain the discrepancy between "executive" in the early year and the later ones.

1944 DELEGATE POLL

Name _____ State _____ Age _____

Occupation _____

Delegate to previous conventions? Years? _____

Party or public positions which you now hold or have previously held. (Please give years) _____

Education — Number of years: — Elementary _____

H. S. _____ College _____ Graduate or Professional _____

by the Republican electorate. This apparent incompatibility did little to hinder either Ronald Reagan's election that year or the support he received from a sizable number of Democrats. From what media polls have already shown about the 1984 delegates, this asymmetrical pattern once again exists between Republican leaders and their followers.

For political scientists, the 1968 Democratic convention was a watershed. The party's efforts to institute reforms at the 1972 convention rekindled interest in the delegate elites. Researchers descended on Miami Beach that year in droves to interview delegates and to observe the convention proceedings.

That same year, the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan initiated the most comprehensive survey of delegates, co-sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund. From this survey, Jeane Kirkpatrick documented the emergence of a "new breed" of Democratic delegates, who defined themselves more in terms of the candidates they supported than in terms of traditional party values or issues.

The Michigan-based delegate research project entered a new phase in 1980. Russell Sage again sponsored the study, in which researchers reinterviewed 1972 delegates and interviewed 1976 and 1980 delegates for the first time. We charted the movements of these party elites in and out of presidential politics. We were also interested in the continuity of their participation. We documented two major trends: the ascendancy of conservatism in the Republican party over the last decade, and women's emergence as a powerful force in national party politics. The Michigan research enterprise will continue with its 1984 study. In addition, a consortium of scholars from academic institutions across the nation have also been studying delegates to state conventions since 1980. Ronald Rappaport, Alan Abramowitz, and Walter Stone, who are involved in this project, are examining the candidate preference ordering of delegates to better understand the decision-making process among party elites. John Jackson and his group of scholars continue to examine issue similarities and differences between rank and file and convention delegates, and among state party chairs and national committee members.

Another scholar who has been studying convention delegates since at least 1968 is Byron Shafer. Unlike other researchers, who are interested in delegates as party activists, Shafer is concerned with party conventions as political institutions.

The Simple Past

Now that complex convention delegate surveys are so prevalent, it is difficult to imagine what we did without them. Back in 1944, delegates to both conventions received a questionnaire on a penny postcard from a young Northwestern University assistant professor. It asked only eight questions: state, age, occupation, education, previous convention attended, and party and public officeholding experience.

Once the data were collected, they were tucked away in Professor LeRoy Ferguson's office, where they stayed until his retirement forty years later. The yellowed cards, stuffed in two large dusty shoeboxes, were then turned over to the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan.

Much to the delight of the graduate student designated to code the information on the 1,059 Republican and 1,176 Democratic delegates, the shoeboxes yielded responses from a few notables. From the Republican party came Hollywood movie producer Cecil B. deMille and a young political novice from Minnesota, Warren Burger. The latter, having no party or public officeholding experience to report, indicated on the card that he had "no personal political ambition" beyond supporting his party's platform and ticket, and serving as one of Governor Harold Stassen's floor whips at the convention.

On the Democratic side, incumbent Vice President Henry Wallace attended the convention as a delegate, only to find that he would not be renominated as Franklin D. Roosevelt's fourth term running mate. Two of the younger Democratic delegates attending that year's convention were Edmund G. Brown, Sr. from California, who had recently switched his party allegiance, and Hubert H. Humphrey from Minnesota, already an active member of his state's Democratic Farm Labor party.

The 1944 study reminds us that convention delegate polling—today a national pastime—had humble beginnings.

Barbara G. Farah *is director of news surveys at the* New York Times.

REAGAN-MONDALE TRIAL HEATS

(Continued from page 37.)

ROPER

Now suppose the presidential election were being held today with Walter Mondale as the Democratic candidate and Ronald Reagan as the Republican candidate. Which would you like to see win? (March 1984—May/June 1984) (If undecided or don't know) As of today, which candidate do you lean to more: Mondale the Democrat or Reagan the Republican? (asked only in March 1984)

Now, suppose the presidential election were being held *today*. If Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate and Ronald Reagan were the Republican candidate, which would you like to see win? (July 1984)

Note: The Roper numbers have been recalculated to apportion the "lean to" percentages, applicable only in the March question. In March, May-June, and in July, the question was asked of only one-half of the sample.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

If the November general election for president were being held today, which candidate, if any, would you vote for, former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, or President Ronald Reagan, the Republican? (February 4-9, 1984)

If the November general election for president were being held today and these were the candidates, which one, if either, would you vote for: former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, or President Ronald Reagan, the Republican? (April 28—May 3, 1984)

If the November general election for president were being held today, and these were the candidates, which one, if either, would you vote for, former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, or President Ronald Reagan, the Republican? ** (August 25-30, 1984)

Note: **In the August asking, the sample was split. One half of the sample was asked the question above, the other half was asked: "If the November general election were being held today, and these were the candidates for president and vice president, which ticket, if either, would you vote for, former Vice President Walter Mondale and Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro, the Democrats, or President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush, the Republicans? The results for this question were 54 R/B—34 M/F.

TIME/YANKELOVICH, SKELLY AND WHITE

Supposing the election for president was being held today, and you had to choose between Walter Mondale, the Democrat, and Ronald Reagan, the Republican, for whom would you vote—Mondale or Reagan? (January-February 1984)

Note: Sample size for January/February 1984 = 1,021 registered voters; sample size for August 7-9, 1984 = xxxx registered voters.

GORDON BLACK/*USA TODAY*

If the election for president were held today, for whom would you vote, President Ronald Reagan, the Republican, or former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat? (May 29-June 1, 1984)

If the election for president were held today, for whom would you vote, the Democratic ticket of former Vice President Walter Mondale and Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro or the Republican ticket of President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush? (September 4-11, 1984)

Note: Sample size for May = 1,465 registered voters. Sample size for September = 1,032 registered voters. For the September asking, sample was split and the order of the Democratic and Republican tickets was reversed.

GALLUP/*NEWSWEEK*

If the 1984 presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote in each of the following races? . . . Reagan vs. Mondale? (March 1984)

If the 1984 presidential election were held today, which ticket would you favor? (July 12-13, 1984)

As the convention ends, whom would you like to see win the 1984 election? (July 19-20, 1984)

If the presidential election were being held today, which ticket would you vote for? (September 6-9, 1984)

Note: Sample size for March 1-2, 1984 = 980; for July 12-13 = 750 registered voters; for July 19-20 = 1,006 registered voters; for September 6-9, 1984 = 1,005.

NBC NEWS

If the 1984 presidential election were bing held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and Walter Mondale, the Democrat, for whom would you vote? (March 1984)

If the 1984 presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan and George Bush on the Republican side, and Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro on the Democratic side, for whom would you vote? (July 1984)

If the 1984 election were being held today, would you vote for Ronald Reagan and George Bush, the Republicans, or Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro, the Democrats? (August 12-14, 1984 and September 9-11, 1984)

by Adam Clymer

The 1984 National Primary

"Older voters, union households, and the support of 19 percent of black voters were the key elements in Walter Mondale's narrow victory over Gary Hart in the Democrats' national presidential primary, according to exit polling of 35,118 voters."

That lead could have been written if this year's 24 contested delegate selection primaries had been one national event—with the same people voting the way the exit polls show they did between February and June. Despite the improbability of those two assumptions, it is worth looking at the characteristics of the nearly 17 million primary voters, and at the groups that mattered most to each candidate.

It is true, for example, that Jesse Jackson received 20 percent of his 3.15 million votes from whites, as he often claimed. But that finding is hardly a pot of interracial gold at the end of the rainbow coalition. Looked at another way, he received only 5 percent of the white votes cast, or only a bit more than Gary Hart's 3 percent share of black votes—and no one ever claimed that Hart's campaign had any interracial appeal. The Jackson totals came decisively from blacks; he got 77 percent of the 3.05 million black votes cast.

Again, in a year when the candidates were excited by yuppies, and yuppies were excited by at least one candidate, it is important to note that while 48 percent of the votes were cast by people under forty-five (most of them in the thirty to forty-four year old category), *52 percent* were cast by their elders.

There is no sure way to tell whether blacks made up a bigger share of this year's turnout, at 18 percent of the whole, than they did in previous years. Nor do we know if fewer self-described liberals, at 27 percent of the 1984 total, voted this time. Primary exit polls were not widespread enough before 1980 for a computer model to have been used with much confidence; and nobody did it then. This year, systematic exit polling made it possible to construct a model. Louisiana's was the only election primary with no exit poll, but its 317,584 votes were less than 2 percent of the national total. Not all the demographics calculated here were available for all states, but all were available for at least 86 percent of the voters, so the computer assumption that demographic patterns among those voters were duplicated in the missing states would result in errors no larger than 1 or 2 percentage points.

The primaries can be viewed as one strung-out election, similar to the way that the fifty-one separate November 6 elections for the Electoral College are treated as one election. The "national" primary figures allow us to correct impressions peculiar to one primary or another that fail to stand up all through the election season. At some times during the primaries, for example, women seemed to be favoring Hart, and at other times they favored Mondale. Overall, women gave Mondale a bit of an edge, perhaps a tiny bit bigger than men did, but there really seemed to be no intra-Democratic gender gap worth noting.

Age did matter, and very strongly. In each of four cohorts, one candidate had a solid lead. Hart led by thirteen points in the eighteen to twenty-nine year old group and by eight points among the thirty to forty-four year olds—the biggest single group with 5.2 million votes. But Mondale led by seven points among the forty-five to fifty-nine year old group, and by a striking 52 percent over

Hart's 31 percent and Jackson's 10 percent among voters sixty and older. Indeed, aside from Jackson's 77 percent among blacks, there were only two majorities rolled up for a candidate, and both were Mondale's. His 52 percent majority was among the 4.82 million older voters, and he also received 51 percent of the votes among the 2.41 million voters who had less than a high school education.

One truism emerged from the primaries won by Hart: the more people there were who thought of themselves as independents, the better Hart did. One out of five Democratic primary voters considered himself or herself an independent; Hart carried them with 44 percent compared to twenty-eight for Mondale and sixteen for Jackson. (Among the 600,000 or so who called themselves Republicans, a group too small to be measured seriously by this model, Hart got about two-fifths of their votes, or almost twice as many as Mondale did.) If the years of efforts by some Democrats to reform the primary rules had succeeded in limiting the franchise to self-identified Democrats, then Mondale would have won the nomination comfortably, instead of staggering over the finish line.

The model revealed as nonsense one piece of frequently voiced analysis—the argument that the AFL-CIO endorsement hurt Mondale more than it helped him. That could prove true in the general election, but in the primaries one out of every three voters came from a union household, and Mondale got 45 percent of their votes, compared to 31 percent for Hart and 19 percent for Jackson.

In a race where none of the surviving candidates could plausibly call himself a conservative, or easily escape the label of liberal, it is not surprising that voters' ideology seemed to matter very little. Hart enjoyed a very slim edge among liberals, and Mondale margins were only a shade bigger among moderates and conservatives. The lesson here is that ideology did not cut in 1984, at least so far. The lessons from the national election may be quite different.

Table 1
"NATIONAL PRIMARY" VOTE

	Total 16,935,896	Percent of primary electorate	Mondale 6,465,846 38.2%	Hart 6,023,277 35.6%	Jackson 3,152,582 18.6%
	(In millions)				
By Sex:					
Men	7.65	46%	38%	36%	17%
Women	9.09	54	39	35	20
By Race:					
White	13.14	78	42	43	5
Black	3.05	18	19	3	77
White men	6.22	37	41	43	5
Black men	1.27	7	19	3	76
White women	6.92	41	43	44	5
Black women	1.78	11	18	3	78
By Age:					
18-29	2.89	17	26	39	26
30-44	5.20	30	30	38	23
45-59	4.02	24	41	34	18
60 & over	4.82	28	52	31	10
Men 18-44	3.65	22	28	40	23
Women 18-44	4.44	26	30	38	25
Men 45 & over	4.19	25	46	33	13
Women 45 & over	4.65	27	47	32	14
By Family Income:					
Under $25,000	9.13	54	40	32	22
$25,000 & over	7.81	46	36	40	15
Men under $25,000	3.97	23	40	33	20
Women under $25,000	5.16	30	40	31	24
Men over $25,000	3.88	23	35	39	15
Women over $25,000	3.93	23	37	41	14
By Education:					
Less than high school	2.41	14	51	26	18
High school graduate	5.54	33	43	34	16
Some college	4.51	27	33	38	21
College graduate	4.48	26	31	41	20
By Party:					
Democrat	12.57	74	42	33	20
Independent	3.42	20	28	44	16
By Ideology:					
Liberal	4.49	27	34	36	25
Moderate	7.97	47	41	37	15
Conservative	3.54	21	37	34	16
Union household	5.57	33	45	31	19

Note: This table is derived from a *New York Times* computer model of the electorate in the twenty-four contested delegate selection primaries, using vote totals from secretaries of state and exit poll data (11 *New York Times*/CBS News, 7 CBS News only, 3 NBC News and 2 ABC News). No one did a Louisiana exit poll. For California, where no rationally devised official state vote total was available, a CBS News estimate of the total vote and the *New York Times*/CBS News poll's 40 percent for Hart, 38 percent for Mondale and 18 percent for Jackson was used.

The Data

The findings, derived from a *New York Times* computer model of the primaries designed by Liana MacKinnon and implemented by Amy F. Solas and myself, used exit polls (mostly the *New York Times* and CBS News, plus some by CBS News alone and by NBC and ABC) in the following way. In Alabama, Jackson got 83,787 votes. The *New York Times*/CBS News poll showed that 96 percent of his voters said they were black. That works out to 80,436 black votes. In Florida, he got 144,263 votes, and the ABC News poll showed that 86 percent of his voters said they were black. That is another 124,066 black votes for Jackson. And so on, by all the categories in the table.

A. C.

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What the Israeli Election Portends

by Asher Arian

When theorists of democracy have nightmares, they might visualize a country that elects its 120-member parliament by proportional representation in such a manner that no party group can easily form a coalition but can block the other side from doing so with relative ease. Imagine the two largest parties having eighty-five of the seats between them, with the larger of the two having forty-four seats and the smaller forty-one. Assume that the other thirty-five seats are divided among thirteen parties, with one having five seats, and three parties each having four, three, two, and one seats. This was Israel in July 1984.

The 1984 election results indicated that the two factors that have polarized the country in the past are still very potent—ethnicity and opinions about the future of the territories held since the 1967 war. The Jewish voters from European background, Ashkenazim, voted heavily for the Labor Alignment, while Sephardic Jews who had immigrated to Israel from Asian or African countries supported the more nationalist and populist Likud. Alignment voters tended to be older, to have more education, and to come from higher social classes; Likud voters were the opposite. Alignment voters were more conciliatory regarding the territories; Likud voters were less so.

Demography and Destiny

Two far-reaching demographic trends continued to play a key role in Israeli politics. Since the mass immigration of the 1950s, the Sephardi population has grown steadily, so that its proportion now surpasses the Ashkenazi. But the electorate—until very recently—had remained Ashkenazi in its majority. In 1984 the number of Ashkenazi voters equalled the number of Sephardi voters. The Sephardim have a higher birth rate, thus a lower median age, and as a result, the number of older Ashkenazim diminished in the electorate. But as this was happening, another no less important development was taking place. A society almost completely composed of immigrants had become largely Israeli born. In 1984, 60 percent of Israel's Jewish population and 40 per-

cent of the electorate had been born in the Holy Land. These developments explain to a large degree where the political system of the country is today and indicate what direction it is likely to take in the future.

The hope of the Alignment in 1984 was that many who had voted for the Likud in 1981 would be disappointed with the government's handling of the economy and the war in Lebanon and so would vote for the opposition. But this did not happen. Few shifted from one part of the spectrum to another. Some Likud supporters voted for Tehiya, the ultra-nationalist group that had been part of the Likud government; a few (1 percent) for Rabbi Meir Kahane's rabid nationalist list; and some went to Ezer Weizman's list, 3 percent.

Table 1
1984 VOTE

	Alignment	Likud	Tehiya	Shinui/ Civil Rights	Religious Parties
By Ethnic Self-Identification:					
Ashkenazi (32%)	64%	10%	6%	8%	11%
Sephardi (40%)	26	62	4	2	6
Neither (30%)	50	35	6	4	5
By Continent of Birth:					
Israeli born; father born in					
Israel (14%)	52	38	5	3	2
Asia/Africa (25%)	26	57	8	2	7
Europe (17%)	57	14	6	12	11
Asia/Africa (22%)	25	63	4	3	6
Europe (23%)	70	11	5	6	8
By Years of Schooling:					
Through eleven years (32%)	40	53	2	1	4
High school (35%)	45	40	6	4	6
College (33%)	50	20	8	10	13
Total	45	38	5	5	8

Note: Sample was a national adult sample of 1,259 Jews, excluding Kibbutz members (3% of population).
Source: Survey by the DAHAF Research Institute, mid-July 1984, for tables 1 and 2.

A small proportion did move from the Likud to the Alignment, but most of these were Ashkenazim. The Alignment was unable to penetrate the rapidly growing Sephardi segment of the electorate. Many Sephardim still perceive the Alignment as the establishment, despite seven years of Likud rule; they continue to rebel against Labor as the party that had been in power when they and their parents arrived in the country as immigrants, and were housed in crowded slumlike quarters while the Ashkenazim appeared to live in comparative luxury.

The New Israel

The paralytic stalemate we saw this summer cannot continue indefinitely. It may be broken by the emergence of "the new Israel"—second and third generation natives who lack strong commitment to the big parties and to past ethnic interactions. Unfortunately, there is the possibility that this group's beliefs might polarize the system even more. About 20 percent of all families are "intermarried" in the sense that one member of the family is of Ashkenazi background and the other of Sephardi; the rate of intermarriage increases about 1 percent a year. Their children are taking the sting out of the ethnic issue.

When Israelis were asked in a July 1984 survey whether they perceived themselves as Ashkenazim or Sephardim, 32 percent of the national sample said Ashkenazi, 40 percent responded Sephardi, and 30 percent answered "neither one." The "neither" response increased as tenure in Israel increased: only a quarter of those respondents born abroad said "neither," compared to a third of native Israelis whose fathers were born abroad and 40 percent of second generation Israelis. With the relative growth of the Israeli-born segment of the population, it is likely that the ethnic link will recede in Israeli society.

In 1984, the "neither" group split 50-35 between the Alignment and the Likud, while Ashkenazim went heavily for the Alignment, and Sephardim just as strongly voted for the Likud (see table 1). Since the Ashkenazim immigrated earlier, it is likely that their children make up a bigger proportion of the "neither" group. Over time, the "neithers" will probably realign the Israeli political system.

Three smaller parties were especially successful among the second and third generation Israelis: Tehiya, which had opposed the Camp David agreements, won five seats; the centrist and dovish Shinui party and the leftist Civil Rights movement won three seats each. Shinui and the Civil Rights movement were very popular among the Ashkenazim. Tehiya drew strength from all of the ethnic groups and from each of the generations. The four religious parties attracted votes from the entire spectrum.

Education affected the fortunes of both big parties. For high school-educated Israeli-born voters of Asian or African fathers, the split between the two big parties was 63 to 27 in favor of the Likud; for those who had a college education, the split was an even 36 to 36.

Influential Interactions

The potential for political change is clearly seen with the confluence of higher education and the emergence of the "new Israel." Support for the Alignment rose, and voting for the Likud fell as the level of education increased. At the elementary school level, the Alignment-Likud split was 37 to 63 (100); at the high school level, 51 to 39 (90); and at the college level, 53 to 31 (84). The share of the two-party vote (the number in parentheses) decreased as the "new Israel" voters moved up the educational ladder. The higher their education level, the more likely they were to vote for smaller parties. This phenomenon holds true for Israel in general, but since this group is growing so quickly, the system is likely to be specially affected by it.

The direction of the flux, however, is harder to predict. Levels of education keep increasing; the proportion of "new Israelis" will grow, barring unforeseen immigration. These patterns would seem to aid the Alignment. On the other hand, the young support the Likud and Tehiya more than they support the

Table 2
FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES, NATIONAL AND BY PARTY

	Percentage of National Total, by Party Affiliation					
	National Total	Alignment	Likud	Tehiya	Shinui/ Civil Rights	Religious Parties
1. There are three long-range solutions for the territories held since the 1967 war. Which one do you agree with most?						
In exchange for peace I would be willing to give up the territories as long as Israel's security interests were provided for	35%	76%	11%	1%	11%	2%
Annexing the territories	23	19	54	12	0	15
Leaving the situation as it is	40	30	53	6	2	8
1a. And, if Israel had to choose between the first two alternatives, which would you choose?						
In exchange for peace, I would be willing to give up the territories as long as Israel's security interests were provided for	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Annexing the territories	54	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
2. In your opinion should Israel make territorial concessions in Judea and Samaria in order to achieve a peace settlement, and if so what is the greatest concession that should be made?						
No territorial concession should be made	42	17	60	10	2	11
A small part of Judea and Samaria should be conceded	22	44	41	3	1	1
Only a part of them should be conceded	22	77	12	1	8	2
Almost all of it should be given up	6	81	7	2	10	0
All of the territories should be returned in exchange for a peace settlement	8	69	11	1	17	2
3. As long as no solution is achieved in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, are you in favor of increasing the civil rights of the residents of the territories, decreasing them, or leaving them as they are today?						
Increasing them, including the right to vote for Israel's Knesset	6	61	19	2	19	2
Increasing them, but not giving them the right to vote	17	55	25	2	11	7
Leaving their rights as they are today	60	45	39	6	3	7
Decreasing their rights	17	25	56	8	1	11

Alignment, Shinui, or the Civil Rights movement.

Issues

No less important, public opinion on foreign and security policy issues are closer to those of the parties of the right (see table 2). Most of the population would like to leave the situation in the occupied West Bank and Gaza territories as it is; about a third favor working out a political solution; and another quarter favor annexation. A question that forces respondents to choose one of two options, however, shows greater support for annexation than for conciliation. A majority of Israelis favor keeping all or part of the territories. Most of the sample wants to preserve the status quo with the Arab inhabitants of the territories; one in six would expand the Arab's civil rights (but deny them the right to vote in Israel's elections), and another one in six wants to limit their civil rights. Attitudes follow party lines; agreement for reducing the civil rights of Arabs is most pronounced among voters of religious parties, while support for an increase—including the right to vote—is strongest in the left-of-center parties (see table 2).

The increasing potential for polarization of the system reveals itself when these attitudes are considered by place of birth. The European-born, followed by their Israeli-born children, are most supportive of a peace settlement based on a territorial compromise. The Asian or African born, followed by their Israeli-born children, are most in favor of annexation. Second and third generation Israelis fall in between; they support a peace settlement less than the Europeans do, but more than the Asian/Africans do. They support annexation less than the Asian/Africans do, but slightly more than the Europeans do. Regarding civil rights for West Bank inhabitants, the second and third generation Israelis support the status quo position less strongly than any other group; they support limiting rights about as strongly as the Asian/Africans do and support expanding rights as rates similar to the Europeans.

As the new generation becomes a bigger fraction of the Israeli electorate and wields commensurate power, it could make the stalemate of 1984 look like the nightmare we now think it was —or like a pleasant dream.

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by Richard Rose

The European Parliamentary Election 1984

Any election in which nearly 200 million people are eligible to vote is bound to pack a punch. In the case of the election of the European Parliament in mid-June, the one-two punch was directed first against the ideal of the European Community, and second against incumbents in the ten national governments that constitute the Community.

The first European parliamentary elections were held in July of 1979, when proponents saw them as a necessary and important first step in creating a supranational government of Europe. Five years later, the dreams of a United States of Europe are no closer to being realized, but this year's vote for members of the 434-seat European Parliament did reveal much about the European mood.

During the spring campaign the parties showed—as they had in the past—that they put their nations first; they sought votes on national, not European, issues. The voice of those who advocate turning the Community's weak confederal institutions into a truly supranational federation was barely heard. The national parties largely ignored such Community-wide matters as Europe's agricultural surplus or trade problems with the rest of the world. Instead, incumbent parties asked for a vote of confidence in their handling of national affairs, and opposition parties asked voters to register a protest against those in charge of their national Parliaments.

Two in five electors registered their views by staying home. The turnout for the European election was 59 percent, down 3 percent from the first European ballot in 1979. Turnout varied enormously between nations, from 92 percent in Belgium to 32 percent in Britain. By the standards of an American presidential election, the European turnout looks good. But by the standards of individual European member countries, it is poor. On average, the turnout was one-quarter less than each country's last national election.

Most of the ten member countries returned unfavorable verdicts on their government's performance. In Britain, the governing Conservative party of Margaret Thatcher saw its vote drop by 1 percent from the last national election, and Labour had its vote rise by nearly 9 percent. In France, there was a swing to the right in protest against a government of the left. President Mitterrand's Socialist party suffered a loss of 16 percent from its winning 1981 vote, and the Communists dropped 5 percent.

In Germany, both governing partners, the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats, saw their share of the vote fall (in the case of the Free Democrats the vote fell below the 5 percent barrier required to win seats in the Bundestag under that country's system of proportional representation.) In Italy both Christian Democratic and Socialist partners in the coalition government suffered a decline in votes. In the smaller European democracies it was normally the center and right-wing parties that saw their vote drop, because those are the governing parties. But in Greece, it was Andreas Papandreou's governing Socialists whose vote fell by 6 percent.

The most reasonable way to interpret the low turnout and the swing against the governing parties is that it was a midterm protest vote. Proponents of the Community would liken the ballot to a midterm congressional election. Critics of the Community would liken it to ten gubernatorial elections, where nothing of national significance was at stake. The latter interpreta-

tion is nearer the mark, for the European parliamentary election was literally about the government of nothing: the Parliament has limited powers, and national governments collectively determine the policies of the European Community.

In most European countries, an unusually large number of voters used the Community ballot to cast votes for minority parties. In Denmark, for example, an ad hoc anti-Community coalition won one-fifth of the vote—a protest directed specifically against the idea of Europe. In most European countries, the Ecology candidates secured a large enough share of the vote to be noteworthy in multi-party systems, reaching 8 percent in Germany and Belgium, and winning seats in the Netherlands as well.

Insofar as the protest vote was an extremist vote, it registered support for the far right, a term that in Europe embraces parties with Fascist inclinations rather than neo-liberal and libertarian ideas as in America. The most striking protest vote occurred in France, where 11 percent supported the National Front led by Jean-Marie Le Pen's anti-immigrant law and order party. Le Pen admits that his views are controversial. "They call me the beast," he says. But he denies that his views are fascistic. "I say out loud all the things that most people think but dare not say."

More than a generation after the Second World War and the start of the cold war, terms like Communist and Fascist have less clear-cut meaning. In France the Communist vote dropped because the party was in office under Socialist party leadership. In Italy, the Communist vote rose to edge out the Christian Democrats by 99,000 in a vote of 34 million, but it was support for a Euro-Communist movement, not a hardline Moscow policy.

From the perspective of the leaders of Europe's major nations, it was fortunate that the European election came after the London summit meeting of the free world's leaders. Had it come before, it would have put a cloud over the authority of each of the four European prime ministers represented there. Now it represents a warning to national leaders that the price of leading a free nation is that the electorate can turn you out of office.

Within the ten member nations of the European Community, the low turnout means that national governments need pay even less attention than heretofore to a Parliament nominally meant to represent the people of Europe. But the lack of confidence in governing parties means that in European Community meetings each government's representatives are likely to pay more attention to national interests. The net result is that, instead of the European Parliament at Strasbourg speeding countries along the highway to a supranational integration, for the next five years we will hear a great grinding of gears and collisions as the drivers of ten national governments race each other to win the biggest national benefits from supranational institutions.

Forty years after D-Day, most voters and most parties put national interests first in the Community meetings. General de Gaulle's vision of France reborn has been matched by leaders elsewhere. In place of a Europe forming one community of people and parties, we see a Gaullist *Europe des patries.*

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Table 1
VOTING IN THE 1984 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION

	Turnout	Socialist	Communist	Christian	Center-Right	Other	
Big Four (81 seats each)							
UK	32%	35%	—	—	38% + 18%	8%	(.5% Ecology)
France	57	21	11%	—	43	25	(11% National Front, 3% Ecology)
Germany	57	37	—	46%	4.8	12	(8% Ecology)
Italy	84	11 + 4	33	33	9	10	
Little Six (6 to 25 seats)							
Belgium	92	30	—	27	18	25	(9% Flemish Nationals, 8% Ecology)
Denmark	52	19	9	—	21 + 12	39	(20% Anti-EEC)
Greece	77	42	12 + 3	—	38	5	
Ireland	48	8	—	—	39 F. Fail 32 F. Gael	21	
Luxembourg	87	30	4	35	21	10	(6% Ecology)
Netherlands	51	34	—	30 + 5	21	10	(6% Ecology)
Total = 434		Seats = 130	42	109	110	43	(11% Ecology, 16% Far Right)

Source: European Parliament Office data.